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In recent years, many behavioural scientists have come to
see imitation as an important manifestation of intelligence
in nonhuman species. This is a remarkable sea change in at-
titude, because less than a generation ago imitation was re-
garded as more of a nuisance. True intelligence, it used to
be thought, is indicated by insight. The “cheap trick” of im-
itating allowed nonhuman species to simulate intellectual
capacities they did not have. Even now, this remains the lay
view: imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but it
is not a sign of intelligence. (A tradition of distinguishing
certain kinds of imitation as cognitively complex can be
traced back to the last century, as we note in sect. 1.1, so 
the sea change is in some ways more of a renaissance.) Im-
itation’s recent promotion to the status of an intellectual as-
set in cognitive science has been accompanied by a wealth
of evidence that many nonhuman species are unable to
learn by imitating the actions they see others perform,
whereas even newborn humans are now reported to show
imitation. A generation ago, behavioural scientists (as lay-
men do even today) routinely explained the spread of novel
habits among nonhuman species as the result of imitation,
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but any scientific report of nonhuman imitation now at-
tracts the closest scrutiny. Most reports can indeed be sat-
isfactorily accounted for by simpler mechanisms of learn-
ing (“simpler” in the sense of Lloyd Morgan’s scale of
complexity, and in involving only mechanisms already
thought to be necessary to account for other data). All these
simpler mechanisms depend at root on the behaviourist no-
tion of associative conditioning.
We do not question the essential rightness of these
changes, but we believe they have not yet led to a good un-
derstanding of what the process of imitation involves, and
what imitation might be useful for in the lives of other
species. In discarding the murky bathwaters of loose defi-
nitions and weak scientific control, the baby may have been
temporarily lost as well.
In this target article, we review briefly the theoretical ap-
paratus that has been found useful in explaining how non-
human species can seem to learn by imitating when they are
not. Definitions of “true” imitation abound already, but
none are universally accepted. Given this state of affairs, we
have concentrated on the empirical data that researchers
accept (or would accept) as conclusive evidence of imita-
tion, irrespective of how they define imitation. We single
out one of the currently favoured diagnostic tests of imita-
tion, the bidirectional control procedure, which incorrectly
identifies imitation on the basis of behaviour that can be ex-
plained more simply in other ways. Using priming, a com-
mon explanatory concept in cognitive psychology, we show
that a single mechanism can account effectively for most
cases of animal social learning with no need for any “special
purpose” explanations. Novelty will prove to be a cardinal
requirement of imitation.
With this background, we attempt to develop an approach
that can describe the richness of imitative behaviour in hu-
mans and some of the great apes. Our aim is to go beyond
the question “Is it imitation, or not?” to ask instead “What
sort of imitation is it, and why is it used?” Examples of be-
haviour observed in gorillas and orangutans substantiate our
view. These examples are not intended to “prove” that the
apes can imitate; that vexed question has been discussed in
the original publications and is not the central issue here. In-
stead, we develop a new way of looking at imitation, arguing
that rather than being a distinct “special faculty,” it is one of
a range of cognitive mechanisms for manipulating hierar-
chical representations of behaviour. This calls into question
the widespread current use of “simple” actions to test for im-
itative ability experimentally. The adaptive role of imitation
may be to help acquire complex, novel behaviour; it may be
inappropriate in other situations. Our interpretation has im-
plications not only for animal behaviour and developmental
psychology, but for evolutionary aspects of anthropology and
neuropsychology. If our approach has merit, it should serve
to draw theory in all these areas closer to those of cognitive
developmental psychology and artificial intelligence.
1. Nonimitative learning resembling imitation
1.1. Sorting wheat from chaff. The idea that there is a
“scale” of imitative faculties that vary in complexity has ex-
isted since the times of Romanes (1884; 1889). The stan-
dard belief is that the highest levels of perfection of the im-
itative faculty are achieved in humans, but that rudimentary
forms occur in other species. Various terms have been pro-
posed to capture the difference between this highest level
imitation and the simpler processes that generate behav-
iour merely simulating it. These include “reflective imita-
tion” (vs. instinctive imitation, Morgan 1900); “imitation”
(vs. pseudo- or semi-imitative phenomena, Thorndike
1898); “sensorimotor stage 6 imitation” (vs. stages 1 – 5 im-
itation, Piaget 1945/1962); “true imitation” (vs. local en-
hancement, Thorpe 1956), “level 4 imitation” (vs. levels 1
– 3, Mitchell 1987); “observational learning” (vs. other so-
cial learning processes, Galef 1988); “impersonation” (vs.
emulation, Tomasello 1990, citing Wood 1989). [See also
Tomasello et al.: “Cultural Learning” BBS 16(3) 1993.]
A host of definitions and criteria have been proposed to
sort out the “wheat” of evidence for the special faculty of im-
itation, from the “chaff” of material that can be explained by
other, simpler processes; these have been extensively re-
viewed and discussed (e.g., Galef 1988; Moore 1992;
Tomasello et al. 1987; Visalberghi & Fragaszy 1990; Whiten
& Ham 1992). This approach, of sorting out wheat from
chaff, derives from scholars working in the tradition of com-
parative psychology, especially animal learning theory, who
originally took on the task of assessing the capacity for imi-
tation in all nonhuman species. All the resulting definitions
of imitation, of which Thorndike’s classic “learning to do an
act from seeing it done” (1898, p. 50) is perhaps as good as
any, are therefore “threshold” definitions that establish only
minimal criteria for imitation and thereby portray imitation
as a single capacity. None of these comparative definitions
address the possibility that, even for imitation in the strong
sense of the term, there may exist multiple forms, nor do
they aid dissection of what is cognitively involved in imita-
tion. This has been less uniformly true of cognitive-devel-
opmental approaches to imitation (e.g., Mitchell 1987; Pi-
aget 1945/1962). But although scholars working within this
latter tradition have applied their models of cognition to
nonhuman primates for the last 20 years, they have only re-
cently begun to consider cognitive processes operating be-
yond sensory-motor levels. It is perhaps no coincidence that
our own backgrounds are in cognitive psychology and infor-
mation processing; we aim to show the relevance of models
of higher level cognitive processes to nonhuman imitation.
Our primary objectives in this article are (1) to set up a
heuristic distinction between two different kinds of imita-
tion: copying the organisational structure of behaviour ver-
sus copying the surface form of behaviour; and (2) to argue
that at least the first of these, program level imitation, de-
pends on the organism having the ability to build hierar-
chical structures of actions, an ability with more general
consequences.
We must first follow a more traditional line, however, to
set aside the phenomena that we do not wish to discuss from
the cases of significance where something new about be-
haviour is acquired by seeing another individual do it. To do
this, we must undertake a discussion of the other mental
processes that can generate copies of demonstrated actions.
Extensive mulling over the issue of imitation has generated
a long list of hypothetical mental processes that can, inde-
pendently or in combination, generate copies of demon-
strated actions. As the list has lengthened, many attempts
have been made to categorize the different possibilities into
a systematic and meaningful psychological framework and
to standardize terminology (e.g., Galef 1988; Heyes 1993;
Whiten & Ham 1992). To our minds, none of the existing
classification systems offers a package that clarifies all the
important psychological distinctions, or leads to an under-
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standing of how, given the processes that have been identi-
fied, genuinely imitative behaviour can best be identified.
Terminological proliferation suggests that several distinct
processes are involved in producing “pseudo-imitation,”
but we argue that a single process will suffice for most of
them. We now offer our own attempt to impose order on
the plethora of processes proposed, and on this basis iden-
tify phenomena that do not qualify as imitation.
1.2. Stimulus enhancement. The great majority of obser-
vations that suggest nonhuman imitation are vulnerable to
reinterpretation as stimulus enhancement coupled with
individual learning (Spence 1937; “local enhancement,”
Thorpe 1956). Stimulus enhancement is the tendency to pay
attention to, or aim responses towards, a particular place or
objects in the environment after observing a conspecific’s
actions at that place or in conjunction with those objects. (In
the most powerful formulation, this tendency would be spe-
cific to cases where the conspecific is obtaining valued
rewards by its actions; see Byrne 1994.) The result of this
narrowing of behavioural focus is that the individual’s sub-
sequent behaviour becomes concentrated on these key vari-
ables. Naturally, this increases the chance that the animal
will learn to gain the reward it has seen its conspecific ob-
tain, often by performing the same actions, whereas an in-
dividual on its own would seldom do so. However, the mech-
anism that generates this apparent copy is the conventional
one of individual trial-and-error learning. Observation of
the conspecific’s pattern of behaviour is not causal to chang-
ing the observer’s pattern of behaviour. Here we agree with
others in the field, that copying that can be explained in
terms of stimulus enhancement coupled with individual
learning does not qualify as an instance of imitation.
Stimulus enhancement, however, can be subsumed un-
der a class of mechanism very general in cognitive psychol-
ogy. A hypothetical example will serve to explain this idea
(numerous real cases explained as stimulus enhancement
are given in Byrne 1994; Moore 1992; Whiten & Ham 1992;
Zentall & Galef 1988). Suppose a monkey observes another
monkey eating under a coconut tree. Stimulus enhance-
ment focuses the observing monkey’s attention on the large
nuts on the ground under the tree and it begins to experi-
ment with the nuts and discovers how to crack them open,
using actions in its own repertoire. It will consequently
learn more quickly and successfully than if it had come on
the coconut tree alone. It may happen to end up using the
same technique as the other monkey, but not because the
other monkey showed it. In cognitive terms, the social con-
tribution to this learning process can be rather simply de-
scribed as priming: increasing the activation of stored in-
ternal representations that correspond to those particular
environmental stimuli that co-occur with the sight of a con-
specific gaining a reward. The concept of priming assumes
that there exist structures (“records”) in memory that rep-
resent familiar or identifiable items (Baddeley 1990, p.
172). For any recognizable locations or objects, this must
be the case. Identification of these locations or objects, in
the context of a conspecific gaining rewards, increases the
“activation” or “salience” of the corresponding records. The
“primed” records then channel conventional exploratory
behaviour and trial-and-error learning towards the now-
salient objects, often producing the semblance of imitation.
1.3. Emulation. Whereas stimulus enhancement changes
the salience of certain stimuli in the environment, emula-
tion changes the salience of certain goals. In the simplest
formulations (Kohler 1925/1976; Tomasello 1990, citing
Wood 1989; “goal emulation,” Whiten & Ham 1992), the
purpose or the goal towards which the demonstrator is striv-
ing is made overt as a result of its actions, and so becomes
a goal for the observer, too. The observer attempts to “re-
produce the completed goal . . . by whatever means it may
devise” (Tomasello 1990, p. 284). Tomasello et al. (1987)
liken this process to “a variant of the stimulus enhancement
hypothesis” in which the observer learns something about
the environment but nothing about the behaviour of an-
other. How the observer reaches that goal is a matter of in-
dividual learning or prior knowledge, neither of which is di-
rectly influenced by the techniques it has observed.
Nevertheless, the observer working towards this emulated
goal may happen by chance to use the same techniques as
the demonstrator, thereby giving the appearance of imita-
tion. Seeing the actions of the other is not important; what
matters is that the concrete result of them is identified, and
so can be emulated. Again, we agree with others in the field
that such emulation does not qualify as imitation.
In cognitive terms, goal emulation, too, can be described
as a matter of priming (Byrne 1994; 1995a). Whereas stim-
ulus enhancement primes brain records of stimuli, emula-
tion primes brain records of goals. All that is necessary for
this model is that the goals themselves are familiar or iden-
tifiable. Primed, activated goals are addressed before un-
primed ones.
The meaning of “emulation” has recently shifted, how-
ever, to include a wider range of phenomena. This shift in
usage is illustrated in interpretations made of the findings
from three experiments on imitation in chimpanzees and
orangutans. In all three, subjects who observed a demon-
strator raking in out-of-reach food with a rake tool subse-
quently used a similar tool themselves to attain the food, yet
they failed to copy some details of the model’s technique
(Call & Tomasello 1994; Nagell et al. 1993; Tomasello et al.
1987). Tomasello and his colleagues described all these ef-
fects as emulation, arguing that the subjects reproduced the
observed goal and learned about the “affordances” of the
tool, but used idiosyncratic behavioural techniques to attain
it. The affordances of a tool are said to encompass its func-
tion as a tool, the fact that the goal could be obtained with
the tool, or something about the relationship between the
rake and the food (Tomasello et al. 1987; 1993). The mean-
ing of “emulation learning” (Call & Tomasello 1994) has
thus expanded to incorporate observational learning about
the properties of objects and potential relationships among
them. This sort of learning seems to us a cognitively com-
plex phenomenon open to very different interpretations,
and one that may require psychological processes distinct
from those that can account for simple goal emulation. We
return to this issue in section 2.7.
1.4. Response facilitation. In the processes of both stimu-
lus enhancement and goal emulation, the influence of the
conspecific on an observer’s learning is an indirect one. Its
actions direct attention to places and objects, but the ac-
tions themselves are not copied. Indeed, under some cir-
cumstances, the other individual need not even be present
to produce the effects. Simply finding coconuts beneath a
certain tree, cracked open but still containing a little flesh,
may increase the salience of the location and features of co-
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conuts (stimulus enhancement), or stimulate the aim of eat-
ing coconut meat (goal emulation). To discover whether
specific actions have been copied – imitation – many re-
searchers have resorted to an experimental test. An indi-
vidual is given the sight of a conspecific (the demonstrator)
performing an action of a specific type. The subsequent
probability of the test animal performing the same action is
then compared with its original, baseline probability of do-
ing so. Imitation is operationally defined as a significant el-
evation in the frequency of an observed action over the nor-
mal probability of its occurrence. In an improved version of
this method, two groups of test animals are used, each see-
ing the same problem solved by a conspecific but in differ-
ent ways. Then, not only can their baseline frequencies of
performing the actions be compared, but the groups can be
compared with each other in the frequencies of using each
technique (see Galef 1988; 1992; Heyes 1993; Whiten &
Ham 1992). Imitation is then defined as a significant diver-
gence between the groups in the frequencies of using the
two actions, matching the actions observed. In these animal
experiments, the test actions used have always been part of
the existing repertoires of the subjects, actions whose spon-
taneous probability of occurrence is not low.
This experimental technique has also been used exten-
sively in developmental psychology to ask whether very
young humans can imitate (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore 1977;
1983). Typically, one of a set of several different target ges-
tures is repeatedly performed by an adult in front of an in-
fant whose responses are filmed. The crucial test of imitation
is considered to be a selective increase in the frequencies
of matching gestures: for example, significantly more infant
tongue protrusion after adult tongue protrusion than after
adult mouth opening, and vice versa for mouth opening.
Positive results have been confirmed in many laboratories,
and it is now accepted that several different facial gestures
are copied by infants, even when tested only a few hours af-
ter birth. The simple gestures have sometimes been “novel”
ones for the very youngest infants, in the sense that they
have not yet performed them, unlike the case in the animal
work. Nevertheless, the spontaneous probability of these
actions occurring is not low, so the actions are evidently in
the (as yet unexpressed) repertoire of the neonate. The re-
searchers probably have little choice in this, because the
neonate or weeks-old babies used in the experiments lack
the ability to copy a wide range of gestures.
There is now a mutually supportive consensus among
many developmental and comparative psychologists that
this sort of experimental paradigm is conclusive evidence of
imitation. By this criterion, the ability to imitate has now
been detected in a few species of animal (e.g., budgerigars,
Dawson & Foss 1965 and Galef et al. 1986; rats, Heyes &
Dawson 1990 and Heyes et al. 1992; chimpanzees, Whiten
et al. 1996), and in near-helpless neonatal human babies.
However, we dispute that any of these experiments, using
either animal or human subjects, provide evidence of imi-
tation. In the case of animal data, we again propose prim-
ing as the explanation.
If the salience of stimuli can be increased and goals can
be highlighted, by observation of a conspecific’s actions,
then surely an individual’s responses might also be facili-
tated by what it sees. In cognitive terms, just as brain
records of stimuli and goals may be primed or activated by
the observation of others, so those of responses might also
be primed, making them more likely to occur (Byrne 1994;
1995a). If an individual were to see another gaining a re-
ward while performing a response that physically resem-
bled one in its own repertoire, then the corresponding brain
record would be primed and a matching response made
more likely in its own subsequent behaviour. As before, all
that is required is the existence of structures in memory
corresponding to the facilitated actions, which has to be the
case for actions in the existing repertoire. Like stimulus en-
hancement and goal emulation, this simple phenomenon of
“response facilitation” would simulate imitation under
some circumstances (Byrne 1994). It is important to distin-
ugish this theoretical proposal from two different phenom-
ena. In “contagion” (Thorpe 1956), actions that an individ-
ual sees performed by another may trigger the same actions
in the observer, as in contagious yawning. But here the link-
age is innate and involuntary, whereas in response facilita-
tion the effect has the potential to occur with any action in
the individual’s repertoire, voluntary as well as involuntary,
provided the individual’s perceptual system registers the
physical resemblance. In “social facilitation” (e.g., Bandura
1986; Galef 1988), the motivational homogeneity among a
group of individuals is increased and they may tend there-
fore to perform the same behaviours at the same time, but
no specific performance of a motor act is influenced, as
happens in response facilitation.
Any experiment that uses changes in the relative fre-
quencies of actions already present in the individual’s
repertoire as evidence of imitation is potentially vulnerable
to reinterpretation as response facilitation (Byrne 1994;
Byrne & Tomasello 1995). Of course, if an action appears
radically different in form when viewed from the perspec-
tive of demonstrator versus performer, or is invisible to its
performer as in the case of the tongue-protrusion used in
neonatal human work, this criticism has no weight. Priming
can only apply once the identity is registered, and the very
means of recognition is what requires explanation in neona-
tal imitation. (It remains possible that contagion could ac-
count for babies’ matching of maternal gestures, because
only a few gestures are involved [Anisfeld 1991]; close be-
havioural matching between mother and infant is poten-
tially beneficial for the relationship, so the evolution of in-
nate linkages for a few discrete actions is not implausible.)
In contrast, the animal work has employed responses that
look essentially the same to the test animal when performed
by the animal itself or another. We believe that this sort of
experiment, which relies on existing responses, is in princi-
ple insufficient for any convincing demonstration of imita-
tion in animals or humans (see Byrne & Tomasello 1995, for
a detailed critique of one claim to the contrary).
1.5. Implications of priming. We would thus unify three
apparently different phenomena and explain them all by a
single theoretical mechanism, one already found to have ex-
planatory power in cognitive psychology where it is exten-
sively used. In contrast to the several supposed mechanisms
that are sometimes invoked to explain behaviour mimick-
ing imitation (and some behaviour claimed to be imitation),
we propose a single mechanism of extreme simplicity, thus
reducing the amount of “special purpose” theory needed to
understand behaviour. When this mechanism, observa-
tional priming, operates on records of stimuli in the imme-
diate environment, responses in the individual’s repertoire
and goals it might choose, the result can indeed look very
much like imitation (as discussed in Byrne 1994).
Byrne & Russon: Learning by imitation
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Priming can never produce an entirely new behaviour, or
an entirely novel arrangement of “old” behaviours. Novel
behaviour can only arise from other processes, possibly en-
hanced by priming: individual trial-and-error learning, in-
sightful planning and thought, or imitation. Novel behav-
iour that arises from trial and error will have a characteristic
signature in the history of reinforcement. Novel behaviour
might arise from insightful planning and thought, but we
take this to be an even less parsimonious explanation than
imitation where the latter is also possible, as in all cases dis-
cussed in this target article. We argue, therefore, that nov-
elty of behaviour is an essential part of any proper defini-
tion of animal imitation. In many past definitions the
acquisition of new behaviour was not stressed or was seen
as only one aspect of imitation, such as Thorpe’s “copying
of a novel or otherwise improbable act” (Thorpe 1956). We
support Zentall’s firm ruling that to be sure of imitation, the
act should not already be part of the animal’s repertoire,
whether improbable or not (Zentall 1996). Humans, as we
know from conscious experience, sometimes imitate ac-
tions that they can perform already; but if this were shown
by animals, other explanations for their behaviour would al-
ways remain possible.
2. Imitation by animals
Turning now to manifestations of social learning that appear
to be cognitively more complex and not explicable on a sim-
ple priming and trial-and-error model, we will first consider
how animal behaviour should be properly described. We ar-
gue that, at least for certain species of animal, behaviour is
hierarchical – at levels that allow functional control by the
individual, not merely in the underlying organisation of
units to which the individual has no access and no possibil-
ity of control. For these species, it is a real issue to deter-
mine at which level or levels in the hierarchy of behaviour
imitation would take place, if it were to occur. The case that
some animals can control the hierarchical organisation of
their behaviour will be made with data from the routine
food-preparation activities of mountain gorillas, engaged in
their daily activity of eating plants. We aim to establish that
great apes have the ability to imitate behaviour at an or-
ganisational level of description, the “program level.” We
then go on to use behavioural records of orangutans en-
gaged in attempts to copy the actions of human caretakers,
to dissect program level imitation into its components, most
crucially the observational learning of how to manipulate
object-object relationships. Finally, we apply these ideas to
a better interpretation of some existing data from chim-
panzees. It is not our primary aim to attempt to convince
sceptics that great apes can imitate. Although we do con-
sider this to be the most parsimonious interpretation of cur-
rent evidence (and we both made that argument in the orig-
inal data papers), here our intention is to propose and
defend a new interpretation of how imitation works and
what it is for. We suggest that imitation, in the sense of ac-
quiring skills by observation, can best be recognized by its
organisational structure, that its biological function is to al-
low observation to be used (in conjunction with other meth-
ods) to facilitate the building up of novel, complex, hierar-
chical organisations of simpler units of behaviour, and that,
in principle, only species with control over the hierarchical
organisation of their behaviour can imitate in this way.
2.1. Hierarchical organisation of behaviour. It has long
been hypothesized that behaviour is hierarchical in organi-
sation. Lashley (1951) argued that the linear serial order of
actions concealed an underlying hierarchical structure, and
this structure rendered stimulus-response models inade-
quate; the issue for Lashley was hierarchical structure that
is under some voluntary control. More recently, Dawkins
(1976) proposed hierarchical organisation as pivotal to un-
derstanding the evolution of behaviour, arguing by analogy
with many other cases in developmental and neural biology,
which had already been found to be hierarchical, and on
grounds of efficiency. He showed that hierarchical organi-
sations of control are easier than linear ones to repair when
they fail, allow the economy of multiple access to common
subroutines, and combine efficient local action at low hier-
archical levels while maintaining the guidance of an overall
structure. In human behaviour, hierarchical structuring has
long been argued to be essential for many acquired skills,
such as language, problem solving, and everyday planning
(Byrne 1977; Chomsky 1957; Miller et al. 1960; Newell et
al. 1958; Newell & Simon 1972). In addition, theories of cog-
nitive and linguistic development argue that age-related
increases in cognitive and linguistic complexity are the prod-
ucts of hierarchical mental construction processes (Case
1985; Gibson 1990; 1993; Greenfield 1991; Langer 1993).
The proposal that behaviour is hierarchical may apply in
at least three ways. First, evolution may tend to favour hi-
erarchical structuring, as Dawkins (1976) has argued, in be-
haviours whose execution is under tight genetic guidance.
Second, automatic processes of learning may organize
groups of behaviours, learned singly and linearly, into hier-
archical structures. In animal learning theory the possibility
of “second-order” or hierarchical association has sometimes
been proposed, for example, between a discriminative stim-
ulus and a response-reinforcer relationship (Rescorla
1991). Even this limited amount of hierarchical organisa-
tion is not fully accepted, however (Mackintosh 1994). In
neither of these first two cases does the individual organism
have voluntary access to, or control over, the hierarchical
structure; the structures are simply induced and triggered
by constellations of stimuli.
We wish to consider a third and more radical possibility
(already entertained by Lashley 1951), that individuals of
some species of animal have access to the hierarchical
structure of their own behaviour, and control over its or-
ganisation, just as humans show in planning or problem-
solving. In distinguishing this case from the first two, the
crucial issue is whether behaviour is controlled by an elab-
orate but modifiable structure of goals and subgoals. If so,
then the interesting question for imitation becomes the ex-
tent to which individuals can and do imitate this organisa-
tion of behaviour, rather than the old issue of whether they
can imitate a particular action. The answer to this new ques-
tion impacts on the nature of intelligence in spontaneous
behaviour. We would be reluctant to describe as intelligent
any sequence of behaviour whose mental organisation is a
single unit of action connected to a goal-representation, a
long sequence of linear associative connections, or a rigid
hierarchical structure. Thus, whether a behavioural struc-
ture is modifiable by the individual becomes crucial in di-
agnosing it as “intelligent.”
We now turn to two “case studies” on gorillas and orang-
utans that we think point to Lashley’s proposal as applying
in this most radical form, at least in the great apes.
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2.2. Case study: Hierarchical order in mountain gorilla
food preparation. Gorillas inhabit rainforests over a wide
area of west and central Africa. As in other great apes, ripe,
fleshy fruit forms a major portion of their diet, and as with
other apes eating fleshy fruit, their eating techniques are
typically not subtle or complex. However, gorillas have also
colonized a quite different habitat, and one small popula-
tion inhabits the subalpine moss forest and temperate
meadows of volcanoes in Rwanda, Zaire, and Uganda. In
these habitats, there is almost no fleshy fruit, and these
mountain gorillas feed instead on the leaves and pithy stems
of herbaceous plants (Watts 1984). This diet is nutritionally
superior to relying on ripe fruit, as it is rich in protein and
trace elements (Waterman et al. 1983). This largely obviates
the need for the supplementation with animal and fungal
matter seen in lowland gorillas, orangutans, and chim-
panzees. However, the favoured leaves and stems are pro-
tected by physical defences like spines or stings, or encased
in hard and indigestible material. The only other mammals
that regularly eat these plants are ungulates, which have
stomachs that are either specialized or very large, in both
cases allowing bacterial digestion of plant matter. Gorillas,
like other great apes and humans, have simple stomachs.
Gorillas cope with the problems in quite a different way, us-
ing manual skill (Byrne & Byrne 1991; 1993).
In describing gorilla feeding, we will concentrate on just
two plants, nettle Laportea alatipes, covered in painful
stings, and bedstraw Galium ruwenzoriense, covered in tiny
hooks that enable the plant to clamber. The gorillas’ tech-
niques for preparing nettle and bedstraw to eat appear to
be adjusted to minimize the unpleasantness caused by
these physical problems. For nettle, their technique effec-
tively removes the worst stings, those found on the main
stem and leaf petiole, and enfolds others on the leaf mar-
gins. A flowchart representation of the process (Figure 1A)
emphasizes the need for bimanual coordination, as well as
the overall complexity. After pulling a plant into range, one
hand is formed into a cone shape, cupping the base of the
stem, and swept upward, stripping a whorl of leaves from
the stem. This process may be repeated, while holding the
already-stripped whorl(s) with the lower fingers as another
whorl is obtained, until a good handful is ready. Then, the
leaf blades are firmly gripped, and with the other hand the
petioles are grasped; the two hands are twisted or rocked
against each other, detaching the petioles, which are dis-
carded.
As an alternative to simply repeating the process of strip-
ping, the whole of the first few stages may be iterated, again
holding the bundle(s) of prepared leaf blades with the lower
fingers while another bundle is added, until a good handful
is ready. If there is any dry or otherwise inedible debris, it
is then picked out from the mass of leaf blades held in the
half-open hand. Next, the handful of leaf blades is partially
pulled out from the closed hand, folded over the thumb,
and grasped again, forming a “sandwich,” with the power-
ful stings of the leaf margin enclosed within a parcel that
presents to the outside only the less sting-infested under-
surface of the leaf. This parcel is then popped through the
sensitive lips, without contacting them. By this means, all
major areas of stings are removed or enfolded, and a sub-
stantial handful of nutritious leaves is eaten at once.
The technique for processing galium (Figure 1B) is sim-
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Figure 1. Gorilla plant preparation. Flow-chart representations of the data on processing sequences seen in a gorilla eating (A) nettle
Laportea alatipes and (B) galium Galium ruwenzoriense. Where the logical structure is asymmetric, the mirror form will also occur; the
form shown is for a left-handed individual. As is conventional with flow-chart representation, the sequence of actions – which begins
here when the gorilla finds a food plant to eat – starts at the top and moves down. Rectangular boxes show actions, described by the
words in them; parentheses indicate actions that are optional, depending on environmental conditions. Dotted lines indicate bilateral
coordination between the separate actions of the two hands. Boxes are arranged to the left and right of the midline to indicate signifi-
cant lateralities in the hand used (actions with nonsignificant laterality are represented on the midline). Diamonds represent branch
points in the process, with the approximate criteria for the decision indicated in words in the diamond: A process may repeat or iterate
until the criterion is reached. The sequence ends with putting processed food in the mouth.
ilarly complicated, but has different functions. Here, the
problem is that tiny hooks on trailing stems would tend to
catch on throat and mouth surfaces, making eating ineffi-
cient and causing a risk of choking. The gorillas’ technique
works here by compressing a bundle of stems to eat with
slicing bites, so that the tiny hooks cannot attach to the in-
terior of the mouth. Once a mass of bedstraw is hauled into
range, tender green stems are picked out, the picked
stem(s) being repeatedly held with the lower fingers while
others are added, until an adequate mass is built up. Loose
stems are folded into the bundle, both during and after this
iterative accumulation, either using the other hand or – if
the gorilla is in a tree and that hand is already being used to
hold on – by rocking the hand back and forth, grasping and
regrasping the stems that gravity causes to fold. Like nettle,
bedstraw often includes dead leaves and other debris that
must be removed before ingestion; and where this is the
case the actions of removing these inedible items are iden-
tical in both techniques. The manner of ingestion, however,
is quite different: the bundle is rolled against the chin or
hard palate to compress it, then sliced with shearing bites
of the molars, rather like chopping herbs on a board.
Because these techniques are found only in a small pop-
ulation of gorillas, and indeed are valueless outside the very
limited altitudinal zones in which temperate plants like net-
tle and bedstraw grow in Africa, there is no serious doubt
that they are learned. But is their structure the sort of thing
that an associative mental process could produce, or are
there signs of complex hierarchical organisation under vol-
untary control? No field experiments have been, or could
be, carried out on the members of this highly endangered
subspecies of gorilla. Fortunately, however, food prepara-
tion is not a rare activity, and the data from hundreds of
hours of focal-individual observation are available to help
us understand the structure of the techniques.
For a start, we know that at the most detailed level of de-
scription of manual actions, each gorilla uses several vari-
ants of each behavioural element in the process (Byrne &
Byrne 1993). These variants apparently have no functional
significance – each works just as well, and the variant cho-
sen is most likely partly determined by the environment,
the plant itself – just the sort of low-level, local decision
making that Dawkins (1976) pointed out as an advantage of
hierarchical structure. An associative, probabilistic process
may well be an adequate representation of this process of
selection. (However, a choice hierarchy cannot be ruled
out; see Dawkins 1976 for the criteria that enable a choice
hierarchy to be distinguished from a Markov model.)
Turning next to the processes’ structural organisation,
does this show any clearer signs of hierarchical structure of
the sort that the individuals can control voluntarily? The
strongest evidence that it does is given by the animals’ abil-
ity to iterate parts of each process, as already noted. Miller
et al. (1960) first pointed out the importance of iteration un-
til some predefined criterion was reached, a test-operate-
test-exit loop. A loop is not a hierarchical structure, but it
betrays the presence of a subroutine that can be iterated.
Figure 2 uses this evidence to show the hierarchy that is im-
plied for processing nettle. The presence of optional pro-
cesses (those shown in parentheses in the flow chart of 
Figure 1) serves both to parse the string into definite com-
ponents, and to show that a linear chain would be an insuf-
ficient description, because one link in a chain cannot be
“dropped” without losing the place in the sequence alto-
gether. The tree structure of Figure 2 displays the minimum
necessary complexity that is implied by the observed pres-
ence of loops and optional processes. In reality, there may
well be further hierarchical organisation accessible to mod-
ification in some of the “single act” stages, but we have no
evidence for this at present.
In linguistics, rewrite rules are often used as a compact
way of representing the branching tree structure that logi-
cally results from a goal hierarchy, and the nettle technique
can easily be represented as a phrase-structure grammar of
goal and subgoals:
nettle j find 1 collect 1 (clean) 1 fold
collect j strip 1 tearoff 1 (collect)
strip j strip 1 (strip)
When a goal hierarchy of this nature is expanded, the sys-
tem must somehow keep track of where the process has got
to; this requires a working memory. As the problem is “un-
packed” into component subgoals, the system needs to be
able to retrace up the hierarchy, after dealing with one sub-
goal, to proceed with subsequent ones; some memory has
to keep track of where to return to. In a computer, this is
often done with a push-down stack. As the search delves
deeper into the branching structure, subgoals are added to
the top of the stack. When one goal is satisfied (popped off
the stack), the next is automatically available (pops up). The
size of the heap on the stack varies with the depth of un-
packing. In a real system, such as the mind of a gorilla or a
human, short-term memory capacity might set a limit on
how deep a hierarchy it could expand without getting into
a muddle.
With a physical task, as opposed to that of constructing a
sentence, the “external memory” of the current state of a
problem may relax this capacity constraint on working
memory, and for gorilla feeding, the state of a part-
processed handful is continuously in view. This makes a
production system, in which productions are selected suc-
cessively by the current state of the problem, a particularly
appropriate representation of this sort of behaviour (see
Fig. 4, and Byrne 1995b). By definition, a linear, chain-like
process has no equivalent mechanism for jumping from one
Byrne & Russon: Learning by imitation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:5 673
Figure 2. Goal hierarchy for nettle. The hypothetical program
of minimum hierarchical complexity needed to produce the actual
behaviour observed in a mountain gorilla preparing nettle leaves
to eat. The “top goal” is placed at the top of the figure, indicating
its control of the goals below it, and this may occur recursively, in-
creasing hierarchy “depth.”
point to another. If a routine were shared between two
food-processing sequences – as is the case in gorilla feed-
ing for the delicate operations involved in cleaning out de-
bris from leaf bundles during preparation of nettle or bed-
straw – confusion must be expected (see Fig. 3). Were such
a chain-like model to be correct, errors should sometimes
occur, of a distinctive sort: for example, suddenly treating a
bundle of nettle leaf blades as if they were bedstraw stems,
and rolling the bundle against the chin. Nothing of the sort
occurs. The processes of mountain gorilla food preparation
are simply not well described as linear and chainlike: their
organisation is hierarchical.
“Hierarchical organisation” should not be taken to imply
one in which control is always imposed “top-down.” As
noted above, it is likely that many decisions about manual
actions are local ones, dependent on the precise detail of
plants encountered. All we mean is that the organisation of
goals and subgoals is hierarchical; the subprocess working
towards each subgoal may well have considerable auton-
omy, so there may be periods of “heterarchical” control.
Nor do we suggest that the hierarchical organisation of
skilled manual actions by gorillas is in all ways similar to hu-
man action in skilled manual tasks. For example, there may
be a quantitative difference in depth of hierarchical expan-
sion. Gorilla food preparation appears organized into shal-
low hierarchies, and perhaps gorillas can only keep track of
two embedded goals even with the aid of the “external
memory” present in physical tasks.
Finally, we would emphasize that we do not suggest that
gorillas’ organisation of behaviour is inflexible in structure,
like some conventional computer programs. The evidence
that we have used, to show that gorillas have functional con-
trol over hierarchical structures of actions, shows that such
rigidity is unlikely. Representation of their techniques as
production systems captures this sensitivity nicely: if a stage
is unnecessary, the corresponding subprocess is never
evoked (see Fig. 4).
2.3. Hierarchical levels of imitation. Having illustrated the
hierarchical nature of gorilla techniques of plant feeding,
we turn to the implications for imitation. How might the
complex techniques used by mountain gorillas be acquired?
There seems little doubt that learning what to eat is
straightforward for infant gorillas, because they are show-
ered with food remains by the mother from the first day of
life. In addition, the priming effect of stimulus enhance-
ment would tend to focus a young gorilla’s attention on the
growing plant as a potential object to investigate. The in-
teresting question becomes, how does a gorilla first acquire
the elaborate sequence of coordinated actions that con-
verts, say, nettle plants to edible mouthfuls? The answer
must be consistent with two facts. After 3 years of age, the
age of weaning, there is no further change in efficiency as
measured by time to prepare a handful of food (Byrne &
Byrne 1991): techniques are learned quickly. Second, for an
infant mountain gorilla the only potential direct social in-
fluences on feeding are the mother, whom an infant usually
accompanies when foraging, and the silverback leader
male. Other individuals are intolerant of the presence of
nearby conspecifics when feeding, and the dense herb veg-
etation means that animals are out of sight when only a few
metres apart.
Unlike the imitative behaviours usually studied by com-
parative psychologists, learning a new gorilla feeding tech-
nique is not a matter of adding a unitary action to a limited
repertoire. Instead, many acts must be built up into one
particular logical structure, out of a vast range of potential
structures (the term “structure” is used to include sequen-
tial regularity, bimanual coordination, and the organisation
of subroutines). The novelty lies in the arrangement, and
the skill is to arrange some basic repertoire of actions into
novel and complex patterns rather than to learn new basic
actions. The lowest level in the hierarchy would consist of
the smallest possible elements of action that can be inde-
pendently controlled by the individual. In a great ape, ex-
tensive neural representation of the hands allows rather
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Figure 3. Linear models of feeding technique. Hypothetical lin-
ear chains of action generators (partly overlapping) that might be
proposed to account for sequential regularity in gorilla preparation
of nettle and galium (see text).
Figure 4. Production system for galium. A P-S model that is con-
sistent with the hierarchical structure of behaviour observed when
gorillas prepare handfuls of galium to eat.
precise control, and this set of basic elements may be very
large. Integrated groups of these basic elements, assembled
together during the animal’s interactions with the world,
form higher-level units of behaviour, and this process of hi-
erarchical grouping can continue to arbitrary complexity,
though in practice it may be limited by the available men-
tal capacity. The repertoire of the individual therefore con-
sists of all the lowest-level elements plus the already-as-
sembled, higher-level groups of elements, because each of
these behavioural complexes functions as a single unit once
it has been learned. Novelty is found in those patterns of
behavioural units (including basic elements and already-
integrated groups of elements) that are assembled for the
first time. In linguistics, it is common for the multiple lev-
els of patterning in speech – distinctive features, phonemes,
morphemes, words, sentences – to enable a discrete, and
indeed quite small, set of features in speech to encode an
almost infinite range of utterances. The mechanism of this
“productivity” in speech lies in the hierarchical structuring
of groups of elements, in novel orderings and circum-
stances. Following Lashley (1951), we suggest that the
same applies to skilled action.
In a hierarchical system, the way in which the process of
learning new skills can be aided by imitation similarly be-
comes a less straightforward matter. With hierarchically
structured behaviour, there exists a range of possibilities for
how imitation might take place, beyond the simple di-
chotomy of “imitation” versus “no imitation.” Imitation al-
lows the assembly of novel sequences of units by observa-
tion, but, given the possibility of several degrees of
hierarchical embedding, imitation might occur at many dif-
ferent levels, with radically different consequences for what
we would observe. Table 1 depicts in words a number of
possible levels at which the gorilla skill of processing bed-
straw might be copied. At one extreme, the resulting be-
haviour would be indistinguishable from goal emulation:
bedstraw is chosen as a goal, after watching another indi-
vidual eating it. At the other extreme, comparative psy-
chologists would be confident that imitation, in Tomasello’s
(1990) sense of “impersonation,” was occurring throughout,
because the details of manual style, hand preference, and
idiosyncratic movements would closely match in the be-
haviour of model and observer. The emphasis on rather ex-
act duplication of the detail of behaviour is an inevitable
result of comparative psychologists’ use of simple, nonhier-
archical actions in their experiments (Custance et al. 1995;
Heyes & Dawson 1990; Tomasello et al. 1987; Whiten &
Custance 1996). It is also possible, however, that the over-
all form might be imitated, but the fine detail acquired by
trial and error. This would result in a striking match of be-
haviour at coarse levels of description (i.e., higher hierar-
chical levels), contrasting with nonmatching actions at fine
levels of detail. Or, some subroutines might be imitated
within an overall form that is independently constructed.
Thus, imitation operating at different hierarchical levels
would produce distinctively different patterns of behav-
ioural similarity and difference at different levels of analy-
sis. What pattern do gorillas show?
2.4. Program level and action level imitation. Beginning at
the bottom of the hierarchy, there are two reasons to think
that the precise details of the manual actions and individual
uses are learned without imitation. At a fine-grained level
of description, where each element of behaviour is distin-
guished by an exact hand configuration and movement pat-
tern, each animal was found to have a different preferred
set of functionally equivalent variants (Byrne & Byrne
1993). This striking idiosyncrasy is a hallmark of trial-and-
error acquisition. Moving up to a slightly coarser level, at
which minor style differences are ignored but left- and
right-handed forms remain distinct, the pattern of hand
preferences (which are very strong in every animal) can be
used to trace any copying. Because only the mother or the
male leader are potential models, if this level of detail were
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Table 1. Levels of  imitationa
Impersonation Pick out a strand of green galium from the mass with any precision grip of the left hand and transfer the hold to a
power grip by the other fingers of this hand, then repeat this cycle while still holding the picked strands in a power grip
of the other fingers of the left hand, until the bundle is sufficiently large. Then fold in any loose strands by using the
right hand to bend in any loose strands while loosening and regrasping the mass of stems in the left hand, or, if this is
easier at the time, by letting go with the finger and thumb of the left hand so that the bundle is held only by other fin-
gers, then rocking the hand to allow grasping of both loose and gripped strands by finger and thumb again, then re-
peat this process so that the other fingers grasp the bundle firmly, and repeat the whole cycle until all strands are held.
Then grip the bundle of galium loosely with the left hand half-open, pick out any debris with a pad-to-pad precision
grip of the first finger and thumb of the right hand. Then grip the bundle tightly with the left hand and eat by feed-
ing into the mouth until full, then shear off the rest by a molar bite, repeating when mouth empty again.
Pick out a strand of green galium from the mass, then repeat this while still holding already picked strands until the
bundle is sufficiently large. Then fold in any loose strands with the other hand (or with a rocking motion of the hand
holding the bundle with repeated letting go and regrasping of strands if this is easier at the time). Then grip the bun-
dle of galium loosely with the hand half open, pick out debris with the first finger and thumb of the other hand. Then
grip tightly and eat with shearing bites.
Program level Repeatedly pick green strands of galium with one hand, then use the other hand to fold in loose strands, then hold
the bundle loosely with one hand and remove debris with the other hand, then eat.
Pick a bundle of galium, tidy it up, remove debris from it, then eat.
Goal emulation Eat galium.
aDescribed in words, some hypothetical levels of detail at which galium preparation technique might be represented. Some levels are
identified with the terms that would be used to describe copying at that level.
learned by imitation, hand preferences would strongly tend
to run “in families.” The hand preference of an offspring
would correlate either with that of the mother or that of the
silverback male. In fact, they correlated with neither: their
distribution was just what one would expect by chance
(Byrne & Byrne 1991). At these low levels, there seems to
be no need to invoke imitation as an explanation.
A very different pattern emerges when we move up to
the level of overall form of the process. Once sets of low-
level elements, each member of which achieves the same
function, are lumped into classes, the variability of tech-
nique largely vanishes. At this level, instead of idiosyncrasy,
the sequence of actions is a rather fixed one, and in every
animal, the organisation of each technique is essentially the
same (Byrne & Byrne 1993). Even when treating right- and
left-handed versions of the exact same sequence of acts as
“different,” animals were 70–80% reliant on just one tech-
nique for each species of plant. Given the very large num-
ber of possible sequences in which the 6 – 10 different sub-
processes could be combined, this standardization is
remarkable, and contrasts strikingly with the variability we
found among element repertoires. Of course, many of the
sequences that are theoretically possible do not succeed in
processing the food, but plenty do. Even the very simplest
technique, structurally unrelated to the adult gorilla’s
method (picking off nettle leaves, one by one, and eating
each leaf blade while holding the stalk), allows feeding, al-
beit slowly. Environmental influences can mould regularity
from trial-and-error learning, and some of the more “ab-
surd” sequences of actions could quickly be rejected. It is
highly implausible, however, that the constraints of the en-
vironment would be so tight that every animal would end
up with the same hierarchical structure, yet so weak that the
fine details of the techniques are highly variable between
individuals. It would be convenient if there just happened
to exist, distributed among the gorilla population, two or
more equally efficient techniques for processing a plant; we
could then observe if techniques, unlike laterality and de-
tails of hand configuration, ran in families. However, this
situation is unlikely in any natural ecosystem (in fact, we be-
lieve it to be unknown), and the harsh montane environ-
ment of these gorillas would exact a heavy toll for feeding
inefficiency. As it stands, the sharp difference between in-
dividual variation at one level of organisation and group
consistency at a higher level, in a learned behaviour pattern,
leads us to suggest that gorillas may indeed be able to imi-
tate at intermediate hierarchical levels, effectively copying
structural organisation but not minor details: a kind of ob-
servational learning one of us has described as “program
level imitation” (Byrne 1993; 1994). Learning by individual
experience is not completely disproven by these data, but it
becomes a contrived alternative.
Program level imitation may be defined as copying the
structural organisation of a complex process (including the
sequence of stages, subroutine structure, and bimanual co-
ordination), by observation of the behaviour of another in-
dividual, while furnishing the exact details of actions by in-
dividual learning. We refer to this as the “program” of
behaviour because it makes up a recipe for coordinating
and scheduling acts, and when it is enacted some result is
produced by the individual. Imitation at the program level,
then, would consist of copying a novel arrangement. By ob-
servation of an individual that already possesses a certain
program, the observer, using elements already in its reper-
toire, learns to replicate the sequential regularity and coor-
dination of elements and any subroutines and loops in the
flow of control (Byrne 1994; Byrne & Byrne 1991; 1993).
The process by which program level imitation might be
achieved is not necessarily a mysterious one. In the moun-
tain gorillas’ plant processing techniques, the crucial sub-
goals are visible (by their results) in the sequence of action.
These states necessarily recur in every effective sequence,
whereas the irrelevant details of precisely how each of these
states is achieved will vary between occasions without af-
fecting efficiency (see Fig. 5). Thus, an individual observ-
ing a skilled model would be in a position to identify not
only the final result to aim for, but also the appropriate sub-
goals along the way. The detail of how each subgoal is met
can be acquired by individual learning, a process that may
in this instance be much more efficient than the imitation
of all the movements themselves. To imitate in this way, the
individual must have mental apparatus that allows hierar-
chical frameworks to be assembled, to organize this goal
structure, and to hold the goal structure while its detailed
enactment is built up. Novel frameworks could also be as-
sembled on the basis of trial-and-error exploration, and no
doubt in simple cases this is quite sufficient; but imitation
confers benefit in boosting the rate of acquisition – impor-
tant where long sequences produce “combinatorial explo-
sion” – or introducing features unlikely to be invented in-
dependently.
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Figure 5. State-space representation of nettle preparation. Visu-
alization of the possible range of states to which a nettle plant can
be changed by manual processing, as a 2D surface. Actual pro-
cessing sequences are seen as “paths” from the top line (unaltered
plants, of various forms) to the single ultimate goal of a ready-to-
eat handful (bottom). States (plant configurations) through which
any successful sequence must pass are highlighted.
The results expected from program level imitation are
quite different from those sought by comparative psychol-
ogists as evidence of “true imitation” or “impersonation,” in
which a novel action is added – as an unmodified whole –
to an individual’s motor repertoire (Tomasello 1990;
Whiten & Ham 1992). The hallmark of this sort of imitation
is that style and minor details should match between mimic
and model; for consistency, we call this action level imita-
tion. Because (almost) no theorist would wish to restrict
“imitation” to the observational copying of single muscle
twitches, it might be argued that the only possible (de-
tectable) imitation is program level imitation (e.g., Whiten
et al. 1996). This is an empirical question, however. Action
level imitation might occur, for example, by a process of
kinesthetic-visual matching, in conjunction with cognitively
simple (associationist or sensorimotor) processes, as envis-
aged by Mitchell (1993, championing an idea originally pro-
posed by Guillaume 1926). This could certainly copy a se-
quence of acts, each of which organizes a complex sequence
of muscle twitches, but the contributions of action level im-
itation would remain entirely linear in structure. Imitation
at the program level necessarily implies an intelligent abil-
ity to operate with task structure and hierarchical organisa-
tion of behaviour. Lacking this organisation, action level im-
itation might be parodied as the sort of imitation a video
recorder is good at: exact duplication of details and stylistic
quirks, but without any implicit understanding of organisa-
tion.
We suggest that the everyday use of “imitation,” and the
sense often used in traditional developmental psychology,
are closer to program level imitation. Consider, for exam-
ple, the imitation described by Bauer and Mandler (1989)
when they studied 16-month-old children’s copies of adults’
sequences of action. They found that the children required
less observation and were more accurate if the sequences
were of actions that were causally related, such as the steps
in bathing a teddy bear. Any actions unrelated to the job at
hand tended to be missed in the children’s imitations. Al-
though the individual elements of action are unlikely to
have been new for the children, the task’s structural organ-
isation – not simply an ordered string of actions – was
copied, characteristic of program level imitation (see also
Abravanel & Gingold 1985).
In section 3, we will consider whether humans make
much use of action level imitation, and if so, for what pur-
pose. Wood (1989), who introduced the term “imperson-
ation,” noted that some children go on to become stage im-
personators or actors in adult life, implying that the faculty
of action level imitation has a limited usefulness. Nor is the
empirical discrimination between action level and program
level imitation necessarily straightforward. When there are
clear signs of idiosyncratic, individual learning at lower lev-
els of organisation, as in our gorillas, action level imitation
can be ruled out; but if this were less clear-cut, then the ob-
servable behaviour, whatever its true origin, might look a lot
like the result of action level imitation.
Despite these reservations, many recent experimental
and observational studies investigate whether animals imi-
tate by focusing on the action level (impersonation). As we
and others have amply charted, unequivocally establishing
this fact is very difficult, because of the difficulties of ex-
cluding stimulus enhancement, response facilitation, and
goal emulation as alternative explanations for putative cases
of imitation.
The problem becomes more, not less, tractable when
species with very flexible action repertoires are considered,
such as the great apes. Indeed, the whole concept of an ac-
tion “repertoire” may be inappropriate for these species,
implying as it does a fixed and enunciable list of discrete ac-
tions. As humans, we accept that folding, twisting, pulling
apart, and squeezing together are “single actions,” but each
is composed of more elementary motor movements pro-
grammed together to achieve their results. In turn, the in-
tegrated behavioural complexes of pulling-apart-while-
twisting, and squeezing-together-while-twisting, once they
are acquired (perhaps by trial and error), will function as
single units of behaviour in the future. It is perhaps no co-
incidence that few ethological studies of great apes, unlike
those of cockroaches or salmon, have considered the
species’ repertoire – its “ethogram”– as a useful research
tool. Finite repertoires of basic, natural units of behaviour
are not obvious to observers of apes, presumably because
almost all combinations of movements occasionally occur
together in spontaneous behaviour. In addition, behav-
ioural mechanisms other than trial-and-error learning and
imitation may augment an individual’s repertoire. For in-
stance, play with companions or with objects may function
to build up a range of routines that achieve specific results.
In play, by definition, the results themselves have no bio-
logical function, but once a relation between some behav-
ioural sequence and its result is noticed, this new routine
may in the future be elicited in genuine problem solving.
Because every individual is liable to have had a different
history of play experiences, in principle it is probably im-
possible to describe “repertoires” in species that learn in
this way. This makes identification of “new” behaviour very
difficult, and detection of imitation consequently less likely.
The good news is that, if we move instead to a higher
level of organisation in the hierarchy of behaviour, then
“novelty” actually becomes easier to define. In lengthy se-
quences of behaviour, the probability of replicating a
demonstrated arrangement by chance or independent in-
vention quickly diminishes. We would argue that the im-
portant novelty in animal or human behaviour usually con-
sists in novel rearrangements of elements that are
themselves not novel. Our principal aim in section 2.6 will
be to focus on this sort of imitation as it functions within the
process of hierarchy construction. Examples of imitation
employed in the process of constructing novel behaviour –
as opposed to the final products shown in the well-coordi-
nated routines of the mountain gorillas – will be seen in
orangutan behaviour. As preparation, we turn to cognitive-
developmental psychology for insights into the acquisition
of novel, complex behaviour.
2.5. Assembling programs by relational learning. The im-
portance of structure has long been recognized in cogni-
tive-developmental psychology. There, following Piaget
(e.g., 1937/1954), complex behaviour is seen as con-
structed, by combining and coordinating low-level compo-
nents (e.g., mental, perceptual, or motor schemes) into
novel sequences. Such a sequence may become integrated
or fused, so it can operate as a unified “routine”; then it can
in turn be used as a component, a subroutine, in building
higher level complexes (see Case 1985; Gibson 1990; 1993;
Greenfield 1991; Langer 1993). It is important that the co-
ordination and integration of components into higher level
routines implies flexible modification of individual compo-
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nents: components must be adjustable to coordinate effec-
tively with one another.
Hierarchical processes are thought to underlay the emer-
gence of symbolic abilities in children, and simple physical
relationships between objects, like in-ness, on-ness, be-
tween-ness, or together-ness, are often found to lie at the
core of this early hierarchical behaviour. Young children be-
tween about 1 !s and 5 years of age have been found capable
of resolving problems by analyzing them in terms of the ob-
ject-object relationships involved, and generating goals and
routines that manipulate these relationships (e.g., Case
1985). They play with “in-ness,” for example, by repeatedly
putting objects in, then out of, containers. From about their
third year, they generate behavioural complexes that com-
bine and coordinate several relational routines together
(e.g., Case 1985; Greenfield 1991; Langer 1996). These co-
ordinated routines show the features of hierarchically orga-
nized behaviour, making them simple examples of behav-
ioural programs (Case 1985; Langer 1996). (And a number
of researchers have suggested that discovering a new way
to manipulate a relationship is what nonhuman primates ac-
quire when they learn imitatively: Russon & Galdikas 1995;
Russon et al. 1998; Visalberghi & Fragaszy 1990.)
Though this approach derives from child psychology,
there is reason to expect it to apply to great apes as well.
Great apes and humans show very similar patterns in their
early cognitive development (e.g., Gibson 1990; 1993;
Greenfield 1991; Parker & Gibson 1991); even as juveniles,
they can achieve logical and causal reasoning skills beyond
sensorimotor levels (e.g., Langer 1993; 1996; Spinozzi
1993). In adult chimpanzees, Boysen (1993; 1996) has
shown numerical abilities approaching that of 3- and 4-
year-old-children, including counting, summation, and sub-
traction. Matsuzawa (1994) found that some adult wild
chimpanzees who used stone hammers and anvils to crack
open hard nuts also added a third stone as a wedge to level
their anvil rocks; human children he tested did not master
this strategy until they were 6 to 7 years old. At 3 to 4 years
of age, children are already beyond the developmental
threshold at which hierarchical organisation of routines ap-
pears (Langer 1996).
We argue here that young great apes do in fact structure
their learned behaviour in ways very similar to young chil-
dren. Cognitive developmental psychology points to several
diagnostics of hierarchical organisation in behaviour, some
of which we have already illustrated in gorilla food prepa-
ration and used to argue for their hierarchical organisation:
the iterative repetition of subroutines, and the capacity to
handle optional operations interrupting the main process.
Others we shall see in section 2.6 include self-correction of
parts of routines to meet predefined criteria and substitu-
tion of functionally equivalent components. Child psychol-
ogy points to object-object relations as one underlying ba-
sis of hierarchically organized behaviour; we turn now to
orangutans to illustrate the object-object relations that un-
derlie the construction of novel behavioural programs in
great apes, and the use of imitation in this process.
2.6. Case study: Relational learning in orangutan imita-
tion. Rehabilitant orangutans in Tanjung Puting National
Park (Central Kalimantan, Indonesia) have provided some
of the most complex examples of great ape behaviour ac-
quired, in part, by imitation (Russon 1996; Russon &
Galdikas 1993). These orangutans copied many unusual
and standardized behavioural techniques used in the camp,
including techniques for siphoning fuel from a drum into a
jerrican, sweeping and weeding paths, mixing ingredients
for pancakes, tying up hammocks and riding in them, and
washing dishes or laundry. In some cases, their goals were
clearly those of the humans; in others, copying the behav-
iour for its own sake was apparently intended. Most of the
incidents showing imitation entailed organizing many indi-
vidual actions in an elaborate way. In most cases, the
essence of their imitation was not specific motor actions,
but rather the organisation of sets of actions into larger pro-
grams. Many of these programs incorporated manipula-
tions of relations between objects, like pouring liquid into
a container, threading rope through a ring, untying a knot,
sweeping a path with a broom, or fanning a fire with a lid
(Russon & Galdikas 1995).
To support a broad understanding of these orangutans’
imitations, we looked at a larger data set of their sponta-
neous manipulations of object-object relations (700 inci-
dents, from 700 hours of systematic observation in 1990 and
1991). Some were organized as integrated, higher order
programs, showing: (1) flexibility in component objects and
actions (e.g., orangutans could pour water into a soda bot-
tle, kerosene into a cup, or sand into a bag; and pouring
could be done holding lip, base, or handle of a cup); (2) sub-
ordination of components to higher level goals (e.g., pour-
ing rate was modulated to control the transfer of the sub-
stance); (3) iteration to criterion (e.g., one orangutan copied
the camp technique for getting water out of a floating
dugout canoe, repeatedly rocking it so that the water
sloshed out; she paused periodically to inspect the water
levels, then resumed rocking, and stopped finally only when
almost all of the water was removed); (4) self-correction
(e.g., handed a pen upside down, the orangutans would ro-
tate it as soon as they noticed it would not write); and (5) in-
terruption management (e.g., one managed to pour insect
repellent from a bottle onto her hand while simultaneously
warding off her son and daughter as they tried to butt in).
This suggests that orangutans have a clear functional un-
derstanding of some object-object relations. We have not
yet developed an exhaustive list of the physical relations
these orangutans understand, but some of the common
ones they have manipulated in this integrated manner in-
clude: in-out (e.g., absorb by immerse, soak, and squeeze,
embed by implant or scrape out, contain by pour in and
scoop out, and enclose by wrap-unwrap and loosen-
tighten); on-off (e.g., support something on a rigid or float-
ing base, cover by putting lid on or off); together (e.g., join,
mix, gather up, pile, tie-untie); contact (e.g., touch, lean,
poke, wipe, chop, hammer); and through (e.g., thread,
weave). Not all the orangutans showed the ability to create
programs manipulating all these relations; presumably, dif-
ferences were a function of their varied histories.
The orangutans regularly embedded simple programs
for manipulating relations within larger behavioural pro-
grams, showing how an individual’s repertoire of relational
programs can serve as the basis for complex behaviour. The
adult female Supinah, for example, used a “pouring” pro-
gram, imitated from humans, several times as a subroutine
within her elaborate imitation of the local behavioural strat-
egy for making fire. She poured kerosene from a large can
into a cup, poured it from the cup into the original can,
poured it from the cup onto a stick, and poured it from the
cup onto the fire’s embers. Sometimes she poured with two
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hands, sometimes with one. Another imitated subset of her
repertoire consisted of elaborations of two relational pro-
grams, scraping or rubbing one object across another, and
wetting objects in liquids. She organized these as subrou-
tines along with a variety of actions and objects into many
novel programs. This part of her behavioural “kit” probably
allowed her to copy more complex behavioural programs,
including sharpening axe blades, reshaping a blowgun dart,
washing clothes and floors, sawing wood, sweeping paths,
and painting walls (for detailed discussions, see Russon &
Galdikas 1995). Other orangutans also made use of these
particular programs as subroutines. One copied a tech-
nique for removing bark from a branch by tool-assisted
scraping, and another incorporated both rubbing and wet-
ting within her reproduction of the whole ritual tooth
brushing program used by (human) camp visitors.
Although imitation of relational manipulations them-
selves constitutes a simple form of program level imitation,
some of our cases were considerably more complex. We of-
fer three examples to suggest the heights of hierarchical
complexity these orangutans achieved and the varied levels
at which their imitation could occur. Our goal here is to
highlight the hierarchical structure of behavioural routines
in which imitation was used rather than to repeat argu-
ments for the presence of imitation itself, which are de-
tailed in Russon and Galdikas (1993). The two most com-
plex examples are also represented diagrammatically, in an
effort to clarify their organisation. Diagrams represent the
behavioural sequence observed, along with its inferred or-
ganisation and the orangutan’s probable goal and behav-
ioural strategy. For brevity – these incidents involved 15 to
20 minutes of continuous activity – we describe sequences
at the level of manipulations of relations between objects
rather than that of the individual motor actions.
Example 1: Supinah steals soap and laundry by ca-
noe (See Fig. 6). The bottom line of the figure shows the
behavioural sequence observed. Those relational manipu-
lations that were identified as integrated programs for
Supinah are underlined and shown in boxes to indicate
their operation as behavioural units. Shown on upper levels
of the figure is the organisation of her behavioural sequence
inferred from the description (Russon & Galdikas 1993). In
the figure, behavioural units are joined upwards by lines to
the immediately superordinate program. Supinah’s overall
program and her goal, again inferred, appear at the topmost
level of the figure. The organisation of the incident is most
apparent reading from the highest level (top), down.
Supinah’s goal appeared to be using the soap and laun-
dry possessed by camp staff, who were washing laundry on
a floating raft just off the end of the camp dock: this is what
she achieved, she had worked to achieve this goal in the
past, and her behaviour made sense only with this goal in
mind. Although she could take the goods from the staff di-
rectly by intimidating them (they were afraid of her), they
were protected by a guard stationed on the dock to block
her access. Her overall strategy to get the soap and laun-
dry required foiling the humans (Fig. level 1) and this en-
tailed two different tactics: bypassing the guard, and then
taking the goods from the staff (Fig. level 2). Bypassing
the guard meant detouring around him, which meant trav-
elling through water because the end part of the dock
where Supinah lurked stood in knee-deep water. Below
this part of the dock was a dugout canoe; these orangutans
are well known for cruising down the river in pilfered ca-
noes, but this one was moored and half full of water.
Supinah dealt with this situation with two more subrou-
tines: preparing the canoe for use, then riding it past the
guard to the raft (Fig. level 4). Preparing the canoe had two
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Figure 6. Goal hierarchy for stealing soap and laundry by canoe. (See text for explanation.)
subroutines: freeing it and bailing it out (Fig. level 5). Each
involved several minutes of detailed manipulation and sev-
eral relational manipulations, including untying a knot and
two iterative techniques for removing water from the ca-
noe (Fig. bottom level). Not shown in the figure is that
Supinah interrupted her canoe preparation to climb back
up the side of the dock and peek over its edge towards the
guard; the guard was still there and she immediately
climbed back down and resumed canoe preparation. Rid-
ing the canoe required reorienting it relative to the dock
and the raft, then propelling it alongside the dock towards
the raft (Fig. levels 5 and bottom). Taking soap and laun-
dry from the staff was then easy: Supinah merely hopped
onto the raft and the staff obligingly shrieked and jumped
into the water, abandoning the soap and laundry. Supinah
immediately set to work washing the clothes using most of
the manipulations used in the overall washing technique
standardized at the camp (e.g., rub soap on wet clothes or
brush with soap, scrub clothes with brush, wring wet
clothes).
The overall plan appears to have been a one-time, inde-
pendent concoction, and motor actions were varied flexibly
in accordance with immediate needs. Supinah appeared to
have used imitation, however, for the relational manipula-
tions she deployed, sometimes in organized packages. Most
clearly, she copied a standard camp technique to remove
water from a boat (by rocking the floating boat side to side
on the water, thereby sloshing water out of the boat over its
gunwales), and possibly also the component manipulations
for the particular local technique of washing laundry as
well, but not its organisation, because she performed the
components in idiosyncratic order.
Example 2. Weeding paths. During one of the peri-
odic bouts of cleanup around the camp, Mr. Mursiman, a
long-time staff member, was cleaning paths by removing
weeds that had grown along their edges. The standard tech-
nique used in the camp was to slice weeds off at ground
level with a hoe, then toss the cuttings well back into the
bush. In addition, Mr. Mursiman piled the cuttings into a
straight row behind him along the centre of the path before
disposing of them. He reported that Siswoyo, an adult fe-
male orangutan, had followed him, watched his weeding,
then started weeding herself. Anne Russon arrived to find
Siswoyo about 3 m behind Mr. Mursiman on the same path,
also removing weeds from the side of the path and likewise
piling the cuttings behind her in the path. She mostly
chopped roughly at the weeds with a 5-m long stick, but she
sometimes pulled them out by hand, and her row of cut-
tings was ragged rather than straight.
Siswoyo imitated Mursiman’s overall weeding program
(remove weeds until a section of path is clean, pile cuttings,
move to a new section of weeds, then iterate this routine
until the path is clean), but she may have acquired indi-
vidual components independently. Both Mursiman’s and
Siswoyo’s weed removal techniques incorporated two sub-
routines, tool-assisted weed removal and weed piling. Mur-
siman’s weed removal technique required coordinating two
object-object relations, hoe-chop weeds and hoe-shave
ground (so as not to disturb the soil). Siswoyo’s version of
weed removal was less sophisticated, incorporating only
one object-object relation (tool-chop weeds), and she sub-
stituted a stick for a hoe as her tool (Mursiman had the
camp’s only hoe). Mursiman’s weed-piling technique coor-
dinated two object-object relations (collect cuttings to-
gether, arrange cuttings in a straight row). Siswoyo’s version
of piling again involved manipulating only a single relation-
ship, collect cuttings together. Siswoyo’s weeding activity
shows program level imitation in reproducing the hierar-
chical organisation of the whole activity. She also copied
Mursiman’s programs for clearing weeds and piling them,
albeit in poorly differentiated versions. Lower levels of im-
itation were notably absent: for example, she substituted a
stick for a hoe, and used pulling rather than a tool-based
technique for removing weeds.
Example 3. Fire-making. This incident lasted some 20
minutes and entailed a wide range of manipulations on 12
objects of 7 types. Figure 7 diagrams the incident, using the
same notation as Figure 6. The four physical elements cen-
tral to Supinah’s activities are indicated as H (heat), A (air),
W (wood), and K (kerosene); two elements concatenated
indicate a relationship existing independently of her ma-
nipulations (e.g., HW is hot wood, wood already burning)
and two elements hyphenated indicate a relationship that
Supinah created (e.g., H-W is wood Supinah tried to heat,
for example by poking a stick into a fire).
Supinah’s overall objective appeared to be making an ac-
tive fire because, with skill, all the techniques she tried
would have generated one. The elements available to her
included embers of cooking fires, a large can of kerosene, a
lid, a small plastic cup, and various sticks (some of them
glowing hot). Her overall strategy seemed to be to combine
heat, air, wood, and kerosene (Fig. top level). Supinah tried
manipulating the relationships between these elements in
three different patterns:
A-HW (blow air on hot wood)
K-HW (combine kerosene with hot wood)
A-W-K (blow air on wood after immersing it in kerosene)
We classified each of these three relational manipulations
as integrated units, or small “programs,” because she en-
acted each more than once, with variation. Her attempts
were as follows (numbers indicate the sequential position
of the relevant boxed descriptions on the bottom of Fig. 7,
counting from left to right):
1. A-HW blow on burning tip of stick (6 blows).
4. HW-K immerse hot stick in cup of kerosene (twice,
changing the kerosene between attempts).
5. KW-HW touch kerosene-soaked stick to hot stick.
8. A-W-K fan with lid over stick she had immersed in
cup of kerosene.
9. A-KW blow on tip of kerosene-soaked stick.
10. K-HW pour cup of kerosene on burning embers.
13. K-HW dip stick in cup of kerosene, drip kerosene on
burning embers.
14. K-HW pour kerosene on stick, drip kerosene on
burning embers.
It is perhaps significant that Supinah managed to combine
three but not all four of the elements needed to make an
active fire, perhaps reflecting a working memory constraint
to the level of hierarchical complexity that can be achieved
by a great ape.
Despite failure to execute the entire program of fire-
making effectively, Supinah’s attempts show use of imita-
tion in several ways. She probably imitated the overall strat-
egy for making a fire, in the sense of “combine these four
elements,” although her version of this strategy was impre-
cise and inaccurate. Most clearly, she imitated several of the
component techniques, each of which represents a smaller
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program used as a subroutine, especially scooping a cup of
kerosene from the can for use in starting a fire, wetting
wood with kerosene before attempting to light it, and fan-
ning a would-be fire with a particular lid. There are also
signs that she made limited use of action level imitation. For
example, Supinah’s fanning with a lid copied the specific
motor technique used by camp cooks when they fanned
with this same lid for this same purpose.
These examples have been chosen to show how orang-
utans use imitation. Under other circumstances, however,
orangutans, like humans, may well fail to show imitation:
the situational context, the level of skill “gap” between
model and observer (Parker 1996; Vygotsky 1962), and
many other considerations may be influential. For example,
when tested with a device with an internal operation that
was opaque, but which could be set to deliver a reward
when a handle was moved in a particular way, no imitation
of a human model was found (Call & Tomasello 1995). It is
interesting that one of the subject animals in this experi-
ment was a home-reared orangutan, Chantek, that has of-
ten shown an ability to imitate arbitary human actions
(Miles et al. 1996). Just such action level imitation would
have been efficient for Call and Tomasello’s opaque task. In
section 3, we will argue that action level imitation may have
evolved for functions other than skill-learning, which could
help explain why it is not easily recruited for skill acquisi-
tion.
2.7. Emulation of relationships or program level imita-
tion? It would be strange if chimpanzees lacked abilities
found in gorillas, orangutans, and humans – their closest
relatives. We believe that imitation may have been over-
looked in chimpanzee studies, in light of our distinction be-
tween program level and action level imitation. In particu-
lar, the “emulation” that Tomasello and his colleagues
elicited in their experiments on imitation in chimpanzees
(Call & Tomasello 1994; Nagell et al. 1993; Tomasello et al.
1987) can be understood as program level imitation. Recall,
they had seen demonstrators get out-of-reach food with a
rake tool. In the first experiment, a demonstrator used a
two-stage technique with a metal T-bar rake to get food
against a wall, reaching the rake beyond the food and then
dragging the food in. In later experiments the demonstra-
tor used a more standard rake with widely spaced tines but
with the rake head on its back edge; in one condition, the
demonstrator even showed subjects how to flip the rake
from its tines onto its edge. Chimpanzees that observed
these demonstrations did use the rake to bring the food
within reach, but they did not imitate important details of
the technique demonstrated.
Tomasello rejected this behaviour as imitation, the ob-
servational learning of behavioural strategies, and attrib-
uted it instead to emulation, the observational learning of
the result or goal that a demonstrator is seen to achieve
(Tomasello 1990, citing Wood 1989). However, what the
chimpanzees copied was not so much a result – “food-in-
hand” – as a usage – “rake-as-tool” – apparently learning
about the functional relationship between tool and food.
We stress the relationship because the task was a tool task
and tools are in essence relational: “tool” rightfully refers to
objects only in terms of the particular types of relations they
enter into with other objects, when they mediate attaining
external goals (Beck 1980; Reynolds 1982). Flexible tool
use requires the ability to manipulate physical causal rela-
tions in a generalized manner (e.g., Parker & Gibson 1977),
and the ability to imitate tool-using tasks requires under-
standing the causal relations involved (e.g., Kohler
1925/1976; Piaget 1937/1954; Visalberghi & Fragaszy
1990; Visalberghi & Limongelli 1996).
If great ape subjects learned something about the rake-
as-tool by watching, what they learned was de facto rela-
tional. Using what has been learned about the rake-food re-
lationship necessarily entails translating this relational
learning into a behavioural strategy to bring about the goal,
food-within-reach, by manipulating the relationship be-
tween tool and food. In addition, the behavioural strategy
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Figure 7. Goal hierarchy for illicit fire-making. (See text for explanation.)
that the chimpanzees used was basically the same as the
strategy that was demonstrated. Whereas great apes trying
to solve rake problems independently have been observed
using throwing, tapping, and poking among other idiosyn-
cratic relational manipulations (Parker 1969), here they
specifically enacted raking, and they raked with the head
end rather than the handle. Thus their raking behaviour
does match the behavioural strategy demonstrated, but at
the program level rather than the action level. Chimpanzee
performance on these tasks may be better captured by our
concept of program level imitation than by the concept of
emulation. We do not doubt that chimpanzees sometimes
learn the affordances of objects by observation (although
we do not see how this learning is cognitively less complex
than imitation); however, in this case it seems an unlikely
explanation. What we would have to assume is that the
chimpanzees already knew about raking (the relational ma-
nipulation), but did not know that a stick is a suitable rake
(the tool), and this is what they learned by watching suc-
cessful performance. No evidence of this prior ignorance is
presented, and it seems improbable: What else might they
have been used to raking with, if not sticks?
Examination of the techniques chimpanzees used shows
that their programs of behaviour were hierarchically con-
structed. Their raking in the first experiment was described
as simple “sweeping” motions with the T-bar rake (Toma-
sello et al. 1987). To be effective, however, even sweeping
must operate as a relational routine, not a simple action, be-
cause it must establish a relationship of hooking behind the
food, then maintain the hooked food-rake relationship
throughout the sweeping arc of movement. In the process,
the position of the food changes continuously, so sweeping
must be modulated or corrected to track this effectively. In
the other two experiments with a standard rake, effective
raking requires positioning the rake head beyond the food
and then dragging it in (and “beyond” is itself a relational
state). Once correctly positioned, the rake’s position rela-
tive to the food must be continually modulated to effect
dragging. Several chimpanzee subjects succeeded in ob-
taining the food by dragging with the rake’s tines rather than
its edge, a very touchy relational balancing act requiring ex-
quisite modulation to keep the food from slipping out be-
tween the tines. When food did slip, as it usually did (Call,
personal communication; Nagell et al. 1993), corrective
measures must have been taken. The simplest correction is
iterative, repositioning the rake beyond the food, then re-
suming dragging. These characteristics – incorporating in-
tegrated relational routines as subroutines, self-correction,
iteration to predefined criteria, and substitution of func-
tionally equivalent components (e.g., rake flipped over, or
on its tines) – all show that the chimpanzees were using hi-
erarchically structured behavioural strategies when they
manipulated the rake-food relationship, not simple actions.
We accordingly conclude that these chimpanzees did im-
itate the program demonstrated, although they did so at a
coarse level of description. That they did not mimic some
of the details demonstrated is not necessarily a sign of gen-
eral cognitive weakness, but shows that program level imi-
tation begins at higher hierarchical levels. And because the
chimpanzees often succeeded, the pressure to overhaul
their strategies by copying demonstrated details may have
been absent under the artificial conditions of captivity and
the constraints imposed by experimentation. (Compare the
case of mountain gorillas, huge animals existing only on
plant nutrients in a cold environment: they have consider-
ably more to lose from retaining inefficient routines.) We
conclude that chimpanzees, even without home-rearing or
experience with sign languages, probably imitate in ways
similar to orangutans and gorillas. Because this imitation is
typically at program level whereas researchers have sought
evidence of action level imitation, and because the fre-
quency and extent to which chimpanzees imitate at this
lower level is very limited (see Custance & Bard 1994),
their imitative capacity has seemed equivocal.
3. Discussion and conclusions
We began this assessment of imitation in nonhumans in the
conventional way, attempting to sort the wheat of cogni-
tively complex behaviour from the chaff that can be ex-
plained by simpler mechanisms. We argued that most of the
cases currently claimed to be animal imitation should be re-
jected in favour of one of these simpler explanations, re-
sponse facilitation, and that, conversely, some great ape
copying that has been discounted as emulation may warrant
reevaluation as imitation. With these restrictions, we con-
cluded that several of the “simple” processes that guide so-
cial learning (stimulus enhancement, response facilitation,
and goal emulation) can be computationally described by a
single mechanism, priming of brain records. Aside from the
obvious parsimony, this should help to highlight genuine
cognitive complexity where it is found.
We then attempted to show that great ape imitation is hi-
erarchically organized, using evidence from gorillas, orang-
utans, and chimpanzees. When behaviour is viewed hierar-
chically, imitation is a high-level constructional ability; it is
not a “special faculty,” but one expression of the more gen-
eral ability to construct hierarchical cognitive structures.
Imitation, therefore, is generally found embedded within
the whole process of constructing novel behavioural strate-
gies, at various hierarchical levels. Equally, imitation typi-
cally will not be isolated from simpler processes, such as in-
strumental or associative mechanisms, but will occur in
conjunction with them. Failure to recognize these facts has
led to a failure to recognize imitation in great apes.
Hierarchical organisation is pervasive in the nervous sys-
tem, and has long been believed to apply to the coding of
behaviour. Using the skilled food-gathering techniques of
mountain gorillas as an illustrative example, we argued that
– more than this – at least in the great apes, behaviour is
organized hierarchically, not simply at genetic and physio-
logical levels, but in a way that is available to learning mech-
anisms under voluntary control. The hierarchical structure
is made up of integrated complexes of elements, including
relational combinations, generated recursively. Cognitive
developmental psychologists have informed the analysis of
hierarchically structured voluntary behaviour in humans;
they, too, have found the application of such analyses to
nonhuman primates to be fruitful (Gibson 1993; Langer
1993; 1996; Parker & Gibson 1990; and Mitchell 1987,
whose description of “Level 4 imitation” has elements in
common with our analysis).
This view of hierarchically structured animal behaviour
under voluntary control has implications for imitation. In
particular, it suggests that imitation can in principle occur
at many levels. For heuristic purposes, we distinguish ac-
tion level imitation (imitation of basic elements of behav-
iour, singly or in sequential strings) from program level im-
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itation (imitation of the organisational structure at any
higher level, from single relational manipulations to the
overarching program). At the program level, the matching
that indicates imitation will be found not in motor action
details, but in their arrangement within functional pro-
grams. These can range from the program representing the
overall strategy for behaviour, to programs representing any
of its constituents. However, not even action level imitation
can involve copying of single muscle twitches: motor or-
ganisation must be copied. Potentially, then, action level
imitation might be interpreted as one end of a continuum
with program level imitation at the other, varying only in the
level at which organisation is copied. Be that as it may, the
evidence of imitation in humans (see below) and great apes
fits rather neatly into the two discrete categories, with little
sign of intermediates at present. The distinction may be
more than heuristic, and two distinct mechanisms may be
involved.
In addition to the highly practised routines of gorillas that
are essential to their survival and show signs of earlier ac-
quisition by program level imitation, we offered cases of
complex, goal-directed behaviour in free-ranging captive
orangutans to illustrate the use of program level and action
level imitation in the service of constructing new proce-
dures. For both species, we found suggestions of limits to
the hierarchical complexity that a great ape can handle
mentally. Nevertheless, our interpretation is that mountain
gorillas and orangutans can imitate at the program level.
Finding it hard to believe that chimpanzees should lack an
ability found in their close relatives, we reexamined data
previously interpreted as a sort of emulation, in which
knowledge of relationships is acquired by observation. We
argue that these data are better seen as signs of program
level imitation, albeit at coarse levels of detail and lacking
complexity, and suggest, therefore, that all great apes can
and do imitate at the program level. Although none of our
data are by any means perfect, they are the best that is
presently available; our current research is aimed at gain-
ing developmental perspective on the gorilla and orangutan
behaviour we describe.
It is likely that great apes also can imitate at the action
level, but the importance of this for survival is more ques-
tionable. Great apes have repeatedly shown us that fine de-
tails of motor behaviour can be efficiently acquired by trial-
and-error learning. Action level imitation of these details
from other individuals, although able to produce convinc-
ing mimicry, may be an inefficient way of acquiring new
abilities. By contrast, inefficient program organisation
would be tedious and sometimes impossible to “debug” by
trial and error, and the organisational structure of behaviour
can often be seen readily in its intermediate steps. Program
level imitation makes ergonomic sense. From this perspec-
tive, it follows that imitation serving the acquisition of in-
strumental behaviour does not commonly operate inde-
pendently, in isolation from other learning processes.
Indeed it may not be designed to do so. This type of imita-
tion builds on existing behaviour structures, and it relies on
other processes like individual learning for efficiency and
attunement to specific environmental contingencies. Per-
haps we should reexamine how we formulate our search for
“pure” imitation, imitation unadulterated by other learning
processes, a conundrum that has frustrated empirical re-
search on imitation for almost a century.
We believe that program level imitation is the major con-
tributor to the acquisition of skilled instrumental behaviour
even in humans, and that action level imitation plays a mi-
nor role. When children learn imitatively to tie shoelaces,
play elaborate games, write, and draw, we suspect that they
seldom copy idiosyncratic details of their teachers’ actions,
because they more often fill in such detail by individual
learning. What they imitate is the efficient hierarchical or-
ganisation of actions, including bimanual coordinations and
subroutine structure. Children’s vocal imitation in acquir-
ing speech might seem a flagrant exception to this general-
ization. However, recall that that the supralaryngeal tract of
a young child is much smaller and less mature than that of
the adult whose words are imitated; the available frequency
range and articulatory capacities are quite different, and in-
deed the frequencies of vowel formants and phonemic pro-
nunciation are not replicated. Instead of physical matching
of sounds, achieved so spectacularly by myna birds, the en-
tire vowel register is shifted to a region of higher pitch.
Children imitate spoken words at the program level, copy-
ing the organisations of phonemes that make up words, not
the physical sounds. Action level imitation might contribute
to skill learning, but it is perhaps more common as a way to
retain poorly understood demonstrations in memory or to
elicit further social exchange with the demonstrator than a
way to learn new instrumental behaviour (e.g., Abravanel
1991; Moerk 1989; Russon 1996).
Completing our argument requires accounting for why
action level imitation has been accepted as the prototype of
imitation, although it is misleading to do so. There is little
doubt that action level imitation does occur, even in great
apes (Custance & Bard 1994; Hayes & Hayes 1952; Miles
et al. 1996; Nagell et al. 1993; Tomasello et al. 1993) and ex-
act behavioural copying is a prominent feature in human
development. (We suspect, however, that action level imi-
tation is less common in children than it seems, and that,
often, children’s “imitation” may reflect response facili-
tation.) Many developmental psychologists have argued
that action level imitation serves a social function for chil-
dren, facilitating, for example, the meshing of mother-
infant behaviour and attachment, or the taking on of de-
sired social roles by “impersonation” (Meltzoff & Gopnik
1993; Mitchell 1987; Nadel 1986; Russon & Galdikas 1995;
Uzgiris 1981; Yando et al. 1978). And it has been pointed
out that imitation can contribute to efficient social func-
tioning, because standardization of form is valuable in com-
munication (Boyd & Richerson 1988).
Perhaps, then, in great apes and humans alike, the main
function of action level imitation is social. The imperson-
ation of others’ behaviour may be funny, or flattering, or an
entry into a new societal role, but in all these cases, it is the
look of the thing, not its effectiveness that matters. Yando
et al. (1978) proposed dual functions for human imitation,
and our work with great apes leads to a similar conclusion.
If this interpretation is correct, action level and program
level are not simply prominent modes in a continuum of
levels of imitative copying, but are independent processes
that have evolved in response to very different needs, and
thus have a very different pattern of occurrence. This would
be consistent with suggestions that they are subserved by
very different mechanisms: kinesthetic-visual matching for
action level imitation, but hierarchical plan construction for
program level imitation.
We believe that our “hierarchical approach” to imitation
accounts for the existing results on great ape imitation bet-
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ter than alternative models, and helps explain the wildly dis-
crepant views of those (mostly fieldworkers) who are sure
that apes can imitate, and those (mostly laboratory workers)
convinced that they cannot. In addition, it suggests new ap-
proaches to experimentation and to analysing subjects’ re-
sponses:
1. Tasks should be constructed differently:
(a) If program level imitation is a process adapted to aid
acquisition of complex, novel structures of behaviour, then
it can only be studied with tasks having significant organi-
sational components, a “program” that is worth copying.
The logical relationships of components in the demon-
strated routine need to be visible to the subjects, unlike the
case in Call and Tomasello (1995), or else the task is re-
duced to an assay of “meaningless,” action level imitation.
So far, the closest experimental approach to this require-
ment is a sequence of two different actions, incorporated
into the design of an “artificial fruit” (Whiten & Custance
1996, p. 308). In fact, however, no sequence was demon-
strated to chimpanzee subjects, and the “organisation” of
two sequential actions was not sufficiently complex to make
for unambiguous analysis of copying.
(b) If action level imitation is adapted to social function,
special care must be devoted to the social circumstances
that will evoke imitation.
(c) If both processes can sometimes be recruited to the
same learning task (a view already foreshadowed by cogni-
tive developmental research), appropriate tasks need to in-
corporate complexity at several levels.
(d) If program level imitation operates in conjunction
with mental apparatus capable of allowing hierarchical pro-
grams to be assembled, and with individual trial-and-error
learning, then it would be unreasonable to expect skills to
be acquired entirely by imitation. Imitation will most likely
be invoked in the face of difficulty, and to short-cut combi-
natorial complexity of possible sequences, not for trivial
problems.
2. Analyses of potentially imitative behaviour need to
partition the variance into hierarchical levels. Rates of copy-
ing actions, relational manipulations, and overall task or-
ganisation should be worked out separately. At the very
least, reproduction of organisational structure must be sep-
arated from reproduction of motor details.
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If it is inevitable, it need not be imitated
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Abstract: Byrne & Russon provide illustrative examples of imitative abil-
ities in nonhuman primates. The convincing aspects of the examples are
not, however, their hierarchical or structured nature: Such organization
may be inevitable and hence, does not require explanation via imitation.
Rather, examples of imitation are derived from reproduction of behaviors
and sequences that, from the organism’s perspective, are arbitrary.
My own conviction that humans are not alone in their capacity to
imitate predates Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) argument. The target
article contains examples that add to the body of observations on
which that conviction is based. The best evidence, however, is not
derived from where the authors instruct us to look. Rather, it is to
be found in the bushes around the light post to which they point.
B&R argue that convincing evidence of imitation in nonhuman
primates is relatively meager because we tend to test apes on sim-
ple actions, the apparent imitation of which can be explained by
other processes (e.g., emulation). B&R suggest that we look in-
stead to production of hierarchically structured behavioral se-
quences that are unlikely to be acquired via individual learning or
to be innate (in any strong sense). Thus, a process of elimination,
the mechanism of acquisition of such structured sequences is im-
itation.
My concern with this argument stems from doubt that we can
observe the product of a behavioral sequence and draw valid con-
clusions about its origin: to show that behavior is structured is not
to show anything about its acquisition. There is nothing about an
organized sequence per se that precludes its accomplishment
through a variety of processes, only one of which is imitation.
There are numerous examples of complex behavioral sequences
that are the result of low-level controls on behavior, such as the
tension between approach and avoidance that produces the zigzag
swimming pattern in stickleback fish (Pelkwijk & Tinbergen 1937,
as cited in Bates 1979). Although I agree with B&R that we must
look elsewhere for an explanation of the behavioral sequences
they describe, I think that for many of them we should examine
more closely the possibility of individual “discovery.”
A typical argument against individual learning (and the one that
B&R make) is that the behavior in question, though complex, is
acquired rapidly by all members of the species, with relatively few
errors. Resolution of this paradox is often sought in sophisticated
processes (in the present case, imitation) or in innateness. For ex-
ample, in language acquisition, some attribute relatively rapid
mapping of symbol to referent to innate constraints on the mean-
ings of words. Overlooked in this argument is the “conspiracy” of
forces that demands that the noises produced by adults of our
species be mapped to the three-dimensional objects that the per-
ceptual system delivers to our young. Mapping opportunities of-
ten involve an adult repeatedly uttering the same sound string,
with exaggerated intonation, in an excited manner, while pointing
to or holding the object of interest: “A kiiittteeey. Look at the kii-
ittteeey!” Innate constraints could control mapping of the noise
“kitty” to the fluffy 4-legged creature. It is equally plausible, how-
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ever, that the mapping is inevitable, given the constraints of the
situation.
Inevitability may be the mechanism responsible for at least
some of the structured behavioral sequences described by B&R.
Consider, for example, the food preparation techniques of the
mountain gorillas. The techniques can be described as having a
clear goal (i.e., to secure food without being stung or choked) that
can be reached via a temporally constrained sequence with read-
ily identifiable intermediate goal states (that there are optional
“repeat” loops does not alter the fact that the overall sequence is
temporally constrained). During the three years before it is
weaned, the infant gorilla spends the majority of its day with its
mother. The mother, in turn, spends the majority of her day work-
ing her way through food preparation sequences. Assuming a con-
servative estimate of 10 hours per day spent feeding, the result
would be 10,950 hours of exposure to the target behaviors. The
circumstance affords a great deal of opportunity for observation
and imitation. Critically, there is also ample opportunity to analyze
the goal state of the causal sequence, the intermediate steps along
the path, and thus, the means of achieving the goal. In fact, the
conspiracy of forces imposed by the constraints of the task, the
similarity in morphological characteristics, and environmental
similarity virtually ensure that the young organism will settle on
the same solution as its elders, with or without imitating them.
When we see only the final product, it is impossible to tell whether
an imitative process or some other one created it.
At issue in the controversy surrounding imitation in nonhuman
primates is not whether the behavior to be imitated is simple or
complex: “exquisite products can be constructed with humble
tools” (Bates et al. 1991, p. 59). Rather, it is whether the target be-
havior is inevitable, given the organism, its goals, its environment
and the constraints imposed thereby. If it is inevitable, then
whether it is a structured sequence or an isolated action, it will not
serve as a convincing example of imitation. What is convincing is
when the organism produces target behaviors even when it does
not understand the goal or the means to the goal and is therefore
precluded from using causal analysis to plan or problem solve
(whether mentally or on the plane of action) as a means to ac-
complish it. In essence, it is when animals are shown to reproduce
arbitrary actions or sequences that the argument for imitation is
most convincing. Given that it is highly unlikely that the orang-
utans in Russon (1996) and Russon and Galdikas (1993) shared the
humans’ goals of cleanliness, hygiene, or aesthetics, the behavioral
sequences associated with clothes washing and weeding were,
from the apes’ perspective, arbitrary. As such, imitation would be
the most plausible avenue to the behaviors.
That great apes are not particularly accomplished imitators of
arbitrary behaviors or sequences is illustrated by the orangutan
Supinah’s less-than-successful reproduction of fire-making and
the relatively unsuccessful imitation of an otherwise opaque solu-
tion in a problem-solving task by orangutans (Call & Tomasello
1995). On the other hand, that they can engage in such species-
inappropriate behaviors as clothes washing and weeding illus-
trates that the ability is available to them, even if it is not particu-
larly well developed. What is convincing in these examples is not
that the behaviors are embedded in a structured sequence, but
rather that from the animal’s perspective they are arbitrary. In this
light it is interesting to note that by 20 months of age, human chil-
dren successfully generate means–ends sequences of action based
only on knowledge of the goal state they are to attain (Bauer et al.
1997). Although they are able to imitate temporally constrained
sequences as early as 9 months of age (Carver & Bauer, in press),
it is not until 28 months of age that they reliably reproduce arbi-
trarily ordered action sequences (Bauer et al. 1998). Thus, for hu-
mans, the ability to solve a causal sequence predates the ability to
imitate an arbitrary one. It should not be surprising then that for
other primates, the pyramid of difficulty would be similarly ori-
ented.
Priming primates: Human and otherwise
Mark Chen, Tanya L. Chartrand, Annette Y. Lee-Chai, 
and John A. Bargh
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003-6634.
markc@xp.psych.nyu.edu tanyac@xp.psych.nyu.edu
annette@xp.psych.nyu.edu bargh@xp.psych.nyu.edu
Abstract: The radical nub of Byrne & Russon’s argument is that passive
priming effects can produce much of the evidence of higher-order cogni-
tion in nonhuman primates. In support of their position we review evi-
dence of similar behavioral priming effects in humans. However, that ev-
idence further suggests that even program-level imitative behavior can be
produced through priming.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) argue that a variety of putative instances
of imitative behavior in primates can be accounted for in terms of
passive priming effects. They accordingly conclude that these in-
stances do not constitute compelling evidence for higher-order,
strategic cognition.
The assumption that priming can play such a pervasive and
powerful role in producing primate behavior is a key ingredient of
the B&R argument about the accurate assessment of higher-order
primate cognition. Although B&R’s position may appear radical in
the context of traditional priming research in human cognition, in
which priming effects are limited to memory and linguistic phe-
nomena, it is in fact consistent with recent priming research in so-
cial cognition.
This research is based on the principle of the perception-be-
havior link, the assumption that representations used in the per-
ception of the behavior of others either overlap with, or spread
their activation automatically to, representations used to enact the
same behavior by oneself. James (1890) championed this princi-
ple of ideo-motor action, and in one form or another it has been
espoused by many other leading theorists, including Köhler
(1925/1976), Piaget (1946), and Berkowitz (1984).
There have now been several demonstrations of priming ef-
fects on human behavior (see Bargh et al. 1996; Chen & Bargh
1997; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press). For example,
exposing human participants to verbal stimuli related to a type of
social behavior (e.g., assertiveness, patience) dramatically in-
creases the probability that they will behave in line with the
primed concept in a subsequent, unrelated context. Activation of
social stereotypes in the course of perception also has immediate
and nonconscious effects on the perceiver’s own behavior. For ex-
ample, activating the African-American stereotype through sub-
liminal presentation of black male faces results in greater subse-
quent hostility in (white) participants, and priming the elderly
stereotype results in the participant walking more slowly when
leaving the experiment.
These behavioral priming effects also can be induced from the
behavior of an interaction partner. Individuals change their facial
expressions and physical mannerisms to be more similar to those
with whom they interact, in a chameleon-like mimicking of be-
havior, but show little or no awareness of having done so when
later questioned (Chartrand & Bargh 1998). Most notably, if their
interaction partner mimics their own bodily posture and manner-
isms, participants consider the interaction to have gone more
smoothly and show greater liking for the partner. Thus, whereas
B&R speculate that the main function of action-level imitation
might be social, we propose that response-level facilitation also
serves an important social function.
It is not only single behavioral acts that can be primed in hu-
mans, however; entire systems of goal-directed behavior and self-
regulation can be initiated through priming techniques (Bargh &
Gollwitzer 1994; Chartrand & Bargh 1996). Exposing participants
to stimuli related to achievement in the context of a language test
causes them to attain higher verbal performance scores in a later,
seemingly unrelated, experiment. Moreover, qualities of motiva-
tional states are manifested in factors such as persistence toward
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the task goal in the face of obstacles and resumption of the task
following an interruption.
If humans manifest such priming effects with imitative and
goal-directed behavior despite having, if anything, greater frontal
cortical control capabilities (i.e., the ability to control automatic
environmental influences) than nonhuman primates, then, con-
sistent with B&R’s contention, this tendency to be affected by
priming should be the same or even stronger with nonhuman pri-
mates.
These findings suggest that even the program-level imitation
observed by B&R (e.g., the orangutan overcoming obstacles to get
to the dock and steal soap) could be the result of priming. Moti-
vated behavior is characterized by persistence in the face of op-
position, increase in strength over time when the goal is not satis-
fied, and rules of substitution leading to goal attainment, similar
to the description of program-level imitative behavior by B&R.
Goal systems involve the activation and use of program-type ac-
tions that function in a hierarchical way. These individual actions
in the service of the higher order goal do not require conscious
regulation to be completed; they can unfold fluidly and efficiently
in response to environmental events. Thus, what looks like pro-
gram-level imitation might also be produced through passive
means.
There are other reasons to be skeptical about B&R’s proposed
criteria for higher-order, “nonpriming” imitative behavior in terms
of hierarchy and novelty. Epstein and his colleague (1984) showed
that pigeons trained to perform a series of independent behaviors
were able to order them into a novel sequence in such a way as to
replicate Köhler’s (1925) classic box-stacking studies. It is the in-
herent nature of hierarchically organized systems that lower lev-
els operate autonomously (Bateson 1972; Koestler 1967); hence
in pigeons as well as primates, if the overarching goal is activated
(as through priming), novel sequences of skilled, well-learned be-
haviors can follow, with no need of guidance by higher-order cog-
nition.
Modelling imitation with sequential games
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Abstract: A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting
from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own,
provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influ-
ence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation
and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental
than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.
Imitation has been operationally defined as a significant increase
in the probability of an action as a result of observing another
agent performing that action. Byrne & Russon (B&R) have argued
persuasively that this interpretation can lead to behavior being de-
fined as imitative when it can be explained more simply by prim-
ing. I shall argue that such behavior can be explained even more
simply by subjective utility maximization and that this need not
necessarily rule out imitation.
Two-person game theory is applicable to any social interaction
involving two agents (players), each choosing between two or
more ways of acting (strategies), the outcome depending on the
choices of both agents and the agents having well-defined prefer-
ences among the possible outcomes. Imitation, impersonation,
emulation, and observational learning can all be modelled by two-
person games. Potential strategies range from simple behavioral
acts such as tongue protrusion by a mother, possibly inducing ac-
tion-level imitation by an infant, to complex behavioral sequences
such as the removal of strings from nettles by a mountain gorilla,
possibly inducing program-level imitation by a conspecific. Pref-
erences are expressed as payoffs representing units of subjective
utility associated with maternal pride, satisfaction of hunger, so-
cial approval, or, more generally, any form of reinforcement or (in
evolutionary games) change in Darwinian fitness. The fundamen-
tal game-theoretic assumption is that players are motivated solely
to maximize their own individual payoffs. [See also Maynard
Smith: “Game Theory Without Rationality” BBS 7(1) 1984.]
There is a large class of games in which players end up choos-
ing the same strategy. The strategy sets from which they choose
may be large, but for simplicity consider a familiar two-strategy ex-
ample, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game:
C D
C (3, 3) (1, 4)
D (4, 1) (2, 2)
One player chooses column C (cooperate) or D (defect), the other
player row C or D, and for each possible strategy combination, the
pair of numbers in the payoff matrix indicates the (ordinal-level)
payoffs to the row-chooser and the column-chooser, respectively.
The experimental literature on this game includes numerous stud-
ies of human behavior (reviewed by Colman 1995, pp. 134–85)
and some of nonhuman behavior (e.g., Flood et al. 1983; Gardner
et al. 1984). The evidence confirms that a row-chooser who has
reason to expect the column-chooser to defect usually defects, as
well, and this makes sense because if the column-chooser opts for
D, then the row-chooser receives a higher payoff by also opting for
D (2 units) than by opting for C (1 unit). It follows that in a se-
quential version of the game in which the column-chooser moves
first and opts for D, the row-chooser, moving second with perfect
information of the column-chooser’s strategy, is almost certain to
follow suit.
Should such behavioral convergence be interpreted as imita-
tion? I believe it should not, for the following reason. The row-
chooser selects the same strategy as the column-chooser but does
not select it because it is the same. The strategic structure of the
game encourages the row-player to defect, irrespective of the ac-
tion of the column-chooser, because the defecting strategy is dom-
inant in the sense that it yields a better payoff to the row-chooser,
irrespective of the column-chooser’s strategy. Consequently, in the
sequential version of the game, a row-chooser who responds to a
column-chooser’s defecting strategy by following suit cannot
validly be described as imitating the column-chooser’s action, be-
cause defection is mandated by self-interest in any case.
Interestingly, this objection does not apply to all strategic inter-
actions. Consider next the Stag Hunt game (Lewis 1969):
C D
C (3, 3) (1, 2)
D (2, 1) (2, 2)
Here again, a self-interested player will seek to choose the same
strategy as the co-player, but in this case the strategy will be
chosen precisely because it is the same as the co-player’s. The row-
chooser will defect if there is reason to expect the column-chooser
to defect but will cooperate if there is reason to expect the
column-chooser to cooperate. Thus, in a sequential version of this
game, the row-chooser, moving second, will respond to D with D
to receive a payoff of 2 rather than 1 and will respond to C with C
to receive a payoff of 3 rather than 2. The players’ choices will tend
to converge, as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but in the se-
quential version of this game it seems reasonable to interpret such
behavioral convergence as imitative, because the row-chooser’s
strategy is directly induced by the column-chooser’s.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) may reject this as a model of imitation
because it is explicable by the more fundamental process of util-
ity maximization (and also perhaps by priming). This objection
could be dismissed on the ground that all voluntary behavior in-
volves choice and all choice can be interpreted in terms of maxi-
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mizing subjective expected utility (Jeffrey 1983; Kahneman &
Tversky 1979). B&R would certainly reject it in cases in which the
strategies represent non-novel forms of behavior, though the
model is neutral on this point. The counterargument to this is that
an action directly induced by observing the same action being per-
formed by another agent may be imitative even if it lacks novelty.
A teenager who is induced to wear an old pair of jeans by observ-
ing an admired role model wearing jeans is evidently imitating the
role model, and any interpretation of imitation that excludes such
a case seems perverse and at odds with the conventional meaning
of the concept.
What is the essential structural difference between games such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and those such as the Stag Hunt, which
allow strategic convergence to be interpreted as imitation in the
latter class but not the former? The answer relates to Nash equi-
libria. A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies that are
the best responses to each other. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
the best response to C is D and the best response to D is also D;
hence the only Nash equilibrium in the game is the strategy com-
bination DD in the lower-right cell, yielding payoffs of 2 units to
each player. Consequently, in the sequential version of this game,
the best response of the row-chooser, moving second and pursu-
ing self-interest, is D, irrespective of the column-chooser’s strat-
egy. However, in the Stag Hunt game, the best response to C is C
and the best response to D is D, yielding two Nash equilibria in
the top-left and bottom-right cells, and these two equilibria cor-
respond to different strategies of the row-chooser. It seems rea-
sonable to define an action as imitative if it results from observing
another agent making the same voluntary choice and is directly in-
duced by the other agent’s choice, as in games belonging to the
Stag Hunt class.
In some sequential games, an action may be directly induced by
another agent’s voluntary choice but may nevertheless fail to sat-
isfy this definition of imitation. Consider, for example, the Hawk-
Dove game (Maynard Smith & Price 1973):
C D
C (3, 3) (2, 4)
D (4, 2) (1, 1)
In this game there are two asymmetric Nash equilibria. The best
response to C is D, and the best response to D is C, hence the bot-
tom-left and top-right cells represent Nash equilibria. In a se-
quential version of this game, although the strategy of the row-
chooser, moving second, is induced by the action of the
column-chooser who moves first, it does not satisfy my definition
of imitation, because the behavior that is induced differs from the
behavior that induces it. There are many other games of this type
in which the players, by acting to maximize their individual self-
interests, end up choosing different strategies.
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Can humans form hierarchically embedded
mental representations?
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Abstract: Certain recurring themes have emerged from research on in-
telligent behavior from literatures as diverse as developmental psychology,
artificial intelligence, human reasoning and problem solving, and prima-
tology. These themes include the importance of sensitivity to goal struc-
ture rather than action sequences in intelligent learning, the capacity to
construct and manipulate hierarchically embedded mental representa-
tions, and a troubling domain specificity in the manifestation of each.
When researchers from different disciplines reach the same con-
clusions concerning a phenomenon, one feels that one must be on
the right track. So it is here. Byrne & Russon (B&R), through care-
ful analysis of the primatological and developmental literatures,
have arrived at the same conclusions concerning intelligent be-
havior as have researchers of human reasoning and problem solv-
ing: First, intelligent learning requires operating at the goal level,
that is, noticing and reproducing the goal structures that define a
solution to a problem. Second, the hallmark of intelligence is the
capacity to reflect on one’s mental representations to reorganize
and manipulate them, rather than having them trigger direct ac-
tion.
The necessity of copying at the goal level is most apparent in
analogical reasoning, where solutions must be defined and exe-
cuted in terms of similarity in goal structures rather than reenact-
ment of problem-specific action sequences (Cummins 1994). This
necessity is also particularly acute when solving problems whose
goal structures are characterized by dense hierarchical embed-
ding, such as those based on recursive procedures. The classical
example is the Tower of Hanoi. This problem consists of three
pegs and five discs of increasing size. The discs are stacked from
smallest to largest (with the largest on the bottom) on the left-most
peg, and the reasoner’s task is to restack them exactly as shown on
the right-most peg by moving only one disc at a time and never
placing a larger disc on top of a smaller one. The optimal solution
requires 31 moves, which vastly exceeds working memory capac-
ity. Tasks such as this are readily learnable, however, once one no-
tices – and can successfully reproduce – the recursive goal struc-
ture.
The intriguing question that arises for the target article con-
cerns the extent to which other species are capable of reflecting
on their own representations, that is, their capacity to form such
hierarchically embedded mental representations. If, as B&R point
out, much of what has been catalogued as imitation can be read-
ily explained as priming effects, this question still remains to be
addressed. Priming sheds no light on this question because
primed records typically lead to direct action. The promise of re-
search on imitation, mirror (self ) recognition, and false belief test-
ing was that these tasks would provide the means to measure the
depth and complexity of mental representation in other species.
However, the analysis offered by B&R on food “preparation”
among gorillas and “laundry pilfering” among orangutans betrays
a depth of mental representation that is rarely seen in these other
tasks. This disparity leads one to suspect that the goal structures
of tasks such as imitation and false belief testing are not as trans-
parent to other species as they are to us.
This disparity in performance is also not unique to nonhuman
species; indeed, one need not look far to find such disparities in
human intellectual performance. The depth of recursive em-
bedding in the five-disc Tower of Hanoi problem described above
is trivial compared with the embedding depth one typically finds
in the grammatical structure of human language. Yet the Tower of
Hanoi problem is notoriously difficult for adult humans to solve,
whereas parsing sentences with equal or greater grammatical
structures is trivial for most native speakers. Focusing solely
on performance in either of these domains would lead one to
draw very different conclusions about the human capacity to traf-
fic in hierarchically complex mental representation. Indeed, it is
the “now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t” nature of human reasoning
and problem-solving performance that led to the proliferation of
theories in cognitive psychology that explain human intelligence
in terms of domain-specific abilities (e.g., Gardner 1983), reason-
ing strategies (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak 1985), modules (e.g., Cos-
mides 1989), and biological predispositions (e.g., Cummins 1996).
As B&R point out, developmental psychologists have produced
an impressive body of evidence showing that there is a growth in
the complexity and flexibility of mental representation during the
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first five years of life, with an “explosion” of sorts occurring dur-
ing the third and fourth years. The strength of the comparative ap-
proach is that it allows the general question of the nature of intel-
ligence to be explored without parochial biases toward any
particular species. This was the original goal of the rationalist ap-
proach adopted by artificial intelligence researchers: to define the
nature and components of intelligence independently of their par-
ticular instantiations. Intelligence was intelligence whether in-
stantiated in a biological organ with an evolutionary history or in
a silicon chip as a product of human design. What the compara-
tive approach brings to this discussion is the stark necessity of
defining intelligence with respect to an organism’s goal in a par-
ticular environmental niche (whether the environment is defined
physically or socially). As in artificial intelligence, problem-solv-
ing, and reasoning literatures, this has come to mean viewing in-
telligence as an uncertain balance between general-purpose ca-
pacities and special-purpose, domain-specific, or species-specific
capacities. The capacity to form hierarchically embedded mental
representations is emerging in a variety of literatures as a crucial
cognitive function. It appears to underlie the capacity for theory-
of-mind reasoning, language comprehension and production, and
certain numerical abilities, to name a few examples. Although this
would appear to make it a prime candidate for general-purpose
capacity, it nonetheless often displays a “now-you-see-it-now-you-
don’t” quality in human reasoning performance. A more fruitful
approach to investigating this characteristic of intelligence would
be to ask in which domains it appears reliably and in which species,
and to compare the depth of hierarchical embeddings between
species and between domains. In this target article, Byrne & Rus-
son have made admirable progress toward these goals.
A neurobiological approach to imitation
Jean Decetya,b and Julie Grèzesa
aMental Processes and Brain Activation, Inserm Unit 280, 69424 Lyon Cedex
03, France; bCyclotron Biomédical Cermep, Hôpital Neurocardiologique,
69003 Lyon, France. decety@lyon151.inserm.fr
Abstract: To explore the neural mechanisms engaged by the perception
of action with the intent to imitate, positron emission tomographic activa-
tion studies were performed in healthy human subjects. We discuss the re-
sults in light of the framework proposed by Byrne & Russon, especially the
distinction between mechanisms subserving action-level and program-
level imitation.
Byrne and Russon’s (B&R’s) target article provides an excellent
and useful framework to account for the cognitive mechanisms
subserving imitation. We found their approach and arguments
very stimulating. Their parsimonious interpretation should be ap-
plauded. Although most of the evidence in their paper comes from
comparative psychology, they do suggest that their interpretation
has implications for neuropsychology; one can accordingly exam-
ine the neural correlates to imitation.
Neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) provide a unique opportunity to localize and identify
the neural substrate of the perception of actions performed by
others when the explicit goal of the observer is to imitate the ac-
tions perceived. It is difficult to imagine an experimental para-
digm that could address the issue of the cognitive processes in-
volved in imitation as it is conceptualized in the target article.
Indeed, PET activation paradigms are by nature such simpler than
real ecological observation. Hence the inferences from such data
can only be modest ones. Nevertheless, what can be done is to
reinterpret previous findings in light of B&R’s general framework.
The experiments we performed were designed to investigate
the neural network engaged by the perception of human move-
ments using PET (Decety et al. 1997; Grèzes et al. 1998). Per-
ception of both meaningful and meaningless, purposeless hand ac-
tions was compared with the perception of the same kinds of
stimuli with the goal of imitating them later, exactly as the model
performed them (i.e., reproducing only the goal was not suffi-
cient). The presentation of stationary hands served as a baseline.
In all activation tasks, the video tape input consisted of sequences
of five actions that had been executed with the upper limb. Each
action lasted for 5 sec, was separated from the next by a 500-msec
blank screen, and was repeated 2 times in random order (15 stim-
uli per condition). Meaningful actions consisted of pantomimes of
transitive acts (e.g., opening a bottle, drawing a line, sewing a but-
ton, hammering a nail), performed by a right-handed person.
Meaningless actions were derived from American Sign Language
(ASL) and modified with the constraint that they should be per-
ceptually as close as possible to the actions presented during the
meaningful actions (e.g., movements involving mainly the right
hand). As the subjects did not know ASL, the actions bore no overt
relation to language or to symbolic gestures. Thus, meaningful ac-
tions have access to previously stored semantic and procedural
knowledge whereas meaningless actions are not stored in the
repertoire of the subjects. Observing the former would be cate-
gorized by B&R as the priming of brain records, whereas the lat-
ter would not and hence would probably come closer to providing
evidence of imitation. The subjects’ performances, recorded on
videotape, demonstrated that they were equally good at repro-
ducing both types of stimuli. (The scanning was done during the
perceptual phase.)
Perception of both meaningful and meaningless, aimless ac-
tions was associated with the activation of a common set of corti-
cal regions. In both hemispheres, the occipitotemporal junction
(Ba 37/19) and the superior occipital gyrus (Ba 19) were involved.
In the left hemisphere, the active areas were the middle temporal
gyrus (Ba 21) and the inferior parietal lobe (Ba 40). The precen-
tral gyrus in the area of hand representation (Ba 4) was likewise
activated on the left. These regions are interpreted as related to
the analysis of hand movements because they were found to be in-
volved in all activation conditions compared with the stationary
hand condition. In addition to this common network, meaningful
and meaningless movements engaged distinct networks: the per-
ception of meaningful actions involves mainly the ventral pathway
in the left hemisphere, which is known to be engaged in the iconic
and semantic knowledge of actions (inferior frontal gyrus [Ba
44/45], fusiform gyrus [Ba 20], inferior temporal gyrus [Ba
20/38]). Meaningless actions that are unfamiliar and call for fine
visuospatial analysis are subserved by the dorsal pathway (inferior
parietal lobe [Ba 40] and superior parietal lobule [Ba 7]) bilater-
ally as well as the right cerebellum.
In contrast, meaningful and meaningless actions share almost
the same network when the aim of the perception is to imitate. Ac-
tivation sites were found bilaterally in the cerebellum, the dorsal
pathway extending into the premotor cortex, the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. Additional bilateral activa-
tions were located in the supplementary motor area (SMA) and
the orbitofrontal cortex during observation of meaningful actions.
[see also Jeannerod: “The Representing Brain” BBS 17(2) 1994.]
Thus, when perception has no goal, the pattern of activation de-
pends on the nature of the movements presented. However, when
perception has a goal, namely, to imitate, the subject’s strategy has
a top-down effect on the information processing, which seems to
give priority to the dorsal pathway extending into the premotor
cortex. These results fit well with the known division of labor in
the visual cortex, where the ventral stream is thought to play a spe-
cial role in visual perception and the dorsal stream is involved in
vision for action (see Goodale 1997; Milner & Goodale 1995).
Because novelty is “a cardinal requirement of imitation,” the
neural correlates of observing meaningless movements should be
interpretable in terms of B&R’s framework. Given the structure
of the stimuli as well as the task, action-level imitation is likely to
be involved. Our results support, in part, B&R’s suggestion that
action-level imitation is subserved by kinaesthetic-visual matching
(which may correspond to activation in the parietal cortex). How-
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ever, other sites of activation were found in the frontal lobe struc-
tures, which are closely involved in action planning (i.e., prefrontal
cortex, SMA, anterior cingulate, and premotor cortex). Such acti-
vations would be more consistent with program-level imitation.
This suggests that either action-level imitation likewise requires
higher level processes and hence there is a continuum between
action and program levels or it may simply be an artifact of the
PET activation paradigm. [See BBS multiple book review of
Posner & Raichle’s “Images of Mind” BBS 18(2) 1995.] Indeed,
the imitation task was to reproduce a sequence of five actions that
had no relations between any of them. Hence it cannot be ex-
cluded that frontal activations are (partly) caused by temporarily
storing in working memory the sequence of actions to be imitated.
No imitation without identification
Frans B. M. de Waal
Living Links Center, Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center and
Psychology Department, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30329.
dewaal@rmy.emory.edu
Abstract: We cannot solve questions about imitative learning without
knowing what motivates animals to copy others. Imitative capacities can
be expected to be most pronounced in relation to situations and models of
great social significance. Experimental research on nonhuman primates
has thus far made little effort to present such situations and models.
In our chimpanzee colony at the Yerkes Primate Center, infants
sometimes get a finger stuck in the compound’s fence: their fin-
ger has been hooked on the wrong way into the mesh and cannot
be extracted by force. The adults have learned not to pull at the
infant; victims always manage to free themselves eventually. In the
meantime, however, the entire colony becomes agitated: a dra-
matic event analogous to a wild chimpanzee getting caught in a
poacher snare.
On several occasions, we have seen other apes mimic the vic-
tim’s desperate situation. For example, the last time this happened
I approached to assist but received threatening barks from both
the mother and the alpha male. As a result, I just stood next to the
fence and watched. One older juvenile came over to reconstruct
the event. Looking me in the eyes, she inserted her finger into the
mesh, slowly and deliberately hooking it around, and then pulled
as if she, too, had gotten caught. Then two other juveniles did the
same at a different location, pushing each other aside to get their
fingers in the same tight spot they had selected for this game. Long
ago these juveniles themselves may have experienced the situation
for real, but here their charade was prompted by what had hap-
pened to the infant.
I wonder where this behavior would fall under the usual classi-
fications of imitation: no problem was being solved, no goal was
being copied, and no reward was procured. Manifestly fascinated
by the infant’s predicament, the juveniles’ imitation seemed emo-
tionally charged. In discussions of social cognition, I find attention
to motivation, emotional or otherwise, sorely missing. Experi-
ments often test responses to different species in peculiar situa-
tions, such as a person with a bag over his head (Povinelli et al.
1990) or a person manipulating a puzzle box (Whiten et al. 1996).
The animal subjects are asked not only to cross a species barrier,
but also to select the relevant stimuli from among many unfamil-
iar ones.
I applaud the authors of the target article for attempting to steer
away from the all-or-nothing classifications that have until recently
dominated the imitation debate and for studying imitation in daily
life rather than in isolated experimental trials. Their distinction
between action-level and program-level imitation seems ex-
tremely useful, even though I remain unconvinced by some of the
examples in support of the latter capacity. The case for gorillas
would be stronger if individual learning could be ruled out. Pro-
gram-level transmission would predict the existence of different
populations in which the majority of gorillas process the same
plant species by means of different action sequences. Do such
populations exist?
Orangutans stringing up hammocks and washing dishes present
a more convincing case. It seems unlikely that these apes received
training for actions that humans would certainly rather not have
them perform, such as siphoning fuel from a drum. The fact that
this sort of imitation occurs in orangutans living with humans is
significant. These apes probably sympathize with humans, as de-
fined by Humphrey (1976, p. 313): “By sympathy I mean a ten-
dency on the part of one social partner to identify himself with the
other and so make the other’s goals to some extent his own.”
If sympathy varies with emotional closeness to the model, this
has serious consequences for claims about imitation, or the ab-
sence thereof, in human–animal experiments. For example, in-
stead of ascribing to “enculturation” rare forms of imitation of hu-
mans by human-reared apes, as Tomasello et al. (1993) have done,
it is entirely possible that all that human-rearing does is affect the
range of identification objects. Animals probably identify the eas-
iest with the species they know best. Remember Darwin’s (1871)
story of dogs cleaning themselves in cat-like fashion after having
been reared by cats. Perhaps these dogs “thought” they were cats,
in the sense that they had been imprinted on them. In the same
way, rehabilitant orangutans and language-trained bonobos may
see themselves as partly human. Rather than transforming cogni-
tive capacities – as implied by the concept of “enculturation” – the
simpler view is that rearing by another species increases the will-
ingness to imitate this species.
The capacity to identify with others is widespread in the animal
kingdom, as are basic forms of sympathy and empathy (de Waal
1996). Hence we should not hesitate to include in the imitation
debate species such as octopi (Fiorito & Scotto 1992), hamsters
(Previde & Poli 1996), guppies (Dugatkin & Godin 1992), and
birds (Akins & Zentall 1996; Lefebvre & Giraldeau 1994). In ad-
dition, we should focus on the most salient stimuli for each
species: observational learning is probably most fully expressed in
relation to this class of stimuli. A group mate in distress, or en-
gaged in a sexual or aggressive encounter, may draw more intense
and precise attention than the sight of a human experimenter with
a new contraption.
It follows that we should look beyond what animals do in tightly
controlled laboratory tests: convergent evidence from natural or
naturalistic settings is essential to the study of social cognition (de
Waal 1991). Even if Byrne & Russon need to do more research
before their conclusions can be accepted, their attention to spon-
taneous behavior is refreshing and essential for a full picture of an-
imal imitative capacities.
A Piagetian view of imitation
Harold D. Fishbein
Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH 45221.
harold.fishbein@uc.edu
Abstract: Byrne & Russon argue that the action and program levels of im-
itation form two discrete categories, with no intermediate steps. A Piaget-
ian view enlarges our understanding of human and ape imitation by show-
ing the developmental paths that imitation takes in the sensory-motor
period of intelligence. It is clear from Piaget’s (1945/1962) analysis that the
action level of imitation is richly varied and that intermediate steps do oc-
cur between the action and program levels.
Piaget (1945/1962) has arguably presented the most profound
theory of the development of imitation. It is my contention that
Byrne and Russon’s (B&R’s) analysis can readily be accommo-
dated and expanded by his theory. For example, Fishbein (1984)
has summarized results showing that there are striking parallels in
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the development of sensory-motor thought among monkeys, go-
rillas, and humans. All three species achieve the six stages of this
development in the same sequence, with monkeys slower than go-
rillas, who are in turn slower than humans. Despite the fact that
Piaget’s theory is cited, B&R do not follow a developmental ap-
proach to understanding imitation. Given that monkeys and apes
mirror the human stages in sensory-motor thought, parallels in im-
itation, including the timing of its hierarchical nature, should be
observed.
One of the essential points of B&R’s analysis is that the action
and program levels of imitation are not on a continuum, but form
“two discrete categories, with little sign of intermediates at pres-
ent” (sect. 3, para. 4). Earlier in the target article they allude to the
distinction between Piaget’s (1945/1962) Stages 1 through 5 on
the one hand and Stage 6 on the other. These two categories cor-
respond, in a crude way, to the action and program levels of imi-
tation, respectively. However, a detailed reading of Piaget indi-
cates that there is a continuum between the action and program
levels of imitation and that this continuum hinges on the underly-
ing processes mediating cognitive growth.
Let us now turn to Piaget’s (1945/1962) theory and relate it to
B&R’s model. Piaget asserts that in Stage 1 the newborn starts life
with inborn reflexes as its initial schemas, assimilation and ac-
commodation processes that can modify these schemas, and the
capacity to have these reflexes triggered by a variety of external
stimuli. True imitation is absent in this stage; for example, crying
triggered by the crying of other babies is not imitation.
In Stage 2, an additional capacity emerges: primary circular re-
actions. These are essentially self-imitative acts in which infants
are able to repeat actions they have just performed. In this stage,
children can imitate others provided they have previously pro-
duced the activity through their own circular reactions. These are
action-level imitations and should be observed in apes, despite
B&R’s caveat that “to be sure of imitation, the act should not al-
ready be part of the animal’s repertoire” (sect. 1.5, para. 2).
In Stage 3, another new capacity emerges: secondary circular
reactions. These allow two sensory systems such as vision and
touch to be coordinated. This leads to the infant’s ability to repeat
actions that produce desired effects in the environment; for ex-
ample, kicking its feet on the bed, which moves a hanging mobile.
Imitation in this stage is restricted to movements the child has pre-
viously made and seen, and hence are at the action level. Children
cannot defer imitation at this stage because they do not have the
capacity for representation.
In Stage 4, yet another new capacity emerges: mobile indices.
These are not mental representations or signals, but rather be-
haviors that children can perform to mediate between perceived
movements of others and their own imitative behavior. For exam-
ple, in imitating its father sticking out his tongue, the infant bites
its lips (a mobile index) and then sticks out its tongue. The index
is mobile in the sense that it can be used to mediate a variety of
actions. Mobile indices allow the child to imitate actions it has al-
ready made, but unlike the actions in Stage 3, they are not visible
to the infant; for example, sticking out the tongue or opening and
closing the mouth. Thus, action-level imitation has moved to a
new level of complexity, but is still restricted to behaviors that are
already in the child’s repertoire.
In Stage 5, the child can now imitate models performing novel
actions, including those not visible to it. The new capacity of ter-
tiary circular reactions emerges at this stage. These allow the child
to experiment actively in the environment by repeating self-
initiated behaviors to see what results. These tertiary circular
reactions allow the child to imitate novel actions “through sys-
tematic and controlled trial and error.” Thus, Stage 5 is a bridge
between action and program levels of imitation.
In Stage 6, the child has acquired the capacity to form repre-
sentations, or mental images. This allows it to form images of the
actions of a model, store them, and defer imitation to a later time,
well after the model’s action has been performed. In a sense, the
child can now imitate the model internally and defer external im-
itation to a more suitable time or place. In addition, imitation can
now occur for more complex actions than seen in Stage 5. This
stage corresponds to the program level of imitation.
The next period of development is “representative intelli-
gence,” which occurs from ages 2 to 7 years, and in which images
and symbolic functions play the major roles in imitation. Children
become less concerned with attempting to match the details of
models, but focus more on the overall pattern of the actions. B&R
present data that suggest that the great apes can imitate at this
level of complexity.
In summary, a Piagetian developmental approach enlarges our
view of imitation in apes. It points to research that can be per-
formed to determine whether the same developmental processes
are involved with humans and apes. This research should demon-
strate with apes that there are intermediate states between the ac-
tion and program levels of imitation.
Splitting, lumping, and priming
Mark Gardner and Cecilia Heyes
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT,
England. m.gardner@ucl.ac.uk c.heyes@ucl.ac.uk
Abstract: Byrne & Russon’s proposal that stimulus enhancement, emula-
tion, and response facilitation should be lumped together as priming ef-
fects conceals important questions about nonimitative social learning, fails
to forge a useful link between the social learning and cognitive psycholog-
ical literatures, and leaves unexplained the most interesting feature of phe-
nomena ascribed to “response facilitation.”
Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) imaginative target article contains both
splitting and lumping proposals. The recommendation that imita-
tive social learning should be split into two varieties (action-level
and program-level imitation) has significant weaknesses, not the
least of which is its complete lack of empirical support. The data
reported by B&R only illustrate the claim that imitation can occur
at a hierarchical program level and could be interpreted in various
other ways. The mere fact that B&R can describe behaviour in
terms of goals and subgoals is not evidence that the behaviour was
executed under hierarchical control.
In our commentary, we will concentrate on the suggestion that
stimulus enhancement, emulation, and response facilitation
should be lumped together as instances of priming. There are
three problems with this proposal: it conceals important questions
about nonimitative social learning, it fails to forge useful links be-
tween this kind of learning and the cognitive psychological litera-
ture on priming, and it leaves unexplained the most interesting
feature of phenomena ascribed to “response facilitation.”
The first problem arises from the idiosyncratic way in which
B&R characterise stimulus enhancement. They describe stimulus
enhancement as if it were an associative phenomenon, in which a
conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., a location) acquires excitatory
strength as a result of being observed in conjunction with an un-
conditioned stimulus (US; e.g., a conspecific eating). This is odd
because, ever since Spence (1937) coined the term stimulus en-
hancement, it has been treated as a variety of single stimulus learn-
ing in which conspecific behaviour draws the observer’s attention
to a stimulus, but does not act as a reinforcer. Observational con-
ditioning (Mineka et al. 1984) is the term traditionally used for
learning that is thought to depend on socially mediated exposure
to a CS–US relationship. Of course, B&R may use terms in what-
ever way they please, but putting the label stimulus enhancement
on observational conditioning is likely to cause confusion among
those familiar with the terms and to conceal important outstand-
ing questions about social learning. The conventional distinction
between stimulus enhancement and observational conditioning
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amounts to an untested hypothesis that conspecific observation
can attract an animal to an object via associative and nonassocia-
tive routes. By drawing attention to the role of Pavlovian mecha-
nisms in social learning, the term observational conditioning also
raises the largely unexplored possibility that animals can learn in-
hibitory as well as excitatory relationships by observation (Heyes
1994).
The second problem arises from inconsistencies between the
mechanism proposed to account for nonimitative social learning
and the cognitive psychological literature on priming. According
to B&R’s priming account, an internal representation will be
primed only if activated while a conspecific is seen to receive a re-
ward. In contrast, neither of the main types of priming phenom-
ena manipulated by cognitive psychologists require reward pre-
sentation. Under certain conditions, mere preexposure to a
priming item can result in either short-term facilitation of re-
sponses appropriate to a different probe item (associative prim-
ing) or relatively long lasting facilitation of responses to the same
probe item (repetition priming). Furthermore, the assumption
that only familiar items may be primed is inconsistent with exper-
iments indicating that priming can involve novel items (Squire
1992). This evidence undermines the only original prediction gen-
erated by B&R’s account of nonimitative effects, implying instead
that putative observational priming effects could produce novel
behaviours. The observational priming proposal does not harness
the explanatory power of cognitive psychology to make useful pre-
dictions about nonimitative social learning.
The third problem is that the observational priming proposal
does not adequately explain several experimental effects cate-
gorised by B&R as “response facilitation.” They suggest that be-
havioural concordance occurred in these experiments because the
observation of a conspecific making a response primed an inter-
nal representation mediating the execution of a matching re-
sponse. This proposal, however, has overlooked the most interest-
ing aspect of these effects: the information about a response
available to the experimental animals during observation differed
in important respects from that available to them during later ex-
ecution of the same response.
One respect in which observed and executed responses differ is
the availability of proprioceptive information. It is unlikely that re-
sponse representations code only the visual appearance of a re-
sponse (and not also proprioceptive information), yet the obser-
vational priming proposal does not provide a mechanism through
which the visual information available through observation of be-
haviour could prime response representations. A demonstration
of cross-modal priming in animals would be striking because such
effects do not occur equally across all sensory modalities even in
adult humans (Driver & Baylis 1993).
Visual information provided by observed and executed re-
sponses also differs because of the disparate viewpoints of per-
former and onlooker. This is easily illustrated using the example
of rats tested with the bidirectional control procedure (e.g., Heyes
et al. 1992). These animals encounter a conspecific face-to-face
while exposed to demonstrations of lateral responses. Hence a rat
reproducing, for example, a left response, is presented with reti-
nal images of its own limb movements (left translation) that are
radically different from those of the limb movements of its
demonstrator (right translation). Although these experiments
have limitations as tests of imitation (Gardner 1997), observational
priming clearly does not adequately explain behavioural concor-
dance in our rats. Priming is even unlikely to occur when observer-
demonstrator differences in viewpoints are less marked. Visual
repetition priming effects are strongly influenced by the specific
appearance of the priming stimulus (Squire 1992).
When actions are carved at the joints
Merideth Gattis, Harold Bekkering, 
and Andreas Wohlschläger
Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, 80802 Munich, Germany.
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Abstract: We focus on Byrne & Russon’s argument that program-level im-
itation is driven by hierarchically organized goals, and the related claim
that to establish whether observed behavior is evidence of program-level
imitation, empirical studies of imitation must use multi-stage actions as im-
itative tasks. We agree that goals play an indispensable role in the genera-
tion of action and imitative behavior but argue that multi-goal tasks, not
only multi-stage tasks, reveal program-level imitation.
Theories of imitation, as Byrne (1995) has argued, need to address
two problems of imitative action: the difficulty of copying an act
performed from another individual’s perspective and the difficulty
of building complex behaviors from several parts. Current expla-
nations of imitation often deal with these problems by positing
that some kind of representational overlap between events (per-
formed by an observed other) and actions (performed by the
perceiver-self ) allows observed actions to be mapped directly to
motor programs. This account of the mechanisms underlying im-
itation, called direct mapping, kinaesthetic-visual matching, or on-
line coupling (Decety 1996; Fadiga et al. 1995; Meltzoff & Moore
1977; Vogt 1996b), thus skirts these two central problems of imi-
tation: the difficulty of copying an act performed from another’s
perspective is eliminated because the other-schema and the self-
schema are already aligned via representational correspondences,
and the difficulty of assembling a complex action from several
parts is simply not considered. Direct mapping theories hold
tremendous appeal for computer scientists building robots and
other computational implementations because they simplify a
complex mapping problem. However for researchers studying hu-
man and animal behavior, these theories lack plausibility as an ex-
planation of how humans and other animals imitate because they
ignore how complex and flexible imitative behavior can be. For ex-
ample, direct mapping theories do not adequately explain how a
self-schema can be aligned with so many physically different
other-schemas (including much larger and more physically ma-
ture members of one’s own species, as well as members of other
species), or why imitative action often involves several attempts,
which are increasingly close approximations of the modeled be-
havior.
In contrast to direct mapping theories, Byrne & Russon (B&R)
argue that the most common form of imitative behavior, program-
level imitation, is a complex, hierarchically organized process.
B&R propose that action-level imitation, or imitation of the mo-
tor act, may rely on kinaesthetic-visual matching, but program-
level imitation cannot, because it involves imitation of the struc-
ture and organization of behavior and must therefore be driven by
hierarchically organized goals. This distinction offers two advan-
tages for advancing our understanding of imitation. First, focus-
ing on the centrality of goals begins to address the two central
problems of imitation: goals facilitate the conversion from other-
schema to self-schema and supervise the construction of complex
actions from several parts. Second, focusing on hierarchical orga-
nization directs attention to questions about how imitation occurs
rather than what is or is not imitation. As B&R state, “the inter-
esting question for imitation becomes the extent to which indi-
viduals can and do imitate this organization of behaviour, rather
than the old issue of whether they can imitate a particular action”
(sect. 2.1, para. 3).
B&R offer multi-stage tasks as the crucial technique for inves-
tigating the extent to which individuals imitate the organization of
behavior. We are using a different technique, a multi-goal task,
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with similar effect. Multi-goal tasks involve multiple goals enacted
simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, in contrast to the se-
quential stages of a multi-stage task. Bekkering et al. (in prepara-
tion) used a hand-to-ear-movement paradigm with six possible ac-
tions: touching an ear with the same-side hand, touching an ear
with the opposite-side hand (crossing over the body), and touch-
ing both ears at once, either with parallel arms, so that each hand
touches the ear on the same side, or crossing both hands to touch
the opposite-side ears. When asked to imitate an adult modeling
these six movements, 4-year-old children imitated the unimanual
and bimanual ipsilateral movements accurately, as well as the bi-
manual contralateral movement, but failed to match a unimanual
contralateral movement (touching an ear with the opposite-side
hand). When an adult modeled a one-handed contralateral move-
ment, children touched the appropriate ear with the inappropri-
ate hand, and thus produced an ipsilateral rather than contralat-
eral movement. This pattern of imitation also occurred when hand
movements were directed at dots on a table rather than ears.
When similar movements were made always to only one ear, how-
ever, or when movements were directed at locations in space
rather than physical objects (the dots were removed from the
table), this ipsilateral preference was eliminated. This pattern of
results indicates that imitation in young children is organized by
goals, such as an object (a particular ear), an agent (a particular
hand), or a movement path (crossing the body), or salient features
(the crossing of the arms across the body in the bimanual con-
tralateral gesture), and that these goals are hierarchically orga-
nized. Our results suggest that physical objects, such as ears or
dots, occupy the top of this hierarchy: when multiple goals com-
pete for capacity, one goal is selected over the others – in these
cases, the object at which movement is directed. In contrast, when
the number of goals is reduced, for example by limiting the num-
ber of objects (only one ear) or by removing objects altogether
(taking the dots off the table), goals lower in the hierarchy can be
fulfilled, in this case the hand or agent of movement.
The hand-to-ear paradigm is a multi-goal task rather than a
multi-stage task because the component goals, such as object,
agent, and path, appear to be selected simultaneously rather than
sequentially. Were the goals organized sequentially, we would ex-
pect to find children making the least errors in hand selection, be-
cause it would be the first goal executed, and the most errors in
ear selection, because it would be the last goal executed, but our
results reflect the opposite pattern: children make the most errors
in hand selection and the least errors in ear selection. From this
we conclude that in the hand-to-ear paradigm, multiple goals are
enacted simultaneously and nonetheless reveal a hierarchical or-
ganizational structure. Because they reveal the hierarchical struc-
ture of behavior so well, we consider multi-goal imitative tasks to
be an excellent framework for revealing not only the extent of im-
itation, but also the organization of action.
Out of the mouths of babes: A hierarchical
view of imitation by human infants
Harlene Hayne
Psychology Department, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
hayne@psy.otago.ac.nz
Abstract: Byrne & Russon have argued that imitation is not an all-or-none
phenomenon but may instead occur at different levels. Although I applaud
their theoretical framework, their data provide little empirical support for
the theory. Data from studies of human infants, however, are consistent
with the view that imitation may occur at different levels. These data may
provide better support for Byrne & Russon’s hierarchical view of imitation
than the nonhuman primate data that their theory was developed to ex-
plain.
Territorial arguments over the term imitation have historically
dominated the comparative literature on social learning, obscur-
ing the more interesting questions of how, when, and what animals
are likely to learn from watching each other. In their target arti-
cle, Byrne & Russon (B&R) propose that imitation may not be an
all-or-none phenomenon but may instead occur at various levels.
I applaud their attempt to overcome the dichotomous definitions
that have plagued prior research with nonhuman animals. I antic-
ipate that their hierarchical framework may force us to reevaluate
our current views about the evolution of imitation and other forms
of social learning.
Despite the merit of B&R’s theoretical approach, I found their
data far from convincing. The bulk of the evidence they present
comes from anecdotal case reports of human-like behaviors per-
formed by nonhuman primates. There are two fundamental prob-
lems with these data. First, B&R assign considerable importance
to behavioral novelty as a defining characteristic of imitation. De-
spite this, they provide no independent measure of the baseline
rates for any of the behaviors they reported in animals given ac-
cess to the same materials without a prior opportunity to watch
humans using them. For example, B&R report that orangutans are
frequently seen cruising down the river in canoes. I suspect that
even in the absence of prior observation, wild orangutans can eas-
ily detect the affordance of a canoe floating beside the riverbank.
Similar arguments could be generated for many of the other be-
haviors described in this target article and, in the absence of em-
pirical data, it is impossible to resolve the issue.
Second, B&R have not provided evidence that any of the elab-
orate and exciting behaviors emitted by these nonhuman primates
were actually acquired through observation alone, which, even be-
fore behavioral novelty, would appear to be the lynchpin for any
definition of imitation. How do we know, for example, that each
behavior or series of behaviors did not undergo a prolonged pe-
riod of trial-and-error acquisition? Within B&R’s own framework,
many of the behaviors they observed could be the products of
stimulus enhancement, emulation, and response facilitation.
Again, in the absence of empirical data, we cannot sort the imita-
tive wheat from the nonimitative chaff.
Ironically, recent data collected with human infants may pro-
vide better empirical support for B&R’s theoretical approach than
the unsystematic and highly anecdotal data from nonhuman pri-
mates for which the hierarchy was developed in the first place. I
suspect that B&R failed to exploit the human infant literature to
their full advantage because they mistakenly assume that the ex-
perimental procedures used with older infants are similar to the
procedures used with neonates. B&R do briefly describe past
studies conducted with human neonates. They correctly report
that an infant’s imitation of an adult’s facial expression is defined
as a selective increase in the frequency of that expression relative
to other expressions. As B&R also note, the spontaneous produc-
tion of some of these target facial expressions is not low, even in
newborns. The lack of a nonzero baseline raises the possibility that
the infants’ behavior could be classified as response facilitation
rather than as imitation per se. (According to B&R, “Novelty will
prove to be a cardinal requirement of imitation”; Introduction,
para. 3.)
The emphasis on behavioral novelty as a defining characteristic
of imitation comes as no surprise to most developmental psychol-
ogists. Over the past 30 years, imitation of zero-probability be-
haviors has been the accepted hallmark in studies with older in-
fants (Masur & Ritz 1984; Meltzoff 1988a; Piaget 1962; Uzguris &
Hunt 1975). A number of recent empirical studies of imitation by
6- to 24-month-old infants have specifically included target be-
haviors for which spontaneous production hovers close to zero
(Barr et al. 1996; Hayne et al. 1997; Meltzoff 1988a; 1995a). The
results of these experiments have clearly shown that infants can
and do acquire novel behaviors after watching them performed by
an adult even when they are tested for the first time following a
delay.
Given that some studies conducted with human infants satisfy
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B&R’s criterion for behavioral novelty, what are the implications
of these studies for B&R’s hierarchical approach to imitation? Re-
cent research from my laboratory has shown that 12-, 18-, and 21-
month-old infants exhibit similar levels of imitation when tested
after a 24-hour delay with the same props that were used by the
experimenter during the original demonstration (Hayne et al.
1997). When infants are tested with different props, however, per-
formance varies as a function of age. Changes in the props that dis-
rupt imitation at 12 months have no effect on imitation at 18
months, and changes in the props that disrupt imitation at 18
months, have no effect on imitation at 21 months.
We have argued that the findings described above reflect an
age-related increase in the flexibility of the underlying memory
representation (Hayne et al. 1997). Our argument is consistent
with B&R’s notion that imitation may not be an all-or-none phe-
nomenon, varying instead along a continuum. In this theoretical
context, human neonates may be restricted to some form of highly
constrained mimicry. Over the course of development, however,
infants may begin to use information acquired through observa-
tion to solve problems at a more flexible and intelligent level (for
similar arguments see Meltzoff 1988b; 1995b). We now know that
early in life, an infant’s imitative behavior reflects a relatively pre-
cise copy of the model’s actions. Later in infancy, however, infants’
imitative response will vary to meet current stimulus or contextual
conditions (Barnat et al. 1996; Hayne et al. 1997) or to match their
understanding of the goal of the model’s behavior (Meltzoff
1995b). In my view, this developmental change in imitation by hu-
man infants provides some empirical support for the distinc-
tion between action-level and program-level imitation outlined by
B&R.
In conclusion, the full story of the evolution of imitation as a so-
cial learning process cannot be told in the absence of highly sys-
tematic empirical investigation. Developmental psychologists
have learned this lesson the hard way. Piaget’s theory of cognitive
development was based primarily on the observation of his own
three children. Empirical research has shown that Piaget grossly
underestimated infants’ ability to learn by imitation. In view of
this, B&R should use their naturalistic observations to guide sub-
sequent research on imitation in nonhuman primates conducted
under more controlled conditions. Their hierarchical framework
is likely to stimulate new research activity as individuals from a
number of disciplines attempt to garner empirical support for and
against their approach. The end result will undoubtedly con-
tribute to our current understanding of the evolution of imitation
per se as well as to our understanding of other forms of social
learning.
When is imitation imitation and who has 
the right to imitate?
Mikael Heimann
Departments of Psychology and Special Education, Göteborg University, SE
403 50 Göteborg, Sweden. mikael.heimann@psy.gu.se  www.psy.gu.se
Abstract: It is suggested (1) that motivation must not be overlooked, (2)
that most social imitation does not involve novel behaviors, and (3) that
newborn babies do imitate.
The ideas presented by Byrne & Russon (B&R) are of great in-
terest to anyone trying to understand what imitation is and how it
might work. B&R suggest (1) that imitation is often an ill-defined
concept and (2) that what is seen as imitation could be the result
of quite different processes, two of which are outlined in the tar-
get article: action-level and program-level imitation. To this, I am
basically sympathetic, but I fail to understand why this must im-
ply that some types of imitation should be considered “truer” than
others. This issue – how we allow imitation to be defined – is one
of my concerns; in this commentary another concern is how B&R
treat imitation in human newborns.
Definition of imitation. B&R start in a grand fashion when they
state that they would like to “go beyond the question ‘Is it imita-
tion, or not?”: and “instead ask ‘What sort of imitation is it, and
why is it used?’” (Introduction, para. 4). Unfortunately, this is not
what they achieve. Instead, they more or less conclude that the
process that most researchers have studied – that is, action-level
imitation – should not be considered imitation because one can-
not with 100% certainty rule out other processes (e.g., response
facilitation). The only process worthy of being called imitation is
program-level imitation and perhaps some action-level imitation
– provided that novel behaviors are part of the process. Thus, im-
itation within the social domain is excluded, because such imita-
tion rarely involves novel behaviors.
B&R needlessly narrow the use of the word imitation, making
it difficult to discuss alternative processes behind imitation. One
such alternative might be motivational factors (Trevarthen 1993):
imitation can be socially driven, cognitively motivated, or the re-
sult of a combination of social, emotional, and cognitive processes
(Heimann 1998; Holmlund 1995; Uzgiris 1981). Moreover, some
imitation might be caused by direct conscious processes, whereas
other instances of imitation are the result of more immediate and
direct processes outside the awareness of the individual (as in
neonatal imitation).
Imitation among newborn human babies. Although neonatal
imitation is not the main issue in B&R’s target article, they “dis-
pute that any of these experiments . . . provide evidence of imita-
tion” (sect. 1.4, para. 3). The reader is first left to believe that they
prefer instead to explain neonatal imitation through the process of
response facilitation. This does not turn out to be the case: they
state that the criticism “has no weight” because the action per-
formed by the infant “is invisible to its performer” (sect. 1.4, para.
5). B&R instead turn to a different process and suggest that
neonatal imitation can be explained as a form of contagion. How-
ever, the existing evidence to date (of which most is not cited by
B&R) does not seem to favor such a conclusion.
Neonatal imitation is not as automatic or reflex-like as conta-
gious yawning. It can take up to 60 seconds for a newborn child to
form an imitative response (e.g., Heimann et al. 1989; Holmlund
1995). Thus, in some respects neonatal imitation can be seen as a
form of delayed response. At 6 weeks, this delay can be 24 hours
without interfering with imitation (Meltzoff & Moore 1994).
Moreover, some researchers have noted that newborn children
slowly work themselves up toward a complete imitative response
(e.g., Kugiumutzakis 1993). In our own studies, we found imita-
tion during the newborn period only if partial responses were in-
cluded in the analysis.
Finally, observations indicate that a newborn’s imitative capac-
ity is related both to the early mother–infant interaction (Hei-
mann 1989) and to the child’s temperament (Heimann 1994).
Highly imitative infants display less gaze aversion and infants
judged to be more active by their mothers also tend to be more
imitative.
Newborn babies do imitate, but this fact does not imply that
neonatal imitation is based on processes similar to the more ma-
ture imitation that develops later. In newborns, imitation is prob-
ably mediated through subcortical multimodal structures (Stein &
Meredith 1993), but it still deserves to be called imitation!
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Movement imitation as faithful copying 
in the absence of insight
Ludwig Huber
Institute of Zoology, University of Vienna, Biocenter, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.
ludwig.huber@univie.ac.at
www.univie.ac.at/zoologie/theo/ludwig.htm
Abstract: Byrne & Russon use novelty as the primary requirement for
providing evidence of true imitation in animals. There are three reasons
to object to this. First, experiential learning cannot always be completely
excluded as an alternative explanation of the observed behavior. Second,
the imitator’s manipulations performed during ontogeny cannot be known
in full detail. Finally, there is at present only a weak understanding of how
novel forms emerge. Data from our own recent experiments will be used
to emphasize the need for a tighter methodology in imitation experiments.
Byrne & Russon claim to have set aside threshold definitions of
imitation, but then propose the contrary: that novelty will prove to
be a cardinal requirement of imitation. Imitation is used to refer
to the reproduction of complex, hierarchical behavior rather than
simple movements. Does this justify using novelty as a necessary
condition for imitation? I discuss three reasons for caution.
The first reason comes from Russon (1996) herself, who ac-
knowledges that the novelty criterion cannot identify all cases of
true imitation because of the intrinsic difficulty of excluding ex-
periential learning. Only in combination with other criteria, called
misfits, which one hopes are present when studying attempts at
imitation, is true imitation likely to be witnessed. Thus, identify-
ing cases of imitation under favorable conditions requires luck.
A second reason is that it would be impossible to fully assess the
behavioral history of a very explorative animal with an open-ended
action repertoire. Fortunately, this objection is not a central one
(it only supports the need for experiments that use captive animals
whose learning history can be monitored continuously and does
not pose as much difficulty for students of less intelligent species.
The third difficulty, and theoretically the most problematic one,
is our profound ignorance of how novel forms emerge in nature.
New insights are expected from chaos theory and nonlinear math-
ematics, but in the behavioral sciences such new thinking is rarely
adopted. As a starting point, one could take Konrad Lorenz and
Jean Piaget as advocates.
Voluntary movements form the basis of motor learning by cut-
ting segments out of an extensive inherited motor sequence, thus
introducing a new and independent behavioral pattern that is
adapted to external circumstances through a process of reaffer-
ence (Lorenz 1977). The adaptive value of motor learning was
originally based on the need for orientation mechanisms that ful-
filled the demands of spatial insight. However, it would only re-
quire “a slight shift in emphasis, such as would have occurred with
the curiosity behavior of higher mammals and some birds, and
particularly the self-exploration of our immediate ancestors, to
bring the survival value of the acquisition of knowledge to the
fore” (p. 143). This faculty, which originally helped produce mo-
tor skills, would then become an important means of exploration,
play, and social learning.
The phylogenetic programs of explorative animals are ex-
tremely open systems, actively acquiring information from the ex-
ternal world through “objective investigation.” New information
is constantly being integrated into preexisting programs to enable
the animal to become adapted to new circumstances. The new in-
formation is not used instead of old programs; rather, it is inti-
mately woven into those programs by a mutual process of assimi-
lation and accommodation (Piaget 1937/1954). Assimilation is the
process of incorporating an internal operative act through which
environmental data are acquired. Accommodation is the out-
wardly directed process of adapting an overall structure to a spe-
cific case. In this sense it always includes an element of novelty,
but it is an already present structure that becomes differentiated
through observational learning. It is difficult to see how the
threshold definition of novelty could be reconciled with such a dy-
namic and mutual process of learning.
From this point of view, Thorpe’s (1956) definition of true imi-
tation seems quite conservative and intelligible: reproduction of a
novel or otherwise improbable act. How can we objectively assess
the (im)probability of a reproduced act?
We have recently used the “artificial fruit” paradigm (see
Whiten’s accompanying commentary, this issue) to study the imi-
tation of movement in marmosets (Bugnyar & Huber 1997). Mon-
keys were exposed to a conspecific demonstrator performing one
of two alternative actions on a single manipulandum. First, the
proportion of observed to nonobserved versions of the action of
each animal was calculated and compared with that of a control
group of nonexposed subjects. Then we examined the efficiency
and outline of the animals’ responses. Not only did most of the five
observers, compared with none of the six control animals, have im-
mediate success, but two of the observers also made exact copies.
Because nonobservers demonstrated that the action that the
observers were exposed to was not a simple movement of one arm
but a compound action, a microanalysis was performed. First, we
determined the (im)probability of an exact reproduction of the ob-
served opening sequence (the combined probability of five action
elements from the respective upper confidence levels of the con-
trol animals’ acts). Then we determined the probability that this
behavioral copy would occur in the two observers but not in the
control animals. Significant p-values were obtained. Thus, evi-
dence for imitation did not rest on plausibilities, human judg-
ments, or vague criteria.
What remains open is why the probability of a learned copy
should be great. If we acknowledge that program-level imitation
is a necessary supplement to our current understanding of imita-
tive phenomena, then the ecological relevance of movement imi-
tation remains to be specified. Imitation of arbitrary gestures has
been abandoned in favor of the manipulation of objects in prob-
lem-solving or foraging situations. In these it is crucial to deter-
mine whether insight into the causal structure of a task is involved.
An understanding of either the causal relationships or the inten-
tion of the conspecific model’s behavior is likely to affect learning
about the finer details of a behavior. For example, the imitator may
only attend to the affordances of an object (emulation), the goal
of the behavior (goal emulation), the serial order of the actions in-
volved (sequence learning), or the program structure (program-
level imitation). If an understanding of the causal structure of the
task is not available, however, or it is beyond the cognitive capac-
ity of an observer, then faithful (slavish) copying of the behavior of
a model (e.g., the mother) is a valuable alternative. In great apes,
and most obviously in human children, movement imitation has
become part of a social game, because of a functional change in
evolution. In other species, however, it may be the only solution.
In conclusion, rejecting well-documented movement imitation
in animals other than apes as nonimitative priming is by no means
justified. In contrast, a tighter methodology needs to be used
when investigating the more complex forms of animal imitation.
For the moment, however, Occam’s razor dictates waiting for un-
equivocal evidence and, in the meantime, treating program-level
imitation as the “contrived alternative.”
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A methodological behaviourist model 
for imitation
Paul J. M. Jorion
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Du sujet: Theorie et Praxis (STP), Paris;
and Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA
92697-5100. jorion@2aris.ss.uci.edu aris.ss.uci.edu/~jorion
Abstract: Byrne & Russon’s target article displays all the difficulties en-
countered when one fails to take a methodological behaviourist approach
to imitation. Their conceptual apparatus is grounded in a mixture of in-
trospection and folk psychology. Their distinction between action-level
and program-level imitation falters on goal imputation for sequential acts.
In an alternative gradient descent model, behaviour can be simulated as a
frustration/satisfaction gradient descent in the animal’s “potentiality
space,” as defined by knowledge, inventiveness, and the surrounding en-
vironment.
Byrne & Russon’s (B&R) target article displays all the difficulties
inherent in any approach to imitation other than methodological
behaviourism. The initial flaw resides in their conceptual appara-
tus for imitation, which is grounded in a mixture of introspection
and folk psychology in a classical three-step process.
Step 1: I rationalise my own behaviour in purposive terms bor-
rowed from the folk psychology inherent in everyday language;
that is, I generate for my own autobiographical use a post hoc dis-
course in which my consciousness assigns itself goals and then ac-
complishes them.
Step 2: I expand the scope of this schema to rationalise the ob-
served behaviour of my fellow human beings although the sup-
porting evidence remains that of my initial introspection.
Step 3: I further expand the scope of the schema, this time to
cover animal behaviour, but with the evidence still introspective.
Once I reach step 3, I am stuck with the encumbrance of what
appeared innocuous enough initially: consciousness is in the
driver’s seat. Accordingly, in the case of animals, I am faced with
the impossible task of sorting out voluntary acts from involuntary
ones, purposive sequential acts from accidental ones; in addition,
I am forced for plausibility’s sake to jettison the causal role of con-
sciousness in behaviour of some arbitrary point on the evolution-
ary ladder between apes and insects.
B&R’s distinction between action-level imitation and program-
level imitation consequently falters on goal imputation for motor
act sequences, which is grounded on what amounts to the “com-
passionate introspection” of the researcher. For example, in the
authors’ own words: “In some cases [of orangutan behaviour],
their goals were clearly those of the humans” (sect. 2.6, para. 1).
“Clearly” to whom, one may ask, if the reason turns out to be ob-
scure? Similarly, “her behaviour made sense only with this goal in
mind” (sect. 2.6, para. 6). Is “last attempt at making sense” strong
enough support for goal imputation? And so on.
For a number of years I have propounded a gradient descent
model of behaviour that avoids the pitfalls of imputing goals (Jo-
rion 1990, pp. 94–97; 1994, pp. 94–98; 1997, pp. 3–4). In such a
framework, which is consistent with methodological behav-
iourism, any sequence of animal (and human) behaviour can be
modelled as frustration/satisfaction gradient descent in the or-
ganism’s potentiality space, as defined by its knowledge, inven-
tiveness, and the current state of its surrounding environment.
I will illustrate this with examples from B&R’s paper. A human
being reaches satisfaction (relaxation of frustration) upon success
in lighting a stick dipped in kerosene. The orangutan in B&R’s
study achieved satisfaction when human bystanders burst out in
laughter, because she failed to light a stick dipped in kerosene de-
spite astute aping (sect. 2.1). Failing to ignite the stick here is a
part of the ape’s successful strategy (pace B&R: “despite failure to
execute the entire program of fire-making effectively” (sect. 2.6,
para. 12) as her satisfaction resulted from the laughter, the fire-
making being foreign to her monkey business.
This is similar to the other example of orangutan behaviour,
where satisfaction was not obtained from successfully washing
clothes (apes wear no clothes) but from having the “staff obligingly
shriek” and jump into the water (sect. 2.6, para. 6). B&R’s choice
of the word “obligingly” betrays their clear awareness that the ape
is not seeking satisfaction through washing clothes but through in-
teracting with the humans on the scene. The fact that once the
staff was in the water the orangutan diligently went about wash-
ing the clothes is not a problem: it is a perfect example of stimu-
lus enhancement, defined by B&R as “the tendency to pay atten-
tion to, or aim responses toward, a particular place or objects in
the environment after observing a conspecific’s [here human be-
ing’s] actions at that place or in conjunction with those objects”
(sect. 1.2, para. 1).
Such “relaxation” of frustration that leads to satisfaction can oc-
cur with any technique – or any combination of techniques –
known to the individual, from on-the-spot invention to the repro-
duction of recorded sequences of action-level imitation. There is
but one principle at work here: the frustration/satisfaction gradi-
ent. At each stage of gradient descent the individual proceeds
downward from the current point in potentiality space so as to
maximise the rate of frustration reduction. In visual terms, the
choice at every local point attained is the path offering the steep-
est slope.
This model has very general applicability. In particular, it ex-
plains away a number of anomalies that B&R mention.
1. Action-level imitation is intrinsically comical to any on-
looker; that is, it has high “social interaction satisfaction potential”
and is used to this end by great apes in their interaction with hu-
mans. This feature of action-level imitation does not rule out its
serving as a possible component in a problem-solving strategy. It
does, however, rule out anything such as “copying the behaviour
for its own sake” (sect. 2.6, para. 1): imitation is in every instance
a strategy for attaining some satisfaction, either instrumental or
social.
2. In discussing Abranavel and Gingold’s (1985) bathing a
teddy bear task, B&R remind us that “any actions unrelated to the
job at hand tended to be missed in the children’s imitations” (sect.
2.4, para. 6). These unrelated actions do not contribute to satis-
faction (frustration reduction) and are consequently left out of the
sequential acts that lead to lower frustration.
3. More important, there is no need to devise a theory that ex-
plains how memory must “keep track of where to return . . . as the
problem is ‘unpacked’ into component subgoals” (sect. 2.2, para.
9) as satisfaction is reached through gradient descent. Sub-goal
imputation is a post hoc reading of the descent path. Alleged sub-
goals single out singularities in the potentiality space landscape
where slopes are at their gentlest.
Using programs to solve problems: 
Imitation versus insight
Stan A. Kuczaj II,a John D. Gory,b and Mark J. Xitco, Jr.c
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg,
MS 39402; and bThe Living Seas, EPCOT Center, Lake Buena Vista, FL
32830; cSpace and Naval Warfare Systems, Code D351, San Diego, CA
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Abstract: Dolphins exhibit both action-level imitation (ALI) and pro-
gram-level imitation (PLI). Dolphins may use ALI primarily for social co-
hesion, whereas PLI seems more likely to occur in goal-directed, problem-
solving contexts. Both PLI and insightful problem solving require a
recognition of the functional relations between actions and outcomes. In-
sightful problem solving, however, involves the creation of a program in
the absence of a model, and therefore requires a higher order apprecia-
tion and application of the relations between actions and outcomes.
Our work with dolphins supports the distinction between action-
level imitation (ALI) and program-level imitation (PLI) advanced
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by Byrne & Russon (B&R). Dolphins can be trained to imitate
novel behaviors at the action level (Xitco 1988), but we do not
know the extent to which they imitate spontaneously at the action
level. Observations of captive and wild dolphins suggest that dol-
phins do engage in spontaneous ALI. If the primary function of
ALI is social facilitation, as B&R suggest, then ALI may play an
important role in developing and maintaining dolphin social rela-
tions.
Dolphins may also be capable of PLI. In our work at the Living
Seas in EPCOT Center, dolphins are often presented with prob-
lem-solving situations that require the use of tools. One of the
tools used by the dolphins consists of a weighted plastic cylinder
with an attached carrying ring. This tool can be dropped into oth-
erwise inaccessible mechanisms, which in turn causes the release
of visible but otherwise unattainable food. Dolphins are not fa-
miliar with manipulating objects, and therefore had to learn to
pick up the tool and to drop it into a bucket. After the dolphins
had learned to manipulate the tool, they observed a human using
the tool to obtain food. The human model picked up the tool with
his hand, and then swam with his arm extended (thus clearly hold-
ing the tool) to a tool site. The human then dropped the tool into
the tool site, releasing the fish. The dolphins soon began to pick
up the weight with their rostrums and try to drop it into the tool
site, eventually becoming quite proficient at doing so. The bucket
with which the dolphins were taught to use the weight tool was
quite different in appearance from the tool site. Therefore, the
dolphins were not simply repeating a previously learned behav-
ioral routine. Lacking hands, they could not imitate the exact ac-
tions of the human; instead they used another behavior to mimic
the functional use of the tool. Although this is not as complex as
the examples described by B&R, we believe the dolphins identi-
fied both the problem to be solved (releasing visible fish from a
container) and the solution by observing a model solve the prob-
lem. To us, this is the crux of PLI: identifying both the problems
to be solved and their possible solutions by watching others. We
are presently exploring dolphins’ ability to imitate more complex
solutions, which will allow us to better test their capacity for PLI.
If dolphins are in fact capable of ALI and PLI, perhaps the abil-
ity to learn from observing others reflects a continuum, the two
endpoints being anchored by action-level and program-level be-
haviors. In this view, ALI demonstrates a simple capacity for imi-
tation, whereas PLI demonstrates a capacity to comprehend com-
plex relationships.
Assuming that PLI involves the identification of a problem and
at least one possible solution via observational learning, it is still
unclear exactly how much of the program must be observed for
learning to occur. If the primary goal of PLI is to acquire some
new technique for dealing with the world, perhaps the most im-
portant observation involves the behavioral goal. Witnessing a
conspecific achieve some desired outcome, such as using a weight
to release otherwise unattainable food or eating nettle without
getting stung, may identify a goal that the observer would not
otherwise recognize. After the goal has been identified, the prob-
lem of how to achieve it remains. One possible way to achieve the
goal is to mimic exactly the behaviors of the model who has suc-
cessfully attained it. As B&R note, such exact imitations are rare.
Another possibility is for the observer to determine a behavioral
plan that it then attempts to put into action. The extent to which
this plan matches the model probably depends on three things: (1)
the extent to which each feature of the model’s behavior could be
accurately observed, (2) the ability of the observer to faithfully
represent and later reproduce the observed behaviors, and (3) the
ability of the observer both to vary its behavior and to understand
the effects of such variation. It is also possible that members of
some species need only witness the attainment of the goal to un-
derstand that there is something worth pursuing. In such cases,
the observer would not imitate a behavioral plan, but witnessing
the goal would be the impetus for the observer’s subsequent at-
tempts to attain it.
We are suggesting that the ability to operate at the program
level has implications for forms of problem solving other than im-
itation. Understanding a program involves understanding the re-
lations that hold among specific types of actions and outcomes. In
the case of imitation, the observer must recognize the program
in the model’s behavior, and then attempt to reproduce the rela-
tionships (even if the specific behaviors are not exactly repro-
duced). In the case of problems that require insightful planning
with no model, the individual must apprehend both the causal and
the spatiotemporal structure of the problem and then create a
problem-solving program. Although PLI ability does not neces-
sarily imply a capacity for insightful planning, animals that engage
in PLI may also prove to be capable of insightful problem solving,
particularly if they are known not to require witnessing the entire
program to achieve the observed goal.
Imitation without attitudes
Eoghan Mac Aogáin
Linguistics Institute of Ireland, Dublin 2, Ireland. eoghan@ite.ie www.ite.ie
Abstract: Byrne & Russon’s account of program imitation in primates in-
volves propositional attitudes (expectations and goals), which limits its fal-
sifiability. Yet their account of priming shows exactly how imitation with-
out attitudes would look. The challenge is to upgrade the notion of priming
to give an account of low-level program imitation without invoking propo-
sitional attitudes.
Expectations and goals. The difficulty I have with Byrne &
Russon’s (B&R’s) target article is its intermittent reliance on old-
style mentalism, something it shares with Miller et al. (1960), the
work of Piaget (1937/1960), and other attempts to use hierarchies
to describe intelligent behaviour. The trouble with hierarchies is
that they are just lists with brackets. To become models of behav-
iour they need a backdrop of free-floating intelligence. This is
what B&R describe as “the ability to build hierarchical structures”
(sect. 1.1, para. 3), or the animal’s having “access to the hierarchi-
cal structure of their own behaviour, and control over its organi-
sation” (sect. 2.1, para. 3) or “an intelligent ability to operate with
task structure and hierarchical organisation of behaviour (sect.
2.4, para. 5). Thus, B&R immediately set aside “rigid” hierarchies
that just run off in response to current stimulation, external and
internal (sect. 2.1, para. 3). They are interested only in the variety
that is “accessible” to the organism, under “voluntary control,”
“constructed,” “manipulated,” and so on. Hierarchies, in other
words, that assume the existence of expectations and goals.
Where are the expectations and goals in B&R’s account? They
are behaviours described as pulling down a bunch of stems, pick-
ing out the green ones, or folding in the loose ones (Fig. 1). These
are not just actions in B&R’s special sense, or mere movements.
They are actions in the ordinary sense, things done in the expec-
tation that they will bring about a desired result. I will call these
actions intentional in the ordinary sense, and in the technical sense
that has come down to us from Brentano (1874/1960).
Expectations are needed to keep behavioural loops going, es-
pecially if results are slow in coming; furthermore, goals are
needed to ensure that the desired result remains fixed through-
out, despite diversions. We must assume the existence of states of
affairs that are, in one case, expected, and in the other, desired.
These are “propositional attitudes” (Mac Aogáin 1986). Hier-
archies come free of charge. The minimum of intelligence that is
required to sustain the attribution of attitudes already implies per-
sistence and embedding; that is, B&R’s “iterative repetition of a
subroutine” and some capacity to “handle optional operations” to
ensure they do not interfere with the main one (sect. 2, para. 5).
Without them we cannot make attributions such as “pulling down
the stems.” Conversely, if we do, we join Brentano and adopt what
Dennett (1996) calls the “intentional stance.”
Stance switching. Compare this with priming and action-level
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imitation in B&R’s sense of “action.” Expectations and goals are
not implied. Representation and a generalised notion of activation
will suffice. The stance here is still intentional, because represen-
tation is necessary, but attitudes are not needed, only activation. I
will call this the “nonattitudinal stance,” contrasting it with the at-
titudinal or fully intentional one.
How could a primate learn to prepare food by imitating hand-
shapes and arm movements? It is impossible. The stance has been
switched in mid-question from attitudinal to nonattitudinal. How
could a child learn phonemes by copying “physical sounds,” as a
tape recorder does (sect. 3, para. 7). Again it it impossible. Pho-
netic and acoustic stances have been switched, this time well be-
low the intentional level. B&R suggest that the discovery of fam-
ily handshapes in gorilla food preparation would have invalidated
the hierarchical account (sect. 2.4, para. 1). This is surely not the
case, any more than local accents invalidate hierarchical models of
word acquisition. The hierarchical account is a stance, not a hy-
pothesis. By adopting it we do not falsify the account that is nonat-
titudinal, linear, associative, and so on – and vice versa.
The challenge. The strange thing about all of this is that B&R
appear to be aware of it. They wonder whether they may have un-
wittingly made program-level imitation the only variety that is ob-
servable in principle, and they refer jokingly to the imitation of
muscle twitches (sect. 2.4, para. 5). They go on to suggest that
program-level imitation may not be all that mysterious in the end,
presenting it in Figure 5 as a continuous flow of activation through
a sequence of required states. Such a stance is always possible. To
take it we need only decline to take the intentional one.
More important, B&R have done all the groundwork necessary
for the eventual removal of attitudes from imitation. This is in the
early part of the target article, when they partial out priming phe-
nomena from imitation in a stronger sense (sect. 1.5). As a result,
we get a fine account of intelligent behaviour that is just beyond
the reach of the nonattitudinal account. The distinctive limita-
tions of primate intelligence show up elegantly in the form of task
hierarchies that are flat and brittle. However, it is clear that in-
telligence of this modest variety has often been overlooked in
primate research because its structure has not been properly un-
derstood.
The challenge is now to extend the notion of priming into this
domain. The fact that action-level imitation cannot be “easily re-
cruited” into program-level imitation (sect. 2.6, last sentence) is
no obstacle. We are still entitled to adopt the nonattitudinal
stance, in the same way that we try to model cognition using asso-
ciative and connectionist paradigms. We can talk about joint and
multiple priming of representations. I believe this would account
for limited forms of program-level imitation in strongly support-
ive environments. It would also provide the baseline from which
to predict the conditions under which program-level imitation will
fail – a topic on which the target article is particularly rich in ob-
servation and hypothesis.
Imitation is not the “Holy Grail” 
of comparative cognition
M. D. Matheson and D. M. Fragaszy
Psychology Department, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602.
matheson@uga.cc.uga.edu doree@arches.uga.edu
Abstract: We commend Byrne & Russon for their effort to expand and
clarify the concept of imitation by addressing the various levels of behav-
ior organization at which it could occur. We are concerned, however, first
about the ambiguity with which these levels are defined and second about
whether there is any particular need for comparative cognition to keep fo-
cusing on imitation as an important intellectual faculty. We recommend
stricter definitions of hierarchical behavioral levels that will lend them-
selves to operational definitions and continued study of how animal sub-
jects organize their goal-directed behavior as opposed to whether it is or
is not imitation.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) (1) set up a heuristic distinction between
organization (program-level) and form (action-level) copying and
(2) argue that program-level copying depends on the ability to
build hierarchical structures of actions. A third, implicit goal
seems to be to demonstrate that all great apes (as opposed to just
chimpanzees) are capable of imitation. We applaud B&R’s at-
tempt to expand the concept of imitation by pointing out that it
can go beyond the rote copying of specific actions. We also agree
that great ape behavior can be hierarchically organized and is of-
ten quite sophisticated. We do have misgivings about B&R’s con-
ceptual approach, however, for two reasons. First, program-level
imitation, as B&R have defined it, is nearly impossible to define
operationally; thus, their theory may be heuristic but it is not
testable. Second, B&R have not made it clear how imitation per
se reflects anything important about a species’ cognitive function-
ing. That it does indicate special cognitive faculties has been
assumed by the research community in recent times; however,
B&R’s formulation of it is sufficiently different to warrant a re-ex-
amination of this idea.
We agree that imitation should be viewed as more than rigid re-
production of specific muscle movement, but some limits must be
placed on behavioral categories to allow for a meaningful analysis.
In their discussion of the hierarchical structure of gorilla feeding
techniques, B&R state that similarity of structure becomes evi-
dent at “coarser levels” of analysis. However, they fail to specify
how to identify the appropriate unit of behavior for analysis, thus
leaving the door open for behavior that is similar on any level to
be admitted as an example of program-level imitation. For exam-
ple, if an individual moves into a tree where another is feeding and
begins to eat using the same processing methods (pick, peel, chew,
swallow), could this not be called program-level copying, as cur-
rently defined? In addition, B&R’s admission of copying “rela-
tional manipulations” (e.g., an orangutan rocking water out of
boat; an orangutan’s “pouring program”; sect. 2.6, para. 4) as ex-
amples of program-level imitation seems to blur their original dis-
tinction, according to which program-level imitation involves
“copying the structural organization of a complex process (includ-
ing the sequence of stages, subroutine structure, and bimanual co-
ordination”; sect. 2.4, para. 3), whereas action-level imitation in-
volves copying the specific details of the actions. Here the
problem is distinguishing between the two forms of imitation. To
collect evidence for B&R’s theory, we need stricter definitions of
program-level and action-level copying that can be operationally
defined and distinguished.
B&R suggest that action-level copying without program-level
copying implies a lack of intelligence (apparently in the sense of
adaptive flexibility). Conversely, program-level copying without
action-level copying implies intelligence because it demonstrates
both hierarchical control of behavior and the ability to modify
lower units in the service of goal. Whereas the ability to organize
voluntary behavior hierarchically could arguably indicate sophis-
ticated intelligence, it is not clear why the imitation of a hierar-
chical structure adds anything to this analysis. Moreover, if action-
level copying, the form of imitation usually sought by the research
community, is less demanding intellectually, it is unclear why any
kind of imitation is still a subject worthy of study from a cognitive
perspective.
In B&R’s impressive example of hierarchically organized be-
havior (i.e., gorilla feeding programs), it is unclear whether imita-
tion is involved at all. They state that the strategy used by the go-
rillas is the most efficient one, in an area where feeding
inefficiency comes at a high price. Given the strong pressure this
would exert, we do not find it surprising that the apes might hit on
the same form of behavior through individual learning. No men-
tion of any kind of social process is made, much less imitation
specifically.
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Conversely, in the examples of orangutan behavior, it is the rote
imitation of specific actions that convinces us that imitation is oc-
curring, even if these actions were sometimes less skilled versions
of the modelled behavior. Although the orangutans showed evi-
dence of hierarchically structured behavioral sequences, B&R
note that these sequences were probably self-generated (e.g., hu-
mans generally do not have to scare others away from laundry fa-
cilities, so this behavior was probably never modeled for the
orangutan). Thus, rather than copying a program and showing
modifiability of action units, the orangutans seemed to copy action
units and create new, perhaps modifiable sequences. This may be
sophisticated behavior, but it does not fit easily into B&R’s frame-
work.
B&R argue that some of the orangutans’ action units were mod-
ified (e.g., the washing sequence), which seems to constitute a state
of modifiable action and modifiable program. If so, then we need
only invoke emulation, in the sense of adopting another’s goal
(e.g., do laundry, by whatever means). B&R discuss emulation
with reference to Tomasello et al.’s (1987) chimpanzee data, which
were originally interpreted as goal emulation. B&R reinterpret
Tomasello et al.’s data as program-level imitation, apparently
based on the chimpanzees’ knowing before the demonstration
that a stick could be used as a rake. We are confused about this
distinction between emulation and program-level imitation that
B&R appear to be drawing.
Imitation has in recent times seemed to be a “Holy Grail” of
comparative cognition – something highly valued and dearly
sought. However, this pursuit exists because of what imitation has
been argued to represent: a particular, rare, and evolutionarily im-
portant aspect of intelligence. We agree with B&R that this em-
phasis may have been misplaced: rote imitation may not repre-
sent anything particularly important about broad intelligence. We
agree that a broader concept of imitation is needed to encompass
observed phenomena. On the other hand, we hesitate to accord
program-level imitation the status accorded by some to action-
level copying. A more fruitful approach may be to focus on the cre-
ative aspects of acquiring behavior, which is likely to involve some
dynamic mix of problem solving and copying. It is precisely this
mixture that makes the rehabilitant orangutans’ behavior so in-
triguing. Rather than trying to categorize and label what seems to
be heterogenous behavior, it would be better to study the process
of acquiring and executing such sophisticated behavior. Thus, we
encourage continued observational studies of the kind highlighted
in B&R’s target article, guided heuristically by an expanded con-
cept of imitation, but equally attentive to other processes that
function to organize behavior in the service of a goal.
High-level social learning in apes: Imitation
or observation-assisted planning?
Peter E. Midford
Zoology Department, University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, WI
53706. pmidford@macc.wisc.edu
www.wosc.edu/zoology/grads/petere.htm
Abstract: Byrne & Russon’s notion of program-level imitation is based on
the ability of apes to plan novel sequences of behavior and on how infor-
mation gleaned by observation can aid the planning process. Byrne & Rus-
son would have made a stronger case by focusing on social learning and
planning and expending less effort interpreting their results as a new cat-
egory of imitation.
Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) target article represents a long overdue
attempt to bring cognitive theory to the question of imitation in
animals. The authors provide a constructive alternative to the no-
tion that budgerigars (Dawson & Foss 1965; Galef 1986) and rats
(Heyes et al. 1992) can imitate in ways that apes cannot. Despite
the reasonable desire to demonstrate that apes can imitate in a
better way than rats, the idea B&R develop may be more appro-
priately called observation-driven planning. Unfortunately, the
authors’ focus on imitation and on the issue of whether apes can
construct novel sequences of actions (i.e., whether they can plan)
distracts from the important issue of how observation aids plan-
ning. What coverage that B&R do give to the contribution of ob-
servation suggests their focus on imitation has clouded their un-
derstanding of what kinds of information are required for
constructing plans.
B&R provide data from three species of great apes to support
their notion of program-level imitation. Although they describe at
length the hierarchical structure of food processing by mountain
gorillas, the treatment succeeds in showing only that the structure
is hierarchical. B&R’s argument for the presence of voluntary re-
ordering stumbles twice. First, “test-operate-test-exit” loops are
not evidence of voluntary control, even in a hierarchical context.
Such loops, embedded in a complex hierarchy of actions, are
found in invertebrates such as the digger wasp Sphex ichne-
unomeus (Brockmann 1980). Second, B&R make the curious
claim that hierarchical structures avoid problems with shared
structures to which linear orderings of actions are subject. This
very confusion of shared structures in hierarchical organizations
of actions is the basis for Schank’s (1982) theory of reminding in
humans. Hence the reported absence of such errors during feed-
ing says nothing about gorillas’ representation of actions.
B&R provide no direct evidence that gorillas either learn
through imitation or plan a series of actions to process their food.
Although the authors report that gorillas use the same ordering of
“high level” actions in processing a particular food type, such ho-
mogeneity of ordering provides only circumstantial evidence for
the operation of any type of social learning, imitation or otherwise.
The production system depicted in Figure 4 only weakens their
case. Selecting actions on the basis of a set of rules does not con-
stitute planning; such rule sets are, at best, the “compiled” out-
come of past planning.
The orangutan and chimpanzee data provide more insight into
planning and observational learning capabilities, respectively.
Both sets of data also raise directly the question of what informa-
tion the observing animals might be acquiring from the demon-
stration. The first and third orangutan examples (from the same
animal) demonstrate plan synthesis using both goal decomposi-
tion (third example) and the construction of a plan from multiple
subplans (first example). To B&R, the chimpanzee results suggest
that a “use as tool,” or affordance (I assume this term is used in
the sense of Gibson 1979), of the rake has been learned. The sec-
ond orangutan example suggests an incomplete understanding of
the goal structure of the weeding task (the animal having missed
the “straight edges” subgoal), as well as a misunderstanding of the
use of the hoe as a tool.
B&R interpret the results to suggest that the chimpanzees had
learned to use a particular object as a tool. According to the au-
thors, learning about an object as a tool means learning a relation
between food and the tool, rather than simply being primed to the
goal of attaining food. Alternatively, learning a new way to use a
tool could be seen as the animal’s acquiring a new operator (ac-
tion) for use in planning. Each of the orangutan examples has el-
ements that suggest the learning of affordances provided by ob-
jects: canoes, hoes (imperfectly), and kerosene. Although no
gorilla data are presented on learning of such novel operators,
those animals may have learned an appropriate decomposition of
the overall goal into subgoals and a valid ordering of the subgoals.
Finally, the orangutan’s attempts at fire-making may be, as B&R
suggest, a set of attempted solutions based on different conjunc-
tions of subgoals (heat and wood, wood and kerosene, etc.). Al-
ternatively, the orangutan may simply have been bringing objects
together, without any inkling of the preconditions for starting a
fire.
By recasting B&R’s program-level imitation idea as planning as-
sisted by observational learning, I have suggested three specific
types of information that animals capable of planning might ac-
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quire by observation. Focusing on planning also weakens the
claim that these data should be called imitation. Because B&R
take pains to distinguish program-level from action-level imita-
tion, and because the nontechnical meaning of imitation is closer
to what B&R call action-level imitation, there is no clear reason to
include the former as a type of imitation.
On the basis of what is currently known of the phylogenic dis-
tribution of action-level imitation, such imitation is at best a ho-
moplasy and at worst an artifact of the procedures used to estab-
lish it. This assessment holds whether or not apes are definitively
shown to exhibit this imitation. As such, action-level imitation
should claim no special interest as an indicator of cognitive com-
plexity or evidence of behavioral continuity between animals and
humans.
In the search for the functional homology 
of human imitation: Take play seriously!
Ádám Miklósi
Department of Ethology, Eötvös University, Göd, H-2131 Hungary.
miklosa@ludens.elte.hu
Abstract: I will argue that we cannot understand imitation unless we know
more about its function. By comparing the two examples presented by
Byrne & Russon I show how the imitative behaviour of orangutans can be
interpreted as a homologue of human imitation during play. In contrast,
the lack of data leave the role of imitation in gorillas doubtful.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) present a new approach to imitation at a
descriptive level. The hierarchical notion of imitation might be
welcomed by ape researchers because describing the behaviour of
these animals in terms of simple motor acts is difficult, but by no
means impossible, as demonstrated by recent studies on mar-
mosets (Bugnyar & Huber 1997) and chimpanzees (Whiten et al.
1996).
A long line of ethological research, however, shows that it is of-
ten very difficult to recognize a pattern of a complex behaviour if
one does not think of a biologically significant function for it.
There are currently two general directions in the study of animal
imitation. (1) The mechanism of imitation is investigated as a par-
ticular component of general learning ability. Laboratory studies
exchange yesterday’s “inanimate conditioned stimuli” for today’s
live animal “demonstrator.” Various more or less social species are
used in these studies (e.g., rats, Heyes 1994; Heyes & Dawson
1990; parrots, Moore 1992; quails, Akins & Zentall 1996; budgeri-
gars, Dawson & Foss 1965). (2) Others are interested in cognitive
or mental aspects of imitation, investigating imitation in apes as a
behavioural homology of human imitation. The copying ability of
nonhuman primates and humans is investigated in the context of
tool use (e.g., Call & Tomasello 1995; Hayes & Hayes 1952;
Tomasello et al. 1987) or other arbitrary tasks (e.g., Custance et al.
1996).
Both lines of animal imitation research, however, started from
a very simplified view of animal learning and human imitation,
which led to the “chaos” we are facing today. The traditional view
of human imitation was that this skill is advantageous for transfer-
ring information from one generation to the next for behaviours
that require special skills, for example, food processing or tool use.
Recent developments in human imitation, however, suggest that
imitation in humans is not a one-way process in which an observer
surreptitiously copies the behaviour of the model. Infants as young
as 9 months old not only imitate the behaviour of the model but
are also able to recognize when they are being imitated (at least at
14 month of age; Meltzoff 1988c; 1990). Moreover, they show a
clear preference for the person who is copying them. In human
models, mothers do not just perform the behaviour but also en-
courage the infant and initiate imitation (Moran et al. 1987). Hu-
man models perform socially rewarding behaviours if the observer
shows signs of trying to imitate. Human imitation is an interactive
social phenomenon that is presumably advantageous for both par-
ties in a functional sense. This kind of imitation is particularly use-
ful in prelinguistic communication and social understanding
(Gopnik & Meltzoff 1995; Uzgiris 1981).
B&R’s two sets of examples differ in several respects. The imi-
tational interpretation of food processing in the gorilla seems to
belong to the traditional view of imitation. Unfortunately, there is
not enough data in the literature to judge the role of imitation in
this complex task. For example, it is not clear how long infant
gorillas have been learning this task, and a large number of pro-
cesses can interfere with an extended period of learning. More-
over, most observers have denied that imitation plays a role in the
nut-cracking behaviour (e.g., Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa
1997) that is in several respects very similar to the food prepara-
tion behaviour in gorillas, which seems to “cry out” for imitative
learning!
The examples of imitative behaviour in orangutans are very dif-
ferent however. Based on recent data (Russon & Galdikas 1993;
1995), we can estimate the number of demonstrations and enact-
ments and the time interval between the action(s) of the model
and the reenactment of the observer that is crucial to under-
standing imitation. Speculating about the “purpose” of the imita-
tion observed, Russon (1996) found no rational explanation. In-
terestingly, Köhler (1927) made very similar observations on his
chimpanzees some 70 years ago and interpreted them as play.
With some exceptions (Brunner 1972), this view of imitation has
not received serious attention, yet it seems to be a very powerful
way of explaining the behaviour of the orangutans. Play might be
interpreted as a form of adaptive transformation or functional rep-
etition of other behaviours (Fagen 1981). [See also Smith: “Does
Play Matter?” BBS 5(1) 1982.] In some species, play may serve to
develop, practice, or maintain cognitive abilities and social rela-
tionships. The behaviour observed during play might be similar to
the behaviour observed in a functional context later in life (Fagen
1981). The sequence of acts might be different and repetition
might occur more often. Play is itself rewarding, hence there is no
need for extrinsic reward. There is now evidence that human in-
fants learn about basic properties of objects during exploratory
play (Baldwin et al. 1993) and are able to generalise the imitation
of a demonstrated behaviour to similar objects (Barnat et al.
1996).
It is not difficult to see how the behaviour of the orangutans ful-
fills the criteria for play behaviour. As noted by Russon (1996), no
specific learning takes place as a result of this type of imitation;
orangutans might “merely” be practicing their skills in dealing
with objects. If one takes exploratory play as a functional explana-
tion seriously, it follows that:
(1) Imitation would be rare, both in wild and laboratory animals,
because (a) the observed animal needs to be in a playful “mood”
and (b) it must observe an action that is neither too easy nor too
difficult to copy.
(2) During playful imitation there is no need for a precise re-
production of the model’s behaviour; even different objects can be
used for imitation.
(3) The tendency to repeat the act should decrease after suc-
cessful reproduction.
(4) More familiar animals are better models.
(5) Imitation cannot be elicited merely by reintroducing the
context of the demonstration.
(6) The presence of direct extrinsic rewards inhibits imitation.
(7) An animal is more likely to imitate a new, complex task if it
has already had the experience of copying similar, less complex
tasks.
On the basis of this schema one can also design planned obser-
vations. As in the case of human infants, it might be useful to in-
corporate demonstrations in the context of play. Deliberate acts
with or without objects by demonstrators with different relation-
ships to the observers should reveal the nature of play in imitation.
Imitation will not be understood until we understand its function,
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for the homologue of human imitation might best be found in an-
imal play.
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Great apes imitate actions of others 
and effects of others’ actions
Robert W. Mitchell
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Abstract: Apes imitate the effects of others’ actions, but the evidence for
program-level imitation seems contradictory and the evidence against
bodily imitation and trial and error in learning the organization of complex
activities seems ambiguous. Action-level imitations are more flexible than
described and may derive from imitation of the effects of others’ actions
on objects.
That great apes and humans can plan actions, understand the goals
of others (or parts of them), and use them as their own is well
known. Byrne & Russon (B&R) provide further evidence of these
abilities in apes and label their confluence program-level imita-
tion. However, their evidence seems contradictory. As evidence
for program-level imitation in gorillas, B&R note that sub-
processes of food extraction that have the same aims are not iden-
tical between mother and offspring, but that the organization of
these subprocesses is consistent between them and that the de-
velopment of such organizational similarity between mother and
offspring by chance or trial and error is unbelievable (though no
developmental evidence is provided). As evidence for program-
level imitation in orangutans, B&R note that subprocesses of ob-
taining a goal, when these have the same subgoals, are usually the
same between humans and orangutans, but that the organization
of these subprocesses is inconsistent between them, and that trial
and error marks the developmental origin of the organizational
similarity between them. Whereas the ordering of behaviors with
the same global aim is essential for program-level imitation in go-
rillas, it is irrelevant to program-level imitation in orangutans. Al-
though trial and error is obviously present in the development of
the sequences in object use by orangutans, it is presumed unlikely
in the development of the sequence of food extraction by gorillas.
Contrary to this last idea, Fossey (1979) noted that during their
second year mountain gorillas make “awkward attempts at prepa-
ration such as stripping leaves from central stalks or wadding of
vines” (p. 150) that are suggestive of trial and error. Oddly,
whereas B&R state that other gorillas were intolerant of the infant
while feeding, so that the mother or silverback were the only po-
tential models, Fossey (1979) noted that the “methods involved in
[food] preparation were learned and imitated from the examples
of older peers and/or siblings” (p. 172).
B&R take orangutans’ remarkable replications of others’ uses of
objects (often as tools) to be relational manipulations and hence
program-level imitations; they do not take them to be action-level
imitations because they do not replicate “specific motor actions”
(sect. 2.6, para. 1). Unfortunately, how orangutans performed
these actions using different motor actions is not always explicated
and one suspects from the descriptions that the orangutans’ rela-
tional actions were often remarkably similar to the human motor
actions. Such similarities could be the result of attempting the
same goals, but may in turn depend on recognizing similarities be-
tween one’s own and another’s actions. The fact that when sub-
goals are identical, motor actions sometimes differ between
species (or generations) need not be evidence of program-level
imitation: it may arise from the animal’s understanding of the
other’s goal. An orangutan may chop weeds (imitatively) as well as
pull them (nonimitatively); the desire to reproduce an important
aspect of the human’s goals is present in both cases, but the same
means are used only in the first case. To say that this orangutan
imitated the overall weeding program because she first removed
weeds and then piled them is inadequate, because she could not
have done the reverse. Understanding goals, along with the abil-
ity to plan one’s actions, leads to organizations of action.
B&R claim that action-level imitation, described as exact repli-
cation of another’s motor movements or vocal sounds, is largely
unobserved in skill learning in great apes and young humans.
However, action-level imitation can clearly be more flexible than
B&R’s characterization suggests. Having spent much time with a
2.5-year-old who imitates parts of his brother’s speech, often with
no apparent comprehension but with much delight and numerous
phonological errors, I find this child’s behavior indicative of im-
precise action-level imitation; labeling the child’s vocalizations
“program-level imitation” is inaccurate, because important words
and sounds are dropped. Although B&R note that 16-month-old
children tended to imitate only those actions that were causally re-
lated to the goal, this need not indicate that they were imitating
the organization of the actions. Rather, the action sequence made
sense because of the understanding of the goal, and thus actual
imitation of organization was less essential. Children are, after all,
smart, just like many apes.
B&R’s focus on the imitation of actions with objects (either food
or tools) in every instance of program-level imitation is intriguing
in that Guillaume (1926/1971) initially posited that the human in-
fant’s recognition of the similarity between its own actions and
those of others (which would lead to flexible bodily imitation) de-
rives from initially attempting to recreate the objective effects of
another’s actions on objects, and only later trying to reproduce the
movements that led to the effects. Gradually, through imitation of
effects, in which the visual (objective) stimuli of the model be-
come a cue for the production of the same act by the child, the
subjective kinesthetic feeling of the child’s act is associated with
the model’s act; the ability to imitate others’ bodily actions results.
Perhaps flexible action-level imitation, which seems so cognitively
simple to B&R, is a skill derived from the imitation of object use
so prevalent in apes and humans (see Miles et al. 1996; Mitchell
1994).
The neural basis of Imitative behavior:
Parietal actions and frontal programs
Naoyasu Motomura
Department of Health Science, Osaka Kyoiku University, Osaka 582, Japan.
motomura@cc.osaka-kyoiku.ac.jp
Abstract: Byrne & Russon suggest that there are two kinds of imitation
learning – action level and program level – and that the latter is critical for
great apes’ learning. I have interpreted this phenomenon from the stand-
point of clinical neuropsychology and conjecture that action-level imita-
tion might be related to parietal lobe function and program-level imitation
might be related to frontal lobe function.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) report that there are at least two types of
learning by imitation: action level (a detailed and linear specifica-
tion of the sequential act) and program level (a broader descrip-
tion of subroutine structure and the hierarchical layout of a be-
havioral program). B&R emphasize, on the basis of observations
of great apes, that program-level imitation is critical for learning.
This inference is highly attractive, but it lacks a neuroanatomical
and neuropsychological basis. The authors might reconsider it in
the light of the evidence from experimental and clinical neu-
ropsychology.
First, we should distinguish the kinds of movements involved in
imitation learning. Disturbances of imitation are well known in pa-
tients with brain damage and are called ideomotor apraxia,
ideational apraxia, or constructional apraxia. The definition and
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the classification of these clinical conditions is still controversial
but the imitation and learning of movements may well be likewise
disturbed in these conditions. There are at least three types of im-
itative movements: imitation of real objects, imitation of mean-
ingful movements, and imitation of meaningless movements. Al-
though based on brain damage data, this taxonomy also may be
very useful for the analysis of imitation in great apes.
There is evidence that only a few neurons fire when a monkey
uses real tools (Taira et al. 1900). In monkeys one might speculate
that the miming of tool use is regulated by a separate class of neu-
rons. In humans there is clinical data for dissociating the manipu-
lation of real objects and imitation without real objects (Motomura
& Yamadori 1994). This evidence suggests that in the case of the
great apes we had better distinguish three types of movements:
movements using objects, meaningful movements without using
objects, and meaningless movements. The critical brain area for
these forms of imitation in both animals and humans is thought to
be the parietal lobe. One might expect disturbances in B&R’s ac-
tion level to be related to parietal function, because their corre-
sponding apraxic disturbances tend to occur after parietal lobe
damage.
There are data on the neural bases of the more programmed
and complex imitative behaviors. After damage to the frontal lobe,
the inhibition of programmed imitation is damaged. Di Pellegrino
et al. (1992) found a group of neurons in the prefrontal area of
monkeys that fires during the imitation of the complex behaviors.
Hence program-level imitation might be based on frontal lobe
function and action-level imitation on parietal lobe function. 
Program-level imitation is thought to be closely related to intelli-
gence, particularly Machiavellian intelligence, which concerns so-
cial relationships; this, too, deserves further investigation.
Mechanisms of imitation: 
The relabeled story
Herbert L. Roitblat
Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822.
roitblat@hawaii.edu
Abstract: Byrne & Russon propose an account of imitation that mirrors
levels of behavioral organization, but they perpetuate a tendency to dis-
miss imitation by members of most species as the result of more primitive
processes, even though these alternative phenomena are often poorly un-
derstood. They argue that the prerequisites to program-level imitation are
present in great apes, but the same prerequisites appear to be present in
a broad range of species. The distribution of imitative capacity across
species may be more limited by research methodology than by cognitive
ability.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) propose a very useful distinction among
levels of imitation, one that mirrors levels of behavioral organiza-
tion, but their proposal does not go far enough toward identifying
the mechanisms of putative imitation or their role in behavior.
Along with many of the other approaches to imitation, it sets the
wrong standards for a behavior to be considered an example of im-
itation.
Two lizards meet on a sunny rock wall. One of them extends his
bright orange dewlap and appears to do push-ups, raising and low-
ering the front half of his body while facing the other lizard. After
a few seconds, the second lizard begins to perform the same ac-
tion sequence. Although the behavior of the second lizard closely
resembles that of the first, it does not seem appropriate to call this
an example of imitation, because it is a territorial display and is un-
likely to have been learned by the second lizard during this
episode. Any definition of imitation must be able to correctly re-
ject this display, but it must not reject other behaviors that are ac-
tual examples of imitation. This demarcation criterion is the pri-
mary issue in imitation research. I will argue that the criterion has
been set to reject all examples of imitation as well as behaviors that
should probably not be considered imitative.
Many counterproposals seek to explain what looks like imitation
by appeal to some other capacity. These counterproposals are not
unique to B&R, so it is perhaps unfair to make them take respon-
sibility for them. In each case, a putative example of imitation is
explained away by some other, presumably more primitive, phe-
nomenon, but the variety of alternative phenomena results in a
confusing, incoherent morass of alternative explanations. More-
over, these alternative phenomena are often poorly understood.
Their validity relies on implicit mechanisms that have not been ad-
equately demonstrated and that predict other phenomena that are
themselves problematic. These alternatives appeal on the one
hand to discredited learning mechanisms and on the other to cog-
nitive mechanisms that have not been investigated in animals, let
alone established, or established as more parsimonious explana-
tions of behavior.
For example, many of the explanatory alternatives to imitation
are derived from so-called simple associative learning, but this no-
tion is often a relabeling rather than an alternative explanation. So-
called simple associative learning is not actually so simple (Roit-
blat & von Fersen 1992). Stimulus enhancement is one of these
alternative explanations; but so far as I am aware, it has never been
studied in its own right. It is a labeled phenomenon, but I know
of no reason why it should be accepted as an established counter-
explanation. The basic idea (target article sect. 1.2) is that the be-
havior of one organism draws the attention of a conspecific toward
the object on which the organism is performing, especially if the
model is obtaining a reward for this behavior. First, attention, al-
though it certainly must exist in animals, is a phenomenon that re-
quires explanation. Second, the notion of directing attention im-
plies the presence of other cognitive skills, such as shared gaze
control and pointing. Although these phenomena occur in at least
some primates (e.g., Povinelli & Eddy 1996), so far as I know they
are unknown in many of the species for which stimulus enhance-
ment has been offered as an explanation. My point is not that phe-
nomena such as stimulus enhancement cannot exist but that they
are themselves problematic. Toward the other end of the behav-
ioral spectrum, priming is also proposed as an alternative mecha-
nism to imitation. Apparent cases of imitation might be simply de-
scribed as priming; but this description is not an explanation.
Priming has not been demonstrated in animals, and in the absence
of such a demonstration, this alternative explanation is nothing
more than a “just-so” story.
Emulation, another proposed alternative to imitation, is also
problematic. It is not clear why observational learning about the
outcome of a behavior is more parsimonious than learning about
the behavior itself. B&R describe goal emulation in the following
terms: “the purpose or the goal toward which the demonstrator is
striving is made overt as a result of its actions, and so becomes a
goal for the observer, too” (sect. 1.3, para. 1). For such emulation
to occur, the animal seems to need some theory of instrumental-
ity and some theory of the goals of its conspecific that it can use to
formulate plans of actions. The presence of such skills would im-
ply high degrees of intentionality (in the sense of Dennett 1983),
which are not widely recognized among nonhuman animals. B&R
note that the behavior of great apes (and perhaps other primates)
can be described in terms of hierarchical structure and hierarchi-
cal learning. Learning can occur at low levels, which they call ac-
tion levels, and at high levels, which they call program levels. They
correctly recognize that animals may be imitating at high levels
even if the imitator’s behavior does not reproduce the detailed
movement patterns of the model.
This kind of hierarchical behavioral representation appears to
be widespread among animals (Roitblat 1988; 1991) rather than
limited to the great apes, as the reader might infer from B&R’s
presentation. Even rats appear to use high-level representations
of their actions. In the classic experiments by MacFarlane (1930),
Tolman and Honzik (1930), and Tolman et al. (1946), rats were
found to learn the place where a reward was to be found rather
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than the specific behavioral sequences necessary to get there.
They were able to use novel patterns of movement to arrive at the
goal in a maze, for example. In fact, it is quite rare that specific
patterns of muscular activity are learned and unlikely that such
learning would be adaptive. If programmatic learning is sufficient
for imitation, then imitation must be quite widespread. Even if it
is merely necessary for the appearance of imitation, it still does not
preclude the occurrence of imitation in multiple species.
If we interpret B&R as calling for a more enlightened exami-
nation of imitation in animals, then they provide a fresh approach.
If learning does not occur at the molecular level of specific move-
ments, then it hardly seems sensible to require imitation to occur
at that level. This insight is a strong contribution of the target ar-
ticle. The reader may be led to infer, however, that programmatic
learning occurs only in great apes. Aside from being incorrect, this
reading perpetuates an unsupportable demarcation.
There is danger in defining a phenomenon out of existence by
setting the standards at such a level that it cannot be said to occur.
Any behavior can be described in simple terms, but there is no
scala naturae of behavior. The danger is even greater when the al-
ternative explanations are not soundly grounded. The field would
benefit from a thorough examination of the phenomena proposed
as alternatives to imitation and the distribution of the underlying
mechanisms across species.
Hierarchical learning of song in birds: 
A case of vocal imitation?
Dietmar Todt
Institut fur Verhaltensbiologie, Freie Universitaet Berlin, D-12163 Berlin,
Germany. todt@zedat.fu-berlin.de   www.animpys.biologie.fu-berlin.de/
Abstract: The target article by Byrne & Russon treats imitation as an
achievement that originates from observation. In my commentary I pro-
pose extending the database to the role of listening. Referring to current
studies on song learning in birds, I suggest that at least some features of
this accomplishment also may be based on learning by imitation.
The current advances in our understanding of learning and mem-
ory are remarkable, and different fields of science are contribut-
ing to this progress. The target article by Byrne & Russon (B&R)
certainly takes another step forward here. First, it treats a complex
topic in a manner that can stimulate fruitful interdisciplinary de-
bates about “learning by imitation.” Second, it provides a number
of criteria that can help to concentrate such debates on testable is-
sues. I really appreciate an approach that is not bound to some of
the classical definitions (Thorpe 1956) and instead goes beyond
the question “is it imitation, or not?” (Introduction, para. 4).
B&R have reviewed a lot of evidence for an impressive “rich-
ness of imitative behaviours in humans and some of the great apes”
(Introduction, para 4). I especially like the distinction between
“action-level” and “program-level” imitation. I feel a bit uncom-
fortable, however, that the authors restrict imitation to social
learning, which originates from observation. In particular, a dis-
cussion about the phenomenon of vocal imitation would have
been relevant. At least some spectacular cases of such imitation
found in parrots (Pepperberg 1993) and song birds (Hultsch 1993)
would merit explicit consideration. In the following, I will attempt
to validate my opinion by concentrating on the implications of re-
cent studies on song learning, which have changed the traditional
classification of this skill (review in Todt & Hultsch 1996).
The aim of my commentary is to evaluate whether and when
song learning can be accepted as a kind of imitation. I will com-
pare features of song learning to the three properties of imitation,
which B&R consider for the great apes: (1) novelty of acquired
patterns, (2) hierarchical organisation of learned behaviours, and
(3) biological function of application rules. We will not deal with
song learning of birds in general, focusing instead on accomplish-
ments of nightingales (Luscinia megarhynchos). This species is
renowned for its outstanding vocal virtuosity and is an appropriate
biological model for studies on learning and memory (Hultsch
1992; Hultsch & Todt 1989; Todt & Hultsch 1996). Nightingales
develop approximately 200 song-types that are discretely different
and so can be distinguished easily. Moreover, these birds are ex-
cellent subjects for investigations under laboratory conditions,
and thus meet logistic prerequisites for studies on song learning.
Their early period of auditory song acquisition begins around day
15 posthatching and continues for the first 3 months of life. In ad-
dition, birds learn later in life. This provides an extended time
span for learning experiments. Finally, nightingales will accept a
human caretaker as their social tutor, thus allowing us to stan-
dardise variables (e.g., by presenting master songs through play-
back loudspeakers). Findings from nightingales’ vocal learning
corroborate the three properties of imitation proposed by B&R.
Novelty. It has been argued that learning by imitation should
add new patterns of behaviour to an animal’s repertoire. This cri-
terion is clearly fulfilled: auditory access to particular types of
songs is an essential prerequisite for both their acquisition and
their occurrence in a nightingale’s song repertoire. Finally, the cri-
terion of novelty can be stretched further: in addition to their ac-
curate imitation of vocal patterns, nightingales often develop new
combinations from the learned vocal material (Hultsch & Todt
1989; 1996).
Hierarchy. It has been argued that learning by imitation re-
quires a hierarchically structured behavioural repertoire and that
“only species with control over the hierarchical organisation of
their behaviour can in principle imitate” (target article, sect. 2,
para. 1). With this as a criterion, nightingales should rank as mas-
ters of vocal imitation. For example, the study of their learning and
singing has unveiled two forms of hierarchy: first, there is a struc-
tural hierarchy that, in a top-down direction, is provided by a
repertoire composed of a set of subrepertoires that subdivide into
a number of packages composed of song-types, and finally song-
types composed of different types of song elements. Second, there
is a procedural hierarchy that is reflected in a system of rules that
describes the sequencing of these various patterns. The permuta-
tional freedom of such patterns is related to the structural level
they take in behavioural organisation; for example, it is higher be-
tween than within songs. At the within-song level, particular types
of elements occur only at particular song positions, whereas at a
higher level no transitional combination is excluded. However, the
procedural hierarchy of song elements can be complex, as well:
analyses have unveiled a branching of alternative choices that di-
verges at the beginning of songs but often converges again toward
the end Hultsch 1980; Todt 1970; 1971 (Fig. 1).
Features of the structural and the procedural hierarchies and
especially the impact of individual learning on their development
suggest that these hierarchies match what the target article calls
the action level and the program level. To give an example: the
major part of a nightingale’s vocalization is made up of accurate
imitations of master songs, often also mirroring the sequential suc-
cession of such models (action level). However, there are other
cases, as well. For example, nightingales are not only able to ex-
tract and memorise information from the rules of a tutor’s singing
style; they can also transfer such information and use it when or-
ganising the performance of songs that were not acquired from
that particular tutor (program level; Hultsch 1991).
Functional aspects. It has been argued that learning by imita-
tion must have an adaptive function. In birdsong, this function has
been documented, for example, for vocal interactions among ter-
ritorial neighbours. To address a particular neighbour individually,
it is essential that a nightingale will select and produce an ade-
quate song-type, and to add a particular meaning to the signal, he
must begin his vocal response within a specific interval of time
(Hultsch & Todt 1982; Todt 1981; Wolffgramm & Todt 1982).
Such behaviour is not at all stereotyped or quasi-automatic; it is
Commentary/Byrne & Russon: Learning by imitation
702 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:5
flexibly adjusted to a given context. The interactive use of songs,
thus requires highly advanced memory retrieval and well-
controlled decision mechanisms concerning what and when to
sing next. There is now evidence that the hierarchical organisation
of the nightingales’ repertoire reflects a hierarchical representa-
tion format of memorised information (Todt & Hultsch 1996).
This system probably evolved as a strategy to deal successfully
with a large repertoire of song signals (Fig. 2).
The majority of studies on song learning have focused on bird
species that develop only small vocal repertoires and have con-
centrated on biologically fundamental issues such as sensitive
phases or the role of genetic predisposition (Kroodsma & Miller
1996; Marler 1976; 1991). This explains the great number of pub-
lications on the acquisition of the species’ typical structure of song
patterns. Neurobiological research likewise suggests that basic in-
formation on these patterns might be “precoded” in a bird’s brain
(Konishi 1989; Nottebohm 1993) and that adequate auditory stim-
uli are processed by so-called experience-expectant mechanisms
(Greenough & Black 1992). In this context, one can draw the fol-
lowing conclusions: behavioural novelty (i.e., acquired song-
types), is perhaps not a reliable predictor of learning in birds. Re-
liable indicators of vocal imitation here are the learning of se-
quential rules or of information that is encoded on hierarchically
higher levels of song organisation. Data on this are currently avail-
able only for song learning in nightingales but one hopes that they
will encourage investigators to study birds that develop and use
large song repertoires and to examine which mechanisms allow
these nonprimates to show vocal imitation. The target article by
Byrne & Russon points to the issues that such inquiries would
have to tackle.
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Emulation learning and cultural learning
Michael Tomasello
Department of Psychology and Yerkes Primate Center, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322. psymt@emory.edu
Abstract: Byrne & Russon redefine the process of emulation learning as
“goal emulation” and thereby distort its most distinctive characteristic: the
criterion that the observer focuses on environmental rather than behav-
ioral processes. The two empirical examples recounted – gorilla plant pro-
cessing and orangutan manipulation of human artifacts – are hierarchically
organized behaviors, but there is very little evidence that they involve im-
itative learning, program-level or otherwise.
Perhaps the problem is that I came to these issues with an explicit
interest in cultural transmission, the prototype being human cul-
tural transmission. Human beings observe their conspecifics us-
ing artifacts – both material artifacts such as tools and symbolic ar-
tifacts such as language – to achieve some goal. On some occasions
they try to reproduce these instrumental activities. On other oc-
casions they ignore the behavior of others and use the artifact in
some creative new way, which others may then reproduce or im-
prove upon. This dialectic between faithful reproduction and cre-
ative extension produces what I have called the ratchet effect, in
which cultural traditions or artifacts accumulate modifications
over time (e.g., human shelters, as individuals modify them to
serve additional new functions over time).
It is in this theoretical context that Tomasello et al. (1987) re-
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Figure 1 (Todt). Frequency spectrograms of a nightingale song
(strophe) and (below) schematic flowchart of elements compos-
ing this song (filled cells). Vacant cells refer to alternative types of
elements that can follow the same initial element. The flowchart
illustrates a procedural hierarchy that is typical for the song struc-
ture of many birds (one-to-many schema).
Figure 2 (Todt). Illustration of hierarchical levels found in the
singing of trained birds. Songs (black balls) developed from dif-
ferent master strings are performed as members of different con-
text groups (large brackets); the size of these groups depends on
the length of the tutored strings. The number of song-type pack-
ages (large circles) that develop from a master string depends on
this length, too, whereas their sizes do not. Note: Hierarchical lev-
els below the song level (e.g., song sections, elements) are not con-
sidered here.
ported the observation that when an adult chimpanzee imple-
mented a creative tool-use strategy, young chimpanzee observers
did not seem to pick up on it. Although the young observers did
benefit from their observations, as they were more successful with
the tool than members of a control group who saw no demonstra-
tion at all, they did not adopt the novel strategies they observed,
even when those strategies were clearly (to human eyes) much
more successful than their own. Subsequently, I reviewed all the
data I could find on social learning in chimpanzees – a much
smaller amount than I had imagined – and made an explicit com-
parison to the human case (Tomasello 1990). It turned out that
when factors such as environmental shaping in the wild and stim-
ulus enhancement in the laboratory were taken into account,
there were no convincing demonstrations that chimpanzees are
capable of reproducing the novel instrumental behavior of con-
specifics.
Why then was there such marked regional variation in the way
chimpanzees used tools in the wild? And why did chimpanzees
have such a good reputation as imitators among zookeepers and
other seemingly reliable observers? What were the subjects in our
experiment learning from their observations? The then-current
explanation was a behavioristic version of local or stimulus en-
hancement in which an organism learned nothing from its obser-
vations; it was just blindly drawn to a location or object and then
blindly engaged in trial-and-error learning. I thought that some-
thing cognitively more interesting was going on, but that it did not
involve one animal reproducing the novel strategies of another.
Perhaps, I reasoned, the observers are just watching the objects
and learning something about them. It so happens that when I ob-
serve others manipulate objects I learn a lot about those objects
and their affordances for my own actions – much more than when
I observe the objects sitting idle. Thus, if we give naive chim-
panzees a rock and a nut, they may not discover on their own how
to crack the nut open. However, if they see another chimpanzee
do it, they might learn from this observation that nuts can be
opened, which creates a new possibility for them, and they might
even learn something about the rock’s role in the process.
This is what I have called emulation learning. Although emula-
tion learning is clearly a case of social learning – individuals learn
things from others that they would not have learned on their own
– it is not imitative learning in the sense that an organism is “learn-
ing to do an act from seeing it done.” Emulation learning however,
is manifestly not a process of “associative conditioning,” as Byrne
& Russon (B&R) characterize “all these simpler mechanisms” in
the first paragraph of the target article. From the beginning I
thought of emulation learning as a cognitivist’s alternative to stim-
ulus enhancement. It also is not “cognitively less complex than im-
itation” (sect. 2.7), which I have never claimed. In emulation
learning the organism learns new things, some of them quite com-
plex; it is just that they are learning about the environment, not
about behavior. (See Tomasello et al. [in press] for documentation
of ontogenetic ritualization as the major way in which chim-
panzees acquire their gestural signals – also a cognitively complex,
but not imitative, learning process.)
Nothing obscures these facts more than transforming the term
emulation learning into the term goal emulation – which corre-
sponds to nothing I have ever written or said (although it does cor-
respond to a term used by Whiten & Ham 1992). In emulation
learning the observer is not attending to the goal of the other, at
least not in the sense that the goal is something guiding another’s
behavior. We can say that the observer is attending to the end re-
sult in the environment produced by the other, which is, from the
human point of view, the behaver’s goal. However, to repeat, the
distinguishing characteristic of emulation learning, as opposed to
imitative and other forms of cultural learning (Tomasello et al.
1993), is that the observer does not attend at all to the behavior of
the other, much less to its goal. This is in marked contrast to hu-
man children, who reproduce adult tool-use strategies even when
they do not lead to a desirable goal (Nagell et al. 1993); who se-
lectively reproduce intentional over accidental actions even when
they both lead to the same goal (Carpenter et al., in press); who
produce a result that an adult intended but did not actually pro-
duce (Meltzoff 1995); and who learn linguistic symbols, whose
conventional association with their communicative functions re-
quires that they be copied relatively faithfully from the behavior
of others (Tomasello, in press). The most complete discussion of
emulation and imitative learning is in Tomasello (1996), which is
not cited in the target article.
As for B&R’s “evidence,” the two cases are weak in the extreme
(i.e., for the issue of imitative learning, not for the issue of hierar-
chical structure, which is clearly a characteristic of all mammalian
behavior). For gorillas, what we have is the observation that all of
those exposed to certain plants develop some similar, although not
identical, ways of dealing with them. My question is, what would
happen if different groups of gorillas (perhaps in zoos) were given
the same plants? My guess is that they would develop exactly the
same plant processing techniques because it is the problems pre-
sented by the plants themselves that drive the individual learning
process. The rapid learning of youngsters is probably assisted by
some form of stimuli enhancement or emulation learning, as they
observe adults touch certain parts of the plants in a certain se-
quence (and they might learn that sequence). The point is that
what we have here is an intriguing set of naturalistic observations
that have multiple plausible interpretations – just the kind of in-
tellectual quandary that scientific experimentation is designed to
address.
In the case of the orangutans, the problem is that we do not have
any of the information we need to interpret their behavior. The
entirety of the “evidence” is some unusual behaviors that some
orangutans perform with human artifacts – which they may have
learned in any number of ways, including direct training from hu-
mans, because all of these individuals were raised by humans in
one way or another before coming to the Tanjung Puting National
Park. There are also no control conditions with the artifacts to de-
termine what individuals might learn to do with them in the ab-
sence of any demonstrations at all. Many of these competing in-
terpretations could be ruled out with simple experiments in which
these individuals are exposed to novel objects in controlled
demonstrations (including some kind of stimulus enhancement
control condition), which, in at least two cases, have led to nega-
tive results in captive orangutans (Call & Tomasello 1994; 1995).
Also relevant is the fact that the majority of the most convincing
observations of Russon and Galdikas (1993), and two of the three
examples cited in the target article, come from one individual,
Supinah, an orangutan who had extensive experience of an unde-
termined nature with humans prior to any scientific observation
of her behavior (Russon, personal communication).
This last fact is important because we now know that extensive
interactions with humans can potentiate some humanlike social
and cognitive skills in great apes that their wild conspecifics do not
seem to possess (Call & Tomasello 1996; Tomasello et al. 1993).
This demonstrates that great apes can respond in some important
ways to human culture – its artifacts and unique forms of social
engagement, communication, and instruction – but it is only in-
directly relevant to the issue of cultural learning and transmission
within naturally occurring great ape populations.
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Hoist by their own petard: The constraints 
of hierarchical models
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Abstract: In the context of the motor skill literature on observational
learning and hierarchical skill structuring, Byrne & Russon’s findings call
into question their standpoint that great apes imitate the behaviour of role
models at the programme level. The authors impose a hierarchical model
on their observations without properly considering alternative explana-
tions. One such possibility, which stems from a constraints perspective that
they dismiss, is put forward.
Our major concern with Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) target article
is their a priori acceptance of a single model – a hierarchical skill
model – as a framework for their observations. Their only justifi-
cation seems to be that the organisation of the behaviour observed
is “simply not well described as linear and chain-like” (sect. 2.2,
para. 10). They dismiss potential alternatives in a rather cavalier
fashion, stating, for example, that “it is highly implausible, how-
ever, that the constraints of the environment would be so tight that
every animal would end up with the same hierarchical structure,
yet so weak that the fine details of the techniques are highly vari-
able between individuals” (sect. 2.4, para. 2). Our critique will fo-
cus first on the hierarchical model; then we will argue that B&R’s
dismissal of explanations based on the concept of constraints was
rather premature.
Hierarchical modeling. The fact that we, as external observers,
can describe and deconstruct behaviour into hierarchical units is
no guarantee that the actor organised its behaviour hierarchically
or that the behaviour was learned in a hierarchical fashion. Given
that the motor skill literature has much to say about the hierar-
chical structuring of behaviour, also in the context of observational
learning, it is surprising that B&R do not at least make reference
to it. In this literature the origin of such structuring is often viewed
in a similar way, that is, it is assumed that the lower levels of the
hierarchy are established first and serve as the basis for integra-
tion at superordinate levels. This proposed order of establishment
of such levels has been called into question, however, in at least
two studies (Kohl & Shea 1992; Pew 1966). In a replication of
Pew’s earlier experimental laboratory work, Kohl and Shea for ex-
ample, coupled observers to novice subjects required to learn a
cursor matching task. Their findings led them to conclude that a
“first-person direct perspective on sensory feedback and knowl-
edge of results was not critical for attaining open-loop and hierar-
chical control” (p. 257). Kohl and Shea claim that their data 
support the notion that subjects may choose appropriate re-
sponse/control schemes without actual practical experience, a
standpoint that was suggested earlier by Martens et al. (1976). If
this is the case, their findings might easily be subsumed under
what B&R call “priming” rather than imitation. A similar inter-
pretation might then also account for the feeding behaviour of
baby gorillas. After all, the babies, throughout their developmen-
tal period, are confronted daily with the same expert model
demonstrating appropriate response/control schemes. Having
been primed in this way, they are free to experiment – at least
within the bounds of the prevailing constraints.
Alternative explanations. In view of this critique of B&R’s in-
terpretation of the data, we will now present an alternative inter-
pretation, arguing that the concept of constraints is much more
powerful than B&R admit. A constraint on action is defined as any
reduction in the range of possible configurations of the movement
system. B&R mention environmental constraints only, but con-
straints can also originate from the task and from the animal (cf.
Newell 1986). Constraints relevant to mountain gorillas, for ex-
ample, are physiological characteristics of the teeth and gut that
constrain the choice of food; biomechanical characteristics such as
uni- and bi-manual dexterity and characteristics of specific food
that constrain food manipulation such as spines and stings; infor-
mation available from models pointing out alternative behavioural
possibilities; and ambient conditions such as season, time of day,
gravity, and so forth. From this perspective, models serve mainly
as social facilitation. They can increase the likelihood of certain be-
haviours, but they do not prescribe behaviour. In other words, they
act as informational constraints influencing what to do, but not
how to do it. The latter needs to be filled in by individual experi-
ence.
The interactions between all extant constraints determine the
possible patterns of coordination and control for an organism en-
gaged in an activity. Note, however, that the confluence of con-
straints does not necessarily limit the actor to a single solution to
a task, as B&R seem to suggest. Rather, by making certain behav-
iours impossible while influencing the efficiency and optimality of
others, interactions between constraints determine both the range
of possible solutions and the likelihood of each solution. Further-
more, constraints act more severely on behaviour at a global scale
of description than on the details at a local scale of description,
which are left relatively free. In short, the probability distribution
ensures that the behaviour of all animals is channelled toward only
a few solutions; within each of these solutions, behaviour across
different animals will cohere globally but differ locally.
Both these characteristics are consistent with the data B&R re-
port (i.e., 70–80% of the apes converge to the same global solu-
tion of preparing food), although local details vary widely between
individual animals. The 20–30% discrepancy is consistent with a
constraints perspective, but seems inexplicable from an imitation
standpoint.
What is needed to test either explanation is an analysis of the
learning process in young apes. Unfortunately, B&R do not report
any data on the learning process per se. They have analysed the
product of social learning in terms of a hierarchical structure of
goals and subgoals, but it is at the level of the learning process
where support is to be found for either a hierarchical or a con-
straints model. However, even with adult data, critical questions
arise. If separate, noninteracting groups of mountain gorillas have
the same feeding techniques, for example, would this not support
the constraints model?
Toward a microanalysis of imitative actions
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Abstract: We outline a view of imitative behaviour as largely internally 
driven and discuss, based on experimental research, the distinction be-
tween program versus action level imitation, the role of organismic con-
straints, observational learning as vicarious exploration, and imitation as
selection in speeded response paradigms.
If one compares the movement imitated with its imitation, it is the in-
tegrated movement-melody of each which stands forth as being the
common element; a photographic reproduction of the separate move-
ments involved is never found. (Koffka, 1935, p. 308 f.)
Imitative behaviour has all too often invited the equivalent of a
naive realist interpretation of perception, in the sense that an ex-
act copy of the model behaviour is expected. Like perception,
however, imitation always points to the cognitive capabilities of the
imitator as well as to the model. Thus, Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s)
anchoring of their analysis of primate imitative behaviour in the
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capacity for flexible, hierarchical action planning is a sensible
starting point for clarifying the contrasting views in current pri-
mate research. In addition to hierarchical organization, the mod-
ularity and selectivity of sensory and motor processes have be-
come major themes in neuroscience, and to capture the richness
of imitative behaviour, these phenomena, too, require considera-
tion. Also, more microanalytic (e.g., kinematic and chronometric)
approaches have come to prevail over pure observational meth-
ods, and a major goal of current imitation research is to elucidate
the interactions between the multiple sensory, representational,
and motor preparatory processes involved in imitating even such
simple actions as pointing to or grasping a glass of beer. Examples
from our research relate specifically to points made in the target
article and illustrate this approach.
Action level imitation? A close match in kinematic details be-
tween mimic and model may rely as much on structural organiza-
tion as higher (or “program”) level imitation does. Human subjects
were asked to reproduce accurately a sequence of smooth lateral
deviations of a cursor on a monitor (Vogt 1991; Whiting et al.
1992) – an apparently prototypical case for “action-level” imita-
tion. Instead of producing stereotyped sequences of increasing
length, however, subjects initially reproduced a small number of
global characteristics of the cursor movement (such as its center-
ing around a midpoint and an alternation of right- and leftward
movements) before any fixed sequence emerged. Thus, even sim-
ple pattern learning appears to involve the extraction of complex
features rather than the formation of linear associations. Primates
are simply too clever to act as videorecorders. Accordingly, rather
than contrasting program- and action-level imitation as distinct
faculties, we interpret the (limited) capacity of human primates
for near-exact copying as a consequence of their increased cogni-
tive abilities, including a specific, quantitatively and temporally
enhanced capacity to recognize and respond to the mimic and ges-
tural behaviour of their conspecifics.
Organismic constraints. Near-exact copying may in some situ-
ations rely on shared organismic constraints between model and
imitator rather than on sensory processing. Even after more than
100 reproductions of an artificially composed rhythmic pattern,
subjects systematically deviated from its isochronic temporal
structure, whereas their reproductions of a more natural, non-
isochronic pattern were nearly perfect (Vogt et al. 1988). Thus,
the use of artificial models (e.g., video animations) can help un-
cover apparently imitative behaviour resulting from shared motor
control principles.
Observational learning as vicarious exploration. Like B&R,
we were originally skeptical about observational learning as an aid
to motor skill acquisition, particularly when an exploration of the
medium of a skill (such as the mechanical properties of a racket)
is required, but a recent experiment (Vogt 1996a) has made us
more optimistic. The task involved a biphasic movement of the
pivot of a pendulum along a linear track, and mastery of this task
required precise (procedural) knowledge of the pendulum’s iner-
tia and swing duration. To our surprise, a group that observed a
skilled model for 60 trials showed improvements similar to that of
a physical practice group. Two principles may explain this ex-
ploratory effect of observational learning: internal pattern (or
event) generation and gradual correction. Observing a model need
not be limited to the “imprinting” of a perceptual template, as of-
ten assumed; it may well involve processes of internal pattern gen-
eration, thus functioning as an externally guided form of motor im-
agery (Jeannerod 1994; Vogt 1994; 1995; 1996a; 1996b). Unlike in
motor imagery, however, observers can detect divergences be-
tween their internal plan and the model, which can be used for
gradual corrections, either immediately or when preparing the
next (overt or covert) performance. Meltzoff and Moore (1994;
1997) stress that infants’ imitations are seldom perfect from the
start; moreover, infants gradually correct their imitative attempts
in a sequence of ordered steps. Adult imitation may involve an in-
ternalization of this process and thus act as a shortcut in exploring
task constraints.
Imitation as selection. For analysing the processing stages and
neural pathways involved in a particular imitative behaviour, it is
useful to identify the earliest indication of a specific response to
the model behaviour under various display conditions. We are cur-
rently investigating the imitation of simple object-oriented hand
actions. Data from one pilot study indicate that kinematic re-
sponses to shifts in the direction of a model’s hand grasping one of
three objects are as fast as responses to shifts of the target object’s
location (see Paulignan et al. 1991). Note that in such speeded re-
sponse tasks the model display is mainly used as a way to select
one of a (normally small) set of possible actions. Whereas B&R
prefer to exclude such selective, instantly model-guided behav-
iour from imitative phenomena, we see no reason to do so a pri-
ori. To conceptualize imitation as selection in such tasks seems to
imply a very small number of visually addressable dimensions of
control. Accordingly, this view would become increasingly unten-
able if imitation extended beyond the instructed task dimension
(location in our study) and incorporated other task dimensions
such as grip aperture or speed and height of transport. Exactly
such instant multi-dimensional visual addressing of motor control
seems to be largely absent in speeded imitation tasks, and subjects’
copying is reduced to the essential.
In summary, the enormous flexibility of unconstrained primate
imitative behaviour appears to emerge from a variety of individu-
ally addressable visuomotor channels, or modules, which most
likely involve a complex network of parietal, temporal, and frontal
cortical areas (Carey et al., 1997). A detailed investigation of this
neural substrate requires a suitable “taxonomy” of imitative be-
haviour based on experimental research, in which the hierarchical
level of imitation represents only one of a possibly large number
of relevant dimensions.
Indices of program-level comprehension
Stephen C. Want and Paul L. Harris
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Abstract: Byrne & Russon suggest that the production of action by pri-
mates is hierarchically organised. We assess the evidence for hierarchical
structure in the comprehension of action by primates. Focusing on work
with human children we evaluate several possible indices of program-level
comprehension.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) argue that apes, like human children, are
capable of program-level imitation. This type of imitation involves
an appreciation of the way in which the hierarchical organisation
of the model’s action realises its goal. We expand on an important
implication of their argument.
Following the arguments advanced by Miller et al. (1960), we
assume that human beings engage in hierarchically organised,
planned action. These arguments are likely to extend to the great
apes. The more contentious issue, in our eyes, is whether young
primates can perceive and comprehend the hierarchical structure
in the planned activities of an adult so as to reproduce it when they
themselves act. In this commentary, we assess evidence for such
program-level comprehension. We focus primarily on research
with human children.
Weak indices. One criterion for attributing program-level com-
prehension is the tendency to omit those details of an observed ac-
tion that serve no functional purpose. However, the evidence for
such a tendency among young children is questionable. Young
children have often been found to persist in replicating such de-
tails, even when their nonfunctionality has been made clear
(Whiten et al. 1996). Furthermore, this criterion may sometimes
yield false negatives, in that there may be some utility to copying
all the details of demonstrations, either because they are not fully
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understood (Call & Tomasello 1995) or for some social purpose
(Kuczynski et al. 1987).
A second possible criterion for program-level comprehension is
outcome-guided encoding of a given action. When human tod-
dlers watch and imitate the movement of an agent, they encode it
in terms of the outcome it is likely to bring about, even in the ab-
sence of the actual realisation of that outcome (Meltzoff 1995b).
Similarly, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) showed that when 2-year-
olds watch an adult engage in a pretend goal-directed action (e.g.,
lifting an empty teapot and tilting it in a “pouring” gesture), they
encode its pretend outcome. They describe the action as “pour-
ing” (rather than “lifting”) and indicate the outcome (i.e., that tea
would “wet” the surface below). Nonetheless, such outcome-
guided encoding need not amount to program-level comprehen-
sion. In particular, the toddler need not appreciate how an over-
arching goal (e.g., pouring tea) motivates the attainment of various
subgoals (e.g., grasping the teapot). The toddler need simply un-
derstand how an action late in the sequence (tilting the teapot)
normally leads to a given outcome (pouring the liquid).
A third possible criterion for attributing program-level com-
prehension is the ability to watch two sequentially coordinated ac-
tions and either reproduce them in the correct order or exhibit an
understanding of the way that the outcome of the first action
causally enables the second (Harris et al. 1996). Such actions,
however, may be simply encoded not as a hierarchical program but
as a linear sequence of action–outcome pairs. These might then
be combined hierarchically only in the subsequent production of
any imitative action. Hence this criterion for program-level com-
prehension is also questionable.
Strong indices. A more convincing criterion is the ability to
overlook and not reproduce temporary interruptions to an ongo-
ing program. Such selective imitation suggests that the observer
has intelligently grasped the goal (or subgoal) of that behaviour
and distinguishes actions that serve to realise that goal from the
nonfunctional interruptions (Premack & Dasser 1991).
Finally, we may consider a still stronger criterion: cases in which
an observer not only ignores a temporary interruption to an on-
going program but benefits from witnessing that interruption. Ev-
idence for such a benefit has come from our own research (Want
& Harris 1997). Children were given a task in which an object
must, through the use of a stick, be pushed out of a horizontal tube
that has a trap located along its length. To retrieve the object with-
out trapping it, the stick must be inserted into the correct end of
the tube. Three-year-old children saw one of two demonstrations.
They saw either (1) a successful retrieval or (2) an initial, incorrect
insertion, followed by successful retrieval. Demonstration (2) led
to significantly more successful retrievals than demonstration (1).
Moreover, the 3-year-olds who saw demonstration (2) succeeded
without reproducing the initial, incorrect insertion. A linear en-
coding would have led them to treat the initial failed action as a
precondition for successful retrieval. The implication is that the
children understood the observed program in terms of its goal and
reproduced only those behaviours that led effectively to its
achievement. In future research, it will be informative to compare
children and nonhuman primates with respect to this strong
criterion.
How imitators represent the imitated: 
The vital experiments
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Abstract: Byrne & Russon rightly draw attention to complex and ne-
glected aspects of ape imitation. However, program-level imitation as a
single, absolute category may mislead us in understanding abstractions in-
volved in imitation. Designing the right experiments will offer clarity. One
recent experiment has shown imitation of sequential structure: What is
needed to test other components of what the authors propose?
Byrne & Russon (B&R’s) thoughtful, ethologically grounded
analyses make an important case that some natural but complex
aspects of imitation have been thus far neglected by researchers.
Some of their propositions have much potential, but I think that
the way they have tried to specify program-level imitation (PLI)
needs re-thinking, perhaps severe pruning, to make it usefully
confirmable or refutable.
B&R define PLI as copying (1) no details; (2) bimanual coordi-
nation; (3) a sequence of stages; and (4) subroutine structure (sect.
2.4). As they express it, all four are necessary. I will argue that
defining PLI as subroutine structure alone would be clearer as the
core of what interests B&R. Consider the four criteria in turn.
1. Lack of detail in copying. The notion that imitation can oc-
cur without copying detail is acceptable, although not new
(Whiten & Ham 1992, pp. 250–51). The same is true of the pos-
sible assimilation of “emulation” to this schematic conception of
imitation: “[E]mulation as described by Tomasello could be re-
described as just imitation of the final act in a goal-directed se-
quence” [e.g.,] “rake in food” (Whiten & Ham 1992, pp. 251, 267).
However, as Whiten and Custance (1996, pp. 304–309) have
pointed out, all imitation has this schematic character, so identify-
ing the program level on this basis becomes impossible. When we
find only some detail copied, do we reject PLI? Or will B&R say
that wherever some detail is not copied, we have a case of PLI?
This inherently slippery criterion appears unworkable.
Switching between criteria makes for further uncertainty about
when PLI will be claimed. Sometimes PLI is where just one (high-
ish) level of a hierarchical description is supposed to be copied (as
in Table 1), appealing to criterion 1, with criterion 4 ignored; at
other times, criterion 4 is emphasised – but in that case copying
must involve several levels of a hierarchy. These two senses of PLI
seem contradictory: better to focus on 4, jettisoning the unwork-
able 1. Whether detail is, or is not, copied can be a separate ques-
tion.
2. Copying bimanual coordination. Surely a one-handed per-
son will not be incapable of the core of PLI as B&R envisage it?
Bimanual coordination scarcely figures in the orangutan case
studies. I suggest dropping this criterion also.
3. Copying a sequence of stages. Unlike criterion 1, this can
be framed as a testable hypothesis, which is also interesting be-
cause it begins to probe how imitators represent what they copy.
So now let us consider practical identification. In the mountain go-
rilla case, statistical data discriminating social versus individual
learning hypotheses for generating optimal feeding sequences are
not yet available (see Tomasello & Call 1997, Table 9.2). The im-
portant question is, how could such data ever be obtained? Turn-
ing to the orangutans, however compelling the evidence for imi-
tation of human acts such as fanning, the evidence for sequencing
them indicates the exact opposite! Figure 7 does not portray an
imitated program but an array of unsequenced (playful?) combi-
nations. The textual description likewise bears no resemblance to
the putative model sequence of human fire-making. Other cases
in which only one order is possible do not test whether orangutans
copy sequences (Whiten 1998).
Imitation of sequential structure can be tested. “Artificial fruits”
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were designed by Whiten and Custance in 1990 to examine imi-
tation of sequentially patterned actions, although because of the
subjects’ age and doubts about primate imitation, we simplified
the task initially (Whiten et al. 1996). More recently, chimpanzees
witnessed several defences used to get an edible core, but they
were removed in different sequences as well as by different tech-
niques (Whiten 1998). Statistically significant copying of se-
quences emerged, which meets criterion 3, but not 4, so it is still
not PLI. Whiten and Custance (1996) suggested calling it simply
sequence imitation. This is not the same as acquiring only an ac-
tion-string. We have not yet tested this, but it would be surpris-
ing if our subjects could not complete a fruit-opening sequence
presented half-done (perhaps using rules such as those in B&R’s
Fig. 4).
The Whiten and Custance (1996) study cited by B&R distin-
guished two quite different approaches that one can take to such
experiments, using either arbitrarily structured sequences or log-
ically necessary ones (pp. 311–12). There is not the space to re-
hearse the distinction here, but it may help to clarify PLI’s content
and identifiability to learn whether B&R’s theoretical position re-
garding PLI as copying “logical sequences” leads them to favour
the second approach. It seems to have inherent drawbacks.
4. Copying hierarchical/subgoal structure. We are left with
what seems to be the core of B&R’s idea and the most interest-
ing of the four criteria: How shall we identify this in practice?
B&R suggest criteria for recognising hierarchical organisation
(although Fig. 4 seems a clutch of SrR rules, with no subgoals
mentioned), but they give no criteria for identifying such hierar-
chical organisation as is copied, which should be the crux of their
effort. If an experimental paradigm can be envisaged that does
this – goes beyond sequence imitation – then the practical crite-
ria B&R need to determine may be clearer. PLI is perhaps an un-
fortunate label for it, however, because the focus is not on a level
(recall discussion of criterion 1): it would really be “hierarchy im-
itation.”
Following conventions in B&R’s Figure 2, my Figure 1 shows
the hierarchy that chimpanzees in my experiment might have ac-
quired. Chimpanzees who witnessed the removal sequence far-
bolt/near-bolt/pin/handle tended to adopt this: Were they per-
haps acquiring by observation the hierarchical scheme of Figure
1, or just that sequence of removals? One could present a differ-
ent model with no hierarchical “nesting” of bolts; for example, far-
bolt/pin/handle/near-bolt. However, if the subject “hierarchicizes”
and removes the bolts together, it will not be imitating what it saw!
Therefore, I am uncertain how PLI as B&R fully define it (four
criteria) is verifiable or refutable. This may become clearer it if is
stripped down to criterion 4 and framed experimentally, as I sug-
gest. It is worth resolving this, because I think that in our com-
plementary efforts lies the key to uncovering how imitators rep-
resent what they imitate.
Insufficient support for either response
“priming” or “program-level imitation”
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Abstract: Byrne & Russon propose that priming can account for the imi-
tation of simple actions, but they fail to explain how the behavior of an-
other can prime the observer’s own behavior. They also propose that imi-
tation of complex skills requires a sequence of acts tied together by a
program, but they fail to rule out the role of trial-and-error learning and
perceptual/motivational mechanisms in such task acquisition.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) present a novel analysis of the acquisition
of complex skills through imitation. Their ideas concerning the re-
lation between “action-level imitation” (which involves learning
about the sequencing of otherwise learned basic motor responses)
may have heuristic value. However, B&R fail to provide an ade-
quate account of recent findings of true imitative learning, and in
their presentation of evidence for program-level imitation, they
fail to control for less cognitive alternative accounts that have con-
cerned researchers since Thorpe (1963; see, e.g., Galef 1988;
Whiten & Ham 1992; Zentall 1996).
First, B&R assume that most cases of imitation and other so-
cial influence by animals (especially nonprimates) are actually
examples of “priming.” They suggest that what has been referred
to as stimulus enhancement is an example of stimulus priming.
What has been called goal emulation or affordance is an exam-
ple of goal (or outcome) priming. Furthermore, what has been
thought to be evidence of true imitation can be explained as re-
sponse priming.
According to B&R, all that is needed for response priming “is
the existence of structures in memory corresponding to the facil-
itated actions” (sect. 1.4, para. 4). If such structures of behavior
exist, the observation of a demonstrator performing that behavior
is sufficient to activate those structures. The authors do not iden-
tify the nature and origins of those hypothesized structures, how-
ever; nor do they explain the means by which the structures me-
diate the relation between the (visually) observed behavior of the
demonstrator and the quite differently sensed (primarily proprio-
ceptive) behavior of the observer. For example, we have shown,
using the two-action method, that Japanese quail (Akins & Zentall
1996) and pigeons (Zentall et al. 1996) will peck at a treadle rather
than step on it when treadle pecking is demonstrated (by a con-
specific), and they will step on the treadle rather than peck it when
treadle stepping is demonstrated. Are there existing structures for
each possible response? How is it that treadle pecking by a con-
specific activates the same structure as treadle pecking by oneself?
For imitation to occur, a common structure must represent both
behaviors. How do quail “understand” the relation between the
beak of a conspecific and the observer’s own beak (which must
look quite different from that of the demonstrator)? What kind of
simple memory structure or response prime can provide such cor-
respondence?
B&R then propose that the imitation of (complex) skills is dif-
ferent from simple imitation and is acquired through the ordering
of relations among larger, hierarchical units (or subroutines). Al-
though they might be right about this, the authors have not at-
tempted to rule out simpler processes, including trial-and-error
learning and other possible nonimitational accounts (e.g., Zentall
1996), that are based on observation-produced changes in the ob-
server’s state of motivation and perception/attention (e.g., what
B&R refer to as stimulus priming).
B&R do indicate that if an action appears radically different in
form when viewed from the perspective of demonstrator versus
performer, then priming cannot account for the results (sect. 1.4,
para. 5), but they fail to apply this criterion to either two-action
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Figure 1 (Whiten). Structure of one method of artificial fruit
opening, following format of Figure 2 in target article.
method research of the type reported by Akins and Zentall (1996)
or program-level research of the type they report here.
In B&R’s description of gorillas preparing the leaves of plants
for eating, given that mountain gorillas are motivated to eat the
leaves, and given that details of the manual actions are learned
through trial and error (as suggested by the authors), why is it not
possible that the sequence of actions that lead to the goal are also
acquired by trial and error? The authors indicate that “given the
very large number of possible sequences in which 6–10 different
subprocesses could be combined, this standardization is remark-
able.” They do admit that “many of the sequences that are theo-
retically possible do not succeed in processing the food,” so these
sequences can be rejected; but they also suggest that plenty of
them do succeed (sect. 2.4, para. 2). B&R fail to consider, how-
ever, that the particular sequence of movements arrived at by the
demonstrator may be the one that is most efficient (in the sense
of net energy gain) and that any gorilla might arrive at the same
sequence of actions or a similar one by trial and error (i.e., by sys-
tematically rejecting sequences that require more relative energy
expenditure). I would not argue that the gorillas (or the orang-
utans in later examples) do learn these complex behaviors by trial
and error, but only that such learning is possible and must be con-
trolled if learning by imitation is to be claimed. Furthermore, re-
searchers who examine the acquisition of such complex behavior
must also control for the kind of motivational and perceptual
(priming) mechanisms that might facilitate (or perhaps modulate)
acquisition in the absence of imitation. The distinction between
program-level and action-level imitation may yet prove to be use-
ful, but at this point B&R lack the empirical support to claim that
these behaviors are truly imitative in nature. Furthermore, they
lack the theoretical and methodological justification for classifying
as “simple priming” findings of true imitative learning (i.e., re-
sulting from the appropriate use of the two-action method) that
do control for alternative accounts.
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Abstract: Imitation research has been hindered by (1) overly mo-
lecular analyses of behaviour that ignore hierarchical structure,
and (2) attempts to disqualify observational evidence. Program-
level imitation is one of a range of cognitive skills for scheduling
efficient novel behaviour, in particular, enabling an individual to
purloin the organization of another’s behaviour for its own. To do
so, the individual must perceive the underlying hierarchical
schedule of the fluid action it observes and must understand the
local functions of subroutines within the overall goal-directed
process. Action-level imitation, copying strings of actions linearly
without any such understanding, is less valuable for acquiring
complex behaviour and may often have other, social functions. At
present, we lack a mechanistic understanding of the abilities un-
derlying program-level imitation that make it possible for the un-
derlying structure of complex actions to be dissected visually and
recreated in behaviour.
R1. Kinds of imitation
Imitation means many things to many people. Our target
article mentions only a few meanings and is focussed on
only one of them: the ability to learn a new skill by watch-
ing someone. This form of imitation has been singled out
repeatedly for its cognitive implications; it offers a power-
ful means of learning and has been touted as one of those
abilities that separates animal from human mentality. Much
imitation in our daily lives is not of this kind, and may be
subserved by different cognitive apparatus – the pivotal dis-
tinction we made. At its broadest, imitation may only imply
a congruence by design in behaviour between two individ-
uals, at the same time or one after the other. Colman is re-
ferring to this sense of imitation. His use of game theory is
appropriate for understanding behavioural congruence,
but it contributes nothing to our understanding of how an
individual learns a new organization of behaviour, which is
our aim here. Similarly, Roitblat is using imitation in a
much broader way than we are, to include all socially aided
behaviour matching, so that he finds we “dismiss” imitation
in a wide range of species.
Adult humans often choose to copy actions that they
themselves can already perform; many motivations other
than skill-learning affect the distribution of copying. We are
interested in these motivations inasmuch as they reveal
function, and thus hint at evolutionary origins; Jorion,
however, is entirely concerned with why an individual
chooses to do one thing rather than another. We cannot
quarrel with his answer – to increase satisfaction – but can-
not see what this contributes to understanding the cogni-
tive mechanisms of imitation. Similarly concerned with
when an individual might imitate, Miklósi believes that im-
itation may occur particularly in play. This may be so, but
play does not thereby “explain” the function of imitation nor
its cognitive mechanisms, the issue that we set out to dis-
cuss. More to the point, we might ask what functions play
serves, and suggest (e.g., Russon 1996) that imitative learn-
ing of skills is an important one.
As Vogt & Carey point out, it is important to distinguish
imitative phenomena in terms of the cognitive processes
that underlie them. Distinctions are commonly effected by
terminology; it is probably unfortunate that “imitation” has
been among the terms used to affect these distinctions be-
cause it has become a war zone for disputes over who owns
the word and what it means. Perhaps because of this nam-
ing morass, several commentators appear to have misun-
derstood the fact that our discussion concerns only phe-
nomena with specific cognitive features. Fishbein,
Heimann, and Vogt & Carey, for example, take imitation
to include a broad range of phenomena, although they ap-
preciate that varied cognitive mechanisms underpin them,
and Midford uses imitation in a non-technical sense.
Some classes of copying are legitimate targets of discus-
sion because we raised them peripherally. One of them is
neonatal imitation. Heimann suggests that it may be me-
diated subcortically, by different processes than the “ma-
ture imitation” that develops later in childhood. We suspect
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that this is so, but also accept his arguments for mechanisms
more complex than contagion: substantial delay can inter-
vene, and the young infant “builds up” gradually over trials
to a more complete copy of the demonstrated facial gesture.
One explanation for neonatal imitation that is certainly
ruled out is response facilitation, priming of brain records
of actions matching the demonstrated ones. Because the
actions are facial gestures, there is no overlap in features be-
tween the visual experience of another’s face and the pro-
prioceptive experience of making a facial gesture oneself.
When there is some overlap, as in the case of a bird seeing
another peck grain and then pecking grain itself, we cannot
so readily rule out response facilitation. Both Zentall and
Gardner & Heyes disagree, arguing that the experience
of seeing the target action performed would be very differ-
ent for the birds (quail, pigeons, budgerigars) from that of
doing it themselves in those experiments that have claimed
imitation. Given the undeniable overlap in perceptual fea-
tures in the two cases, however, we remain unconvinced
that a bird cannot generalize between them.
We reiterate that for imitation that supports learning, es-
pecially skilled instrumental behaviour, it is important for
the demonstration of imitation in animals that the copy be
a novel organization of behaviour. For this reason we reject
the two-action method as diagnostic of imitation in these
cases. (In the special use of this method by Heyes & Daw-
son [1990], in which the action is either left or right, and an
observer watches from in front of the demonstrator, our ob-
jection is not – as Gardner & Heyes seem to imagine –
that priming can account for their rat data, which it cannot,
but that the effect is an artifact of another problem; see
Byrne & Tomasello 1995.) Huber takes us to task for in-
sisting on novelty, arguing that it is a difficult criterion to ap-
ply in practice, because it requires extensive knowledge of
the individual’s past history and will be helped by luck.
These cannot be strong objections, for species that have
been studied extensively and never seen to perform a par-
ticular behaviour; in our view, it argues for insisting on good
ethology as a prelude to making cognitive claims, not for a
monopoly of laboratory experimentation. We nonetheless
admire the meticulous analysis of data from marmosets
shown one of two techniques performed on an “artificial
fruit” puzzle box (Bugnyar & Huber 1997). We emphasize,
however, that in these data it was the copying of sequences
of action that imply some sort of imitation, not the two-ac-
tion methodology that the apparatus enshrines. Sequence
is an important aspect of program-level imitation, and
Bugnyar and Huber show that the spontaneous production
of some of these sequences would have been highly im-
probable. We doubt there is an essential disagreement
here, because presumably the researchers would have
been even happier if the sequences they recorded had zero
probability in spontaneous behaviour. Hayne notes that be-
havioural novelty and copying of zero-probability behav-
iours are now also the “accepted hallmark” in studies of im-
itation in human infants.
Having again set aside some of the issues about imitation
that we are not concerned with here, we can now return to
the central issue we raised: Is our conceptualization of im-
itation in a framework of hierarchical cognition useful to re-
searchers whose starting points differ from our own but
who are nevertheless struggling to understand complex be-
haviour? In our view, this is the cardinal test – the “proof of
the pudding” – of whether our target article has con-
tributed significantly to the issue of understanding imita-
tion as a cognitive phenomenon.
R2. The proof of the pudding
R2.1. From child development. Several researchers un-
derstand and support our approach, contributing their own
useful observations. Want & Harris, for example, see
straightaway that the crucial point is not that behaviour is
hierarchical (Tomasello apparently misinterprets us as
making this obvious point as a new claim), but “whether
young primates can perceive and comprehend the hierar-
chical structure in the planned activities of an adult” (our
emphasis). Exactly. Program-level imitation implies an
ability to notice the organization of another’s behaviour,
and is thus closely related to planning and thought. We
agree with Want & Harris’s analysis of various diagnostics
of program-level imitation. Omission of nonfunctional de-
tails is a weak indicator, because there may be reasons for
not replicating them (social ones, or because their function
is not grasped) even when the logical organization of the
central process is understood. Imitating the outcome of an
action, even an uncompleted attempt, though highly sug-
gestive of understanding, may be triggered by association
of an action late in a (familiar) sequence with the usual
endpoint, without comprehension of behavioural struc-
ture. Finally, copying of the demonstrated sequence of ac-
tions may not be based on any understanding of their ac-
tual hierarchical organization, as Bauer’s and Whiten’s
comments illustrate. If an individual has understood the
structure of behaviour and its organization toward attain-
ing a goal, they should – as Want & Harris note – be able
to ignore interruptions, and to reproduce only the causally
related sequence. This stronger criterion has yet to be met
unequivocally in any animal study (but see Russon, in
press), but they present their own elegant demonstration
in children, in which an interruption actually benefits imi-
tative learning. In our work, interruptability has also been
crucial to distinguishing hierarchy that is accessible and
modifiable by an individual from a hierarchy that is crys-
tallized and rigid (the latter is present in all complex be-
haviour, but is not relevant to program-level imitation). In
deriving the minimal hierarchy for gorilla manual skills, in-
terruptions for optional processes and for iterative “test-
operate-test-exit” (TOTE) processes were used (Byrne &
Byrne 1993). Midford challenges the latter, on the basis
that iterative loops occur in invertebrate behaviour – as
we, and many other commentators, were well aware. But
the behavioural organizations of gorilla techniques are
learned, and we can see no way in which a TOTE loop can
be learned unless it can be handled computationally as a
discrete organizational structure. In brief, Midford misun-
derstands us as advocating TOTE loops as evidence of vol-
untary control in a hierarchical context, whereas we advo-
cated them as evidence of hierarchical control in a
voluntary context.
Hayne similarly shows quick understanding of our ap-
proach, realizing that it allows that imitation “may not be an
all-or-none phenomenon, varying instead along a contin-
uum.” Fishbein likewise recognizes the continuum possi-
bility, as established by Piaget’s work, although both he and
Response/Byrne & Russon: Learning by imitation
710 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1998) 21:5
Gardner & Heyes mistake our intention as advocating
firm splitting of imitation into “two varieties.” Hayne and
Fishbein both interpret the data from human infants as de-
veloping from the highly constrained mimicry of neonates
to more flexible, context-sensitive imitation that shows un-
derstanding of other individual’s goals, with program-level
imitation occurring late in this progression. We agree, and
are delighted that developmental psychologists who work
with infants find that our distinctions jibe with their own.
We are only surprised that Hayne thinks we are somehow
against an experimental approach per se. (She calls it “em-
pirical,” but the carefully recorded observations of sponta-
neous behaviour made by ethologists are also empirical; see
R3.) Not at all. Our gripe is with inappropriate conceptual-
izations of imitation that have given rise to simplistic ex-
periments, leading to premature and somewhat self-
fulfilled claims of failure to imitate in the artificial condi-
tions of some laboratories.
Gattis et al. work with 4-year-old children, and likewise
find useful our distinction between action-level limitation,
which may be driven by kinaesthetic-visual matching, and
the complex, hierarchically organized cognitive processes
that govern program-level imitation: useful for focusing at-
tention on how imitation occurs rather than what is or is
not imitation, and in particular for highlighting how an un-
derstanding of goal structure facilitates “the conversion
from other-schema to self-schema” and “the construction
of complex actions from several parts.” These were indeed
major aims for us, and we are much intrigued by their
multi-goal tasks, which they suggest reveal an under-
standing of hierarchical structure better than multi-stage
tasks; we look forward to seeing more work with this novel
technique. (We would point out, however, that they use
“hierarchical” in the sense of goals selected before other,
subordinate ones, whereas we use it in the sense of a con-
trol structure of behaviour, organized toward a single
goal.)
R2.2. From cognitive psychology. In studying reasoning
and problem-solving, Cummins reports that researchers
have independently converged on conclusions closely sim-
ilar to ours. Like us, she starts from the position that intel-
ligent imitation requires “noticing and reproducing the goal
structures that define a solution to a problem,” and “the ca-
pacity to reflect on one’s mental representations to reorga-
nize and manipulate them.” Primed records, as she notes,
merely lead to direct action, and hence shed no light on
these questions. (As an aside, it was interesting to learn
from Chen et al. that in social psychology, an idea very sim-
ilar to response facilitation, the “perception-behaviour
link,” is found widely useful in accounting for matching of
social behaviour, stereotype activation, and postural con-
gruence to the extent of “chamaeleon-like” mimicry in
some social contexts. But their suggestion that priming ex-
planations can extend to program-level imitation misses the
derivation of new behavioural structures, which it was our
central purpose to explain.) Tellingly, Cummins notes that
the oddity of intelligent mechanisms being – so far – more
evident in ape food processing and laundry pilfering than in
direct tests of false belief and imitation, is matched by sim-
ilar oddities in human reasoning that continue to perplex
researchers, and have led to a proliferation of theories of
domain-specific abilities for humans. Like us, she is con-
vinced that “the capacity to form hierarchically embedded
mental representations is emerging in a variety of litera-
tures as a crucial cognitive function.”
R2.3. From human neuropsychology. It is clear from sev-
eral commentaries that our ideas resonate with neuropsy-
chological data. Vogt & Carey support our emphasis on hi-
erarchical organization, though they point out that there
may be other important dimensions of variation. More
specifically, Motomura interprets action-level limitation as
parietally mediated, and program-level imitation, more
complex and related to intelligence, as requiring frontal
lobe involvement. Decety & Grèzes take this analysis fur-
ther, using data from PET scans recorded during the per-
ception and imitation of various hand actions, which could
be familiar and meaningful, or novel and meaningless to the
subjects. When no imitation was required, the perception
of meaningful actions (allowing response facilitation by
priming) activated a series of left ventral sites; for novel ac-
tions, bilateral dorsal sites were activated, along with the
cerebellum. When the aim was to imitate, a common net-
work of (bilateral) sites was activated whether the hand
movements were meaningful or not. These involved cere-
bellum and a dorsal stream, often identified with “vision for
action,” which Decety & Grèzes interpret as supporting our
analysis of action-level imitation subserved by kinaesthetic-
visual matching. However, at the same time, some frontal
sites were activated, raising the possibility of some hierar-
chical organization (unless the frontal involvement was an
artifact of the sequential task instructions). Our suggestion
that imitation of familiar movement patterns was separate
in evolution and in its underlying mechanism was based on
empirical patterns of data, not theoretical necessity; all im-
itation might, in principle, be hierarchical (i.e., program-
level) and only the depth of embedding would then vary. As
Decety & Grèzes modestly note, it is not straightforward to
relate PET data to cognitive theories, partly because of the
inevitable task constraints involved when obtaining brain
scans; the method does offer a fascinating sidelight on the
organization of cognitive processes, however, and we await
with interest further developments in technique that may
increase integration between the two fields.
R2.4. From cetacean biology. Perhaps the most extraordi-
nary convergence in findings to emerge from the peer com-
mentary comes from the study of dolphins. Experimental
psychology has traditionally tended to dismiss apparent dif-
ferences in cognitive ability among animals as differences
in motivation, sensory mechanism, or motor capacity and
effector organs. Dolphins have always been a thorn in the
side for advocates of this tidy position, because according to
them, they ought to be among the least likely mammals to
show any cognitive skills! In this vein, Kuczaj et al. con-
tribute their own compelling data on dolphin imitation. Not
only do they find cases of action-level imitation (like that
recorded by Taylor & Saayman 1973), but also what they
consider simple program-level imitation. After observing a
human use a simple tool to release food, dolphins copied
the principle – but having no hands, they used different
motor actions. Kuczaj et al. fully realize that program-level
imitation implies an ability to understand the relations be-
tween specific actions and outcomes, and they share our
own suspicions that, although program-level imitation does
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not itself imply an ability for insightful forward planning,
the two skills are reliant on many of the same cognitive
structures and may in practice go together.
R2.5. From birdsong learning. We restricted our focus to
the imitation of motor actions, as it is commonly believed
that vocal imitation is unlikely to be mediated by similar
processes (e.g., Galef 1988). Todt partly supports this, not-
ing that the processes of acquisition of small repertoires of
species-typical songs may well have little to do with the sort
of imitation we discuss. Indeed, the ability of parrots and
mynah birds to copy the formant structure of human
speech, despite their total lack of a supralaryngeal tract to
modify the carrier sound-wave by resonance, appears to fit
the definition of emulation better than any mammalian ex-
ample (Byrne 1995): copying the end result with precision
by the use of different and idiosyncratic methods. But not
all birdsong is alike, evidently. Todt’s fascinating account of
the structural organization in element sequencing in
nightingale songs, and the nightingale’s ability to learn an
organization from a song tutor but then apply this organi-
zation to a new song, suggests that program-level imitation
may be an important dimension of birdsong learning, after
all. [See also Baker & Cunningham: “The Biology of Bird-
Song Dialects” BBS 8(1) 1985; Johnston: “Developmental
Explanation and the Ontogeny of Birdsong” BBS 11(4)
1988.]
R3. Is imitation observable?
It is with a feeling of some bathos that we return to the
question that, in the target article, we firmly attempted to
get away from: Is what we see in gorillas/orangutans imita-
tion, or not? The target article was not about whether we
had seen imitation; we said this explicitly, did not invite fur-
ther discussion of this already much argued issue, and di-
rected interested readers to our original articles for the
cases we made for these incidents as imitation (few appar-
ently did so). That so many comparative psychologists chose
to base their comments mainly on the is/is not question is
an indication of its domination of this field, a domination
that we have already argued is unfortunate. (We could not
disagree more with Roitblat’s assertion that this is the “pri-
mary issue in imitation research.”)
It must seem odd to those who agree with our view of im-
itation and note that we came to it by observing the spon-
taneous behaviour of great apes, that so many people seri-
ously doubt the value of our observations (among others:
Bauer, Gardner & Heyes, Hayne, Jorion, Matheson &
Fragaszy, Tomasello, Vereijken & Whiting, Zentall).
Most of the doubting Thomases try to subsume program-
level imitation into some other category – the “nothing but”
approach. These alternatives are the products of specula-
tion, with hardly a shred of honest evidence to lend them
credibility, and, as Roitblat points out, the processes pro-
moted as better alternatives are not themselves well estab-
lished.
The point, we believe, is that many of these people doubt
the value of any non-experimental observations to furnish
anything beyond ideas for “scientific testing” (which to
them means controlled experimentation, preferably in the
laboratory). Among those who hold this view, the sugges-
tion that systematic ethological observation of behaviour is
science, and can refute hypotheses as readily as experi-
ments can, is not understood, and dismissed. To them, “ex-
perimental” means science, and “observational” means old-
fashioned natural history, which may be valuable in
exploring a problem but is to be replaced as soon as possi-
ble by science (experiments). Coming into psychology with
backgrounds in the physical sciences, we have both always
found this strange if not actively pernicious, and suppose it
is a legacy of psychology’s early striving to establish itself as
a real science by copying, ineptly, established sciences. In
physics, astronomy, and geology, to name a few, observa-
tions play roles that are equal to if not greater than experi-
ments in testing theories. Perhaps most famously this cen-
tury, the observation of the perihelion of mercury in a solar
eclipse tested Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. The
foundations of classical physics are also built on observa-
tion: Newton did not use billiard balls to test his laws of mo-
tion, as we might do in a school classroom; he used careful
observations of planetary orbitals – a far more stringent test
than any experiment he could do in a laboratory.
Once this peculiar ban is in place, observational data are
dismissed as “anecdotal,” making any experiment better!
This, despite psychologists’s own definition of anecdote as
referring to isolated incidents, observed only because their
unusual nature attracted attention, and reported to re-
searchers second-hand (Washburn 1926); in psychology,
the term is so pejorative that it is used to relegate evidence
to the trashbin. (Anecdote in its dictionary definition de-
notes only a narrative.) Some laboratory psychologists go so
far as to dismiss hundreds of hours of systematically sam-
pled, focal animal observations as “anecdotal.” This is bad
scholarship. Even ad lib data, as unplanned observations
are called in ethology, go beyond anecdotes; although
weaker than any other sort for theory testing, they remain
crucial for the study of rare events such as infanticide. As
de Waal points out, the consequence in animal cognition
research is that great store has been placed in experiments
far divorced from situations of real social and motivational
significance, in which animal species are expected to com-
prehend people mysteriously manipulating puzzle boxes or
wearing paper bags over their heads. Not surprisingly, the
experimental results have been disappointing. We join his
plea for converging evidence from naturalistic settings.
Whether this evidence is observational or experimental
should depend on appropriateness, not on a priori con-
tempt for some kinds of evidence.
Some criticisms of our data are worth considering in
more detail, even though the question of whether our data
“proved” imitation was not germane to the target article.
(We do believe it is an important empirical issue, but not
one that can be decided by pronouncements of long-
experienced workers. Miklósi, Mitchell, and Huber in-
voke such opinions as to whether great apes imitate actions,
and as it happens the opinions are opposite.)
Vereijken & Whiting and de Waal suggest that imita-
tion in mountain gorillas would be more convincing if dif-
ferent subpopulations were found to use techniques for a
single plant species with different program organizations.
This is true, but we suspect it is unreasonable to hope for in
mountain gorillas. Consider an imaginary species that can
imitate the program-level of manual skills, and that as a di-
rect result has social traditions of the technique – different
in each subpopulation – for eating a certain plant. Over
time, any subpopulation that uses a less efficient technique
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is liable to be invaded by the tradition for a more efficient
one when an individual transfers from another subpopula-
tion, or when individual variation from within the subpop-
ulation allows discovery of an improvement. Inefficient
techniques make unstable social traditions. (The analogy
with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in evolutionary theory
will be obvious.) Observing long-established traditions, it
would be surprising to find anything other than all subpop-
ulations with the same traditions. Thus, finding similar
techniques across subpopulations does not argue against
tradition mediated by imitation in favour of individual dis-
covery mediated by trial-and-error learning. (The only
cases of population-specific variants of a technique we
know of occur in chimpanzees, but in these cases, there is
virtually no possibility of knowledge transfer by immigra-
tion.)
Fishbein suggests that we should take more heed of Pia-
get’s developmental work on imitation (e.g., as a broad con-
tinuum spanning action-level, program-level, and beyond).
Indeed, the conceptual framework for imitation developed
by Piaget and revised by his successors is one of the two
main lines of thought that lead to our ideas, as we pointed
out in section 2.5. The other evolved from a melting pot of
thinking in the 1950s about computation, thought as a me-
chanical process, and simulation of behaviour. We of course
suggest that the harmonious convergence of these two lines
of thought is a sign of an underlying truth! Expanding the
developmental framework made little sense in this target
article because we were not in a position to make a solid de-
velopmental case for great ape imitation. Fishbein’s com-
ments are nonetheless useful in underscoring the critical
differences in cognitive processing that probably underlie
phenomena that other commentators have advocated
lumping under one rubric – imitation – and lend support
to our attempt to split, rather than lump, these phenomena.
We do agree with Fishbein and several others (Mitchell,
Vereijken & Whiting), that developmental evidence and
perspectives would strengthen our case. Unfortunately, fac-
tors beyond our control (including the genocide in Rwanda)
make it impossible to obtain in these cases.
The obvious criticism of mountain gorilla imitation of
plant-eating techniques is that individual discovery by trial
and error is a possible alternative. Environmental con-
straints mean that there is a “most efficient” method, po-
tentially discoverable by trial and error. We have often
pointed this out ourselves and several commentators have
joined in (Bauer,1 Matheson & Fragaszy, Vereijken &
Whiting, Zentall). We will not rehash the problems with
this hypothesis, which are discussed in the target article,
and suggest instead that any sceptic take a few nonpsychol-
ogist friends to a nettle patch next summer. Once there, ask
them how they could most quickly accumulate bundles of
leaves, small enough to be ingested without touching the
lips, with minimal stinging of hands or mouth. We predict
that they will not discover the method used by gorillas,
though they –like our critics – will with hindsight be able
to see that this is a more efficient method, when it is de-
scribed to them. This is not an unfair comparison: infant go-
rillas handle nettles warily and infrequently, with evident
dislike and visible signs of pain, yet by weaning at 3.5 years
of age all have learnt the technique and show adult levels of
efficiency. Unlike the pigeons that impress Chen et al.,
conducting thousands of trials of exploration learning is
simply not a realistic option for them.
With respect to the question of explaining skill acquisi-
tion without invoking complex mechanisms, we note that
Roitblat is highly sceptical of some of the theoretical un-
derpinnings of associative learning, which – from our less
informed viewpoint – we had considered merely limited in
power. He considers that there is no reason to accept stim-
ulus enhancement as an explanation, because it is not an es-
tablished phenomenon that has ever been studied in its own
right. In complete contrast, Gardner & Heyes believe the
labels so important that we should not have elided stimulus
enhancement with observational conditioning. Our point
was that a priming explanation can easily encompass both
alleged phenomena, depending on only a minor change of
rule (see Byrne 1994). Gardner & Heyes’s observation that
human subjects are not “rewarded” when they show prim-
ing effects in verbally based experiments is neither here nor
there: subjects do not need their attention explicitly drawn
to the computer screen in front of them and the words on
it; they are asked and often paid to watch it. By contrast, an
animal in the wild may well be more likely to notice a con-
specific if it is gaining reward or suffering pain.
Criticisms of the orangutan imitations are different. It is
true that their behaviour is not simply a result of program-
level imitation, as Midford and Matheson & Fragaszy
note – it also involves creative planning, modification of ex-
isting programs, and action-level imitation. This is one rea-
son that sequential order of subgoals varies at times be-
tween the orangutan’s attempt and the human original,
making analysis more difficult, as noted by Mitchell. It is
also one of the reasons that imitation is important in the
study of cognition: just as blatant plagiarism can reveal the
organizational structure of a written product, so the mixture
of mechanisms underlying orangutan behaviour can sug-
gest how imitative and problem-solving processes are com-
bined in acquisition. (Mitchell states that all these things
are already “well known” in humans and great apes, but this
must be a personal sense of knowledge, or the controversy
would not still be raging.) Matheson & Fragaszy, however,
conclude that this mixing means that only emulation need
be invoked, in the sense of “adopting another’s goal” and
understanding “that a stick could be used as a rake.” We re-
iterate: using an object in a certain way to achieve a certain
result, is not merely “a goal,” it is also the distinct behaviour
program, often one of several, that is used to achieve that
goal. In Tomasello’s experiments, for example, observers
not only achieved the outcome demonstrated – food within
reach – they also adopted the novel behavioural strategy
demonstrated – they raked it. Raking is not the inevitable
product of the affordances of the object provided: it is of
course one of them (otherwise, this object could not func-
tion as a rake), but it is only one of several. As we noted,
when great apes have tackled this task independently, they
have tended to respond to other affordances (poke, tap,
throw) rather than to rake. Tomasello’s apes did not know
how to rake on baseline tests but did rake following demon-
stration: they did imitate the particular program they ob-
served, raking food with the tool provided. All they missed
were details of style.
The question of emulation ties in with general issues of
goals in behaviour. Jorion was one of the few to contest our
imputing goals to great ape behaviour; most joined us in ac-
cepting the massive body of evidence showing that great
apes have goals and design their behaviour to achieve them.
Goals are also inherent to organizing behaviour hierarchi-
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cally, which entails subordinating some processes to the ser-
vice of others, thus turning superordinate processes into
goals the actor intends to achieve via the subordinated ones
(Connolly & Dalgleish 1989; Connolly & Manoel 1991).
Simple hierarchies with their attendant simple goals are ev-
ident in the behaviour of human infants as young as 4
months of age (e.g., Bruner 1970; Case 1985). Complex hi-
erarchies are often constructed by decomposing a final goal
into a set of subgoals that are more directly attainable via
the behavioural programs the actor has at its disposal; our
examples of orangutan and gorilla program-level imitation
conform to this pattern. Relevant to emulation is the oper-
ational aspect of hierarchical behaviour: the means of at-
taining the goal, the behavioural strategies for solving the
intervening problems encountered. In problem solving, 
intentional (goal/outcome) and operational (behavioural
strategy) aspects are like two sides of a coin, different but
tied together.
Because outcomes and the operations that achieve them
are so fundamentally intertwined in problem solving, we
are doubtful of the slick ascription of emulation/imitation
labels when skilled instrumental behaviour is concerned.
The confounding factor is evident in Tomasello’s comment
that chimpanzees might learn from observing that “nuts can
be opened.” Opening is a behavioural strategy, one of many
that nuts “afford” (others include squashing, throwing, or
cooking), albeit one whose enactment can vary in its details.
To take behaviour out of that observation, to strictly isolate
features of the environment from the operations that cre-
ate them, would require saying something like “nuts have
stuff inside them; there’s a rock nearby.” Compare this to
“nuts can be opened with a rock,” which provides observers
with very different information. Tomasello does argue that
observation extracts information about dynamic properties
of objects; but to our minds, dynamic affordances are tied
to behaviour – without behaviour, objects are likely to be
idle. It is a moot point whether watching a rock fall on and
crack open a nut that is fortuitously positioned on an anvil-
like rock would inspire nut-cracking, not to mention
whether it could even happen.
Tomasello is wrong in thinking that we lack histories for
the orangutan subjects or specific controls for imitation.
Camp Leakey was unusual in the extensive background in-
formation available. A number of the staff had worked with
the rehabilitants on a regular basis for 5–7 years, one for 15
years, and Galdikas for more than 20 years. Obviously, nei-
ther field staff nor field researchers tracked the orangutans
100% of the time – but it should be recalled that neither do
experimenters. Like field researchers, experimenters leave
for conferences, take vacations, and go home overnight; like
field staff, animal technicians take breaks, lower their vigi-
lance, covertly indulge in prohibited activities with their
apes, and overlook, misinterpret, or forget to note impor-
tant behaviours. The prevailing notion that captive condi-
tions always provide thorough, detailed histories and field
conditions never do is a stereotype best abandoned in
favour of balanced appraisals of what research conditions
afford. Neither is it true that we used no specific controls
for imitation; our controls were observational (knowledge-
based) rather than experimental (procedural), but proce-
dural controls merely manufacture knowledge that can be
available from other sources – through the literature,
knowledgeable staff, and concurrent events. We controlled
for the same factors as experimenters when assessing the
processes underlying copying behaviour X: that X had never
been acquired independently by other orangutans, that X
was not known but was rapidly acquired post demonstration
by the orangutan observer, and that opportunities were not
available to acquire X experientially or via simpler social
learning processes (Russon 1996). We note that de Waal
accepts our arguments: that the actions these orangutans
engaged in were firmly prohibited at the time, and unlikely
ever to have been encouraged (and were certainly not “re-
warded” by human laughter, as imagined by Jorion).
If de Waal is right that the human “enculturation” some-
times thought to enhance cognition in great apes is actually
a matter of inducing the animals to identify or sympathize
with humans, in the sense of believing they are humans, or
simply allowing them to establish the sorts of interpersonal
relationships that foster imitation (Mitchell 1993; Russon &
Galdikas 1995), these rare individuals are indeed the very
best subjects for investigating imitation. Only they would be
very likely to want to copy human actions.
R4. Rewriting history
Among those who dispute that the great ape behaviour was
imitation at all, opinions vary as to whether this means our
approach is invalid or unnecessary, or whether it is never-
theless worthwhile, despite its shaky foundations. A few of
those who recognize some truth in our approach attempt to
imply that they had gotten there already, quite indepen-
dently. This is strongly at variance with our experiences over
the last few years, so we devote a little time to examining
the claims.
Tomasello disputes our treatment of emulation, object-
ing that we consider a cognitively simple mechanism, prim-
ing, able to account for “emulation,” a phenomenon he pro-
moted as a distinct pseudo-imitative process (Tomasello
1990) – renamed “goal emulation” by Whiten and Ham
(1992). In fact, he also objects to their renaming, com-
plaining that their term “corresponds to nothing I have ever
written or said,” and that “from the beginning” he consid-
ered emulation to be a cognitive phenomenon, not less
complex than imitation, just different: one in which the ob-
server will “learn a lot about objects and their affordances.”
Whiten and Ham are guilty of “transforming” the term into
goal emulation, implying that the observer animal is “at-
tending to the goal of the other”; we are guilty of following
their false trail.
Before we consider whether these attributions are cor-
rect, let us be clear that we do agree that learning the af-
fordances of an object – what it can be used for, what ma-
nipulations it allows, what can be done with it, and so on –
by merely watching another individual interact with the ob-
ject, would be a cognitively complex process, one that could
not possibly be accounted for by any simple mechanism like
priming. Indeed, it is not obvious to us what mechanisms
could account for it, short of mentally simulating the ef-
fects of actions on objects and thus deriving novel conse-
quences without actual experimentation. This would be
very exciting, if it were within the capability of non-human
great apes, and we would expect it to relate to other excit-
ing abilities, such as program-level imitation and planning.
Observational affordance learning, however, has not been
clearly demonstrated in any experiment because imitation,
poorly executed, remains a possible alternative explanation
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in all cases – as we showed in the target article. We should
not of course treat observational affordance learning as a
“null hypothesis” in this case, because it is no less complex
or inherently improbable than imitation as an explanation.
Is this what Tomasello originally described as emula-
tion? Not in our reading of the literature. Introducing the
term, he stated that “a focus on the demonstrator’s goal may
lead the observer to be attracted to and seek to attain the
goal. The observer may then attempt to ‘emulate’ the
demonstrator’s behaviour, that is, to reproduce the com-
pleted goal by whatever means it may devise” (Tomasello
1990). Whiten and Ham did not need to transform his term
to goal emulation, for that was what it already was. Of
course, we did not interpret them or Tomasello as meaning
that the observer could “attend to the goal of the other,” in
the sense of seeing their mental state. Observers can attend
to results, and may consequently set goals for themselves
that resemble those results. We argue that this process of
“goal emulation” can be explained as a priming effect. This
also allows the sort of unification of several superficially dis-
parate mechanisms that Roitblat laments as lacking. We
deliberately used Whiten and Ham’s term to avoid the am-
biguities that have crept into the term emulation.
Tomasello suggests also that emulation can account for
learning a sequence of actions as part of a complex task
(here he presumably means sensu goal emulation, because
an action sequence is certainly not an affordance of any ob-
ject). This is stretching the meaning unreasonably and is not
helpful. Visible intermediate results may help in learning a
sequence of actions, but when the sequence is acquired by
observation, this cannot be dismissed as a matter of learn-
ing a goal or an affordance: It is a kind of imitation, and
specifically, an important component of program-level lim-
itation.
For this reason, we are interested in Whiten’s new evi-
dence of observational learning of a sequence of actions in
chimpanzees, and we agree with him that this work is com-
plementary to our observational fieldwork. However, the
“artificial fruit” that Custance and Whiten first designed in
1990 (Custance 1994) possesses only two independent
stages, and so is not particularly well adapted to the study
of sequence learning; rather, it enshrines a version of the
well-known two-action procedure (Dawson & Foss 1965).
Over the next six years, their puzzle box was set to numer-
ous nonhuman primates. Only in 1997 was sequence learn-
ing finally tested with it – with immediate dividends (see
our comments on Bugnyar & Huber’s 1997 work in sect. R1,
as well). During this time, we put in some effort to convince
scientists of the importance of sequence learning in com-
plex imitation (Byrne 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; Byrne
& Byrne 1991; 1993; Russon 1996; Russon & Galdikas
1993; 1994; 1995) and find it hard to believe that this had
no effect, though none has been acknowledged. (It may
even be that Custance & Whiten’s interest in “imitation of
sequentially patterned actions” in 1990 was piqued by the
first enthusiastic accounts of sequential complexity in
Rwandan gorilla food processing one of us brought back to
their department in January of that year.) Our belief is that
if this paradigm – design of tasks explicitly to model aspects
of adaptive complexity documented in field studies – were
followed deliberately and openly, the field would move for-
ward with more dispatch.
Some commentators appear to disagree with our ap-
proach, yet on closer examination their alternatives differ
mainly in semantics. Thus Bauer suggests, apparently as an
alternative to program-level imitation, that a young gorilla
can observe and imitate “the goal state of the causal se-
quence, the intermediate steps along the path, and thus the
means of achieving the goal.” Just so, and this is very much
what we are suggesting, and have called program-level imi-
tation: the ability to notice, and thus to copy, the structure
underlying another individual’s behaviour. Midford prefers
to call it “observation-assisted planning,” presumably to em-
phasize that the effect of observation is to create efficient
new plans. But remember, the way in which observations
drove planning was by providing a display of behaviour
achieving desired results, one that was quarried for useful
organizations that were then copied in new plans. The point
is how the process works, not how it is labelled, and we seem
to be talking about the same thing, because Midford ac-
knowledges that gorillas “may have learned an appropriate
decomposition of the overall goal into subgoals and a valid
ordering of the subgoals” by observation: a fine summary of
program-level imitation. We agree fully with his wish to con-
centrate on the important types of information that can be
learnt by observation: subgoals, orderings of goals, and
(rather beyond the scope of our target article) affordances.
R5. Distinguishing program-level 
from action-level imitation
We believe it will remain important to keep the distinctions
we have made clear. Whiten makes heavy weather of our
definition of program-level imitation. The reason we fo-
cussed on cases of imitation that lack detail is a pragmatic
one: if the copy is perfect in every detail, it is difficult to rule
out action-level copying. Of course, a “failure to copy de-
tail” is not a postive feature of program-level imitation,
which is about the ability to see organizational structure in
other individuals’ behaviour, and hence to copy it, not about
selective blindness to details.
As we stressed in the target article, it is only our working
hypothesis that human imitation is in fact a chimera of abil-
ities with two evolutionary functions: relatively low-level
copying with a social function, and relatively high-level
copying with a skill-acquisition function. Vogt & Carey in-
terpret the lack of evidence for action-level imitation in
nonhuman primates as resulting from their increased cog-
nitive abilities: “primates are simply too clever to act as
video recorders.” In contrast, Huber suggests that the sort
of slavish copying associated with action-level imitation
may, in cases where an observer lacks the necessary infor-
mation or cognitive capacity to form an understanding of
causal structure of a task, be a useful thing to do (he invokes
the idea of movement imitation in animals, although we are
puzzled that he considers it “well proven”). Mitchell also
suggests an important role for action-level imitation in skill
learning, as a way of finding out what actions are for. We
agree with these points (Russon 1996). It is not always clear,
however, that copying of detail is action-level imitation.
Vogt and Carey’s human subjects showed sensitivity to 
program-level aspects even when attempting to copy ap-
parently simple motor movements, and merely watching
such actions produced learning.
In fact we found considerable confusion about what con-
stitutes an “action,” and this led to confusion about action-
level imitation. Mitchell attributes a child’s copying of new
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words to action-level imitation. This cannot be right, be-
cause as we argued in section 3 of the target article, the
articulatory gestures that produce the sound are invisible to
an observer, the pitch register is shifted in the child’s imita-
tion, and words are organized combinations of phonemes,
all showing a (program-level) understanding of the internal
structure of words. Similarly, Matheson & Fragaszy use
“action” in ways counter to our distinctions, referring to
orangutans’ “action units,” a term we never used, and to the
washing sequence as an “action unit.” In our sense, the
washing sequence is absolutely not an action – as a se-
quence, it obviously constitutes a multitude of actions (e.g.,
simple motor acts like grasp, hold, or squeeze an object), as
well as subprograms for manipulating object-object rela-
tionships (e.g., rub soap on cloth, wring water out of cloth).
And in Matheson & Fragaszy’s example, an animal showing
similar use to another of “pick,” “peel,” “chew,” and “swal-
low,” we can see no grounds for claiming program-level im-
itation when – apart from anything else – the actions are
apparently normal ones in any primate’s repertoire. To re-
iterate, we reserved the term action to mean a more basic
level unit of behaviour; programs are organized combina-
tions of actions.
Action-level imitation may not be altogether useless for
skill-learning, but we remain convinced that program-level
is the normal and most effective mode for using imitation
in learning manual skills, and that this is its evolutionary
function. In contrast, the child’s powerful tendency to copy
adults, apparently for the sheer pleasure of copying, stands
in need of different explanation and currently appears to be
weaker in nonhumans.
Matheson & Fragaszy feel that we blur the heuristic
value of the distinction by categorizing relational manipu-
lations as program-level. In introducing relational manipu-
lations, we were addressing their major concern: how to op-
erationalize the distinction between action-level and
program-level imitation. We looked to the literature on hu-
man cognitive development for clues, and found that pro-
grams for manipulating physical relations are prominent
among the simplest hierarchical programs young children
build (e.g., Case 1985). For this reason, we offered rela-
tional manipulations as appropriate candidates for detect-
ing program-level imitation in mature great apes. However,
if new cognitive structures are generated by shuffling and
repackaging whatever old ones there are in hand, and if an
individual is capable of operating at several hierarchical lev-
els, then new cognitive structures that advance a skill could
occur at any of the levels at which the individual functions,
depending on where novel challenges occur. Which pro-
grams and subprograms are “novel” and which are “old” will
also change with time and individual experience. For these
reasons, we believe that there is no fixed or general level of
analysis appropriate for identifying program-level imita-
tion: it is probably species-dependent and in some species,
it can be highly individualized. This puts the onus on re-
searchers to assess thoroughly each species and, in great
apes, each subject prior to imitative testing; for great apes,
they may well need to customize imitation tasks to individ-
ual competencies.
The relation of sequence to program-level imitation, a
frequently raised issue (Todt, Tomasello, Whiten), is sub-
tle and worth careful attention. Scheduling is a central is-
sue in hierarchically organized behaviour, program-level
imitation included, but scheduling is not synonymous with
sequencing and strict sequence is not a defining feature of
hierarchical organization. A strict sequence is, after all, ar-
guably the product of simple associative chaining mecha-
nisms. Scheduling does include sequencing because, al-
though hierarchical cognitive structures are nonlinear,
turning them into action requires translating them into the
more linear patterns dictated by time, and they may involve
logical or causal operations that entail a particular sequence
of enactment. These constraints may not, however, strictly
determine one order in which behaviour components must
occur. Anyone who has struggled with computer program-
ming will recognize that establishing the order of opera-
tions includes sorting out which operations must be tightly
sequenced and which can be more flexibly placed. This sort
of semiflexible, or partly open, sequential structure is prob-
ably a cardinal feature of skilled instrumental action (Con-
nolly & Manoel 1991): without the flexibility to adjust to lo-
cal constraints, the behaviour risks being ineffective.
This has implications for those who suggest using se-
quence as a test for program-level imitation. That sequenc-
ing differences occur between demonstration and copy
does not per se nullify the occurrence of program-level im-
itation. Some “sequence errors” can occur as a consequence
of the observer’s imprecise encoding of a relational opera-
tion demonstrated (and/with vs. before/after) rather than a
failure to encode it. Other “sequence errors” can reflect the
fact that in the context of skilled instrumental behaviour, a
demonstrated program may not require some subsets of op-
erations to be strictly sequenced. Our observational data do
not afford all the analysis necessary to sort out these various
possibilities. Experimenters can obviously devise “clean”
tasks with respect to scheduling and the basis for sequenc-
ing; but they will have to become mindful of the diversity
of bases for sequence in their demonstrations, what devia-
tions from that sequence maintain the structure of the
demonstrated solution, and what deviations may reflect im-
precise rather than failed encoding of the demonstrated
program schedule.
R6. Imitation without intentionality?
Mac Aogáin takes us to task for relying on a “backdrop of
free-floating intelligence” to interpret the mental struc-
tures we propose, apparently because the actions that most
concern us are not mere movements, but done to bring
about particular, desired results (e.g., picking out a green
stem). We are indeed concerned with mental processes that
set goals, embed them in other goals, work for their
achievement, and recognize when they have been achieved.
(Whether this is sensibly called “free-floating intelligence”
we are less sure: ever since Newell et al. [1958] demon-
strated that a machine algorithm can solve problems by
handling organizations of goals and subgoals like a human,
goal structures have surely been a proper topic of psychol-
ogy.) Mac Aogáin suggests, however, that in our analysis of
some great ape behaviours as hierarchical, program-level
imitation means we have taken an “intentional stance,”
when we could – and should – have taken a stance that al-
lowed no intentions, no “attitudes.” He is then puzzled that
we are ready to consider that program-level imitation may
not be “mysterious”; but in fact our aims are already much
closer to those he recommends to us. Unlike Tomasello
(1990), for example, we do not accept that imitation is nec-
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essarily deeply intentional, and we do not consider the fact
that in program-level imitation hierarchical structures of
behaviour need to be decoded means that the decoder has
insight into “goals in the head.”
This may seem slightly paradoxical, so let us spell out
more explicitly what we mean by the “understanding” of be-
haviour that takes place in program-level imitation. A fluid
stream of behaviour must first be parsed into a string of dis-
crete elements, and groupings of these elements. The pars-
ing must “carve at the joints,” and the acid test of success
here is whether the parsed elements and grouping recur
and correlate with outcomes. Behaviour parsed inappro-
priately results in garble, in the sense that elements and
groupings of elements remain unrelated or inconsistently
related to outcomes, and descriptions of reality are im-
mensely complicated. If the “right” parsing is made, pat-
terns will recur and reality will seem simpler. Once this re-
sult is achieved, the system doing the parsing is in a position
to ascribe “consequences” (based on the outcomes that usu-
ally follow them), and “preconditions” (based on the states
that always precede them). If the parsing system is
equipped by evolution to strive toward certain recognisable
outcomes, it will be able to recruit elements and groupings
of elements that it has decoded from others’ behaviour in
those cases where their consequences and preconditions
match the outcomes it “desires” and the reality it currently
perceives. If it also has the capacity to handle some degree
of recursion in achieving the preconditions, then hierarchi-
cal structures will be constructed, some matching those ob-
served in the behaviour of models, as well as others
“planned” on the basis of experience. In other words, it will
be able to build novel hierarchical structures of behaviour
by observation, showing program-level imitation. At no
point has this account ascribed to our “parsing system” any
ability to understand another individual’s desires or beliefs.
We suspect that we are in essential agreement with Mac
Aogáin in wanting to do away with unnecessary mentalism,
and in particular with seeing less need for it in the case of
imitation than has often been asserted.
R7. Removing obstacles 
to interdisciplinary progress
Our goal at the outset was one of unification, and by this
light we believe there is much room for optimism. The con-
vergence in theoretical perspective and data – with devel-
opmental psychology, the psychology of reasoning and
thinking, neuroscience and brain imaging, and the differing
perspectives of researchers studying birdsong and dolphins
– suggest to us that the description we offered in the target
article is fundamentally right. But then, we would say that,
wouldn’t we? And problems remain.
What we have discussed as a distinction between action-
level and program-level imitation is at the very heart of one
problem we see as blocking advances in the study of non-
human behaviour: failure to see the forest for the trees, fail-
ure to consider the organizational structure of behaviour
rather than its surface form. Tradition has directed re-
searchers to focus on molecular patterns of behaviour to the
extent that they fail to recognize behavioural structures, try
to reduce them to simple phenomena, or try to dismiss
them as nonbehavioural. Signs of this tendency permeate
the comments we received here. Some failed to recognize
behavioural programs, like raking or opening, as behaviour.
Some treated behavioural programs as simple actions even
though they are demonstrably organized programs of sev-
eral more atomic behavioural components (the probable
reason here is that these programs operate, at skilled levels,
as integrated units and have been named with single
“words” e.g., cooking, opening). Others passed over the be-
havioural programs to focus on local behavioural detail
(e.g., individual failures to light a fire versus the overall fire-
making program of combining four key elements) or on se-
quential but not other organizational features (e.g., mis-
matching the sequence of operations demonstrated versus
matching combinatorial patterns and allowing for schedul-
ing flexibilities), as if accounting for some detail sufficed to
account for the larger picture. If our distinction has any im-
pact on shifting attention to the organizational features of
behaviour, we will consider our job well done.
A second obstacle in the way of progress is experimental
psychology’s prejudice against observational data, which we
have suggested may reflect its insecurity as a science, be-
cause it is a prejudice not shared by the physical sciences.
Ethology, meanwhile, has developed a tough-minded
methodology for obtaining reliable data in ecologically valid
circumstances (Altmann 1974; Martin & Bateson 1986). It
is high time psychology took a little more notice of these de-
velopments, and paid less homage to paradigms that have
“evolved” only in laboratories and now share few features
with the real world.
NOTE
1. Bauer find arbitrariness convincing of imitation in the ac-
tions orangutans copy, and notes the lack of it in gorilla actions;
however, any such imitation is action-level.
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